Study Guide (Part II) to Thomas Aquinas
Treatise on Human Actsfrom Summa Theologiae I-II, qq. 10-21
included in Saint Thomas Aquinas
Treatise on Happiness translated by John A. Oesterle
(University of Notre Dame Press, 1983)Instructor: Dr. Garrett
See study questions 1-3 and the explanation of notation given at the beginning of the Study Guide for Thomas on Happiness. Last revised date: August 22, 2005
See also, as needed, the Glossary for Thomas Aquinas S. T. qq. 1-21.
For the Study Guide for qq. 6-9, see Study Guide (Part I) for Thomas on Human Acts,
Question X - The Manner in Which the Will Is Moved
Article 1 46. What objects do we naturally will according to Thomas? (One of them is a universal object of the will; two others are objects of other human faculties.) (a. 1, R)
Article 2 47. Does T hold that the will is necessarily moved by its object? (Is a particular human being who is a bit hungry necessarily moved to pick a ripe pear belonging to somebody else and eat it?)
48. What object necessarily moves the will? (a. 2, R) What is characteristic of objects that do not necessarily move the will? (a. 2, R)
Article 3 49. In what two ways can a person be influenced by passion (a. 3, R)
50. Is it sometimes possible for the will to will not to desire what appears pleasant when the "movement of concupiscence" arises? (r. 1)
51. In what two ways can reason be affected by passion? In which case does reason remain free? (r. 2)
52. Is it possible to be moved to action without being influenced by the passion of sense desire or concupiscence? (How does Thomas think this works?) (r. 3)
Article 4 53. How does Thomas argue for the view that God does not move the human will (with respect to particular objects) by necessity? (a. 4, R)
Question XI - Enjoyment
54. What does T tell us about his concept of enjoyment? (a. 1, R) Note: for Thomas "appetitive power" relates to a faculty of desire, which can be bound with the senses (sense appetite) or not.
55. How does enjoyment relate to the relatively and absolutely ultimate ends? (a. 3, R)
56. When is an end possessed imperfectly? (a. 4, R) In what two ways may the rest (i.e., tranquility) of the will be prevented? (r. 2)
Question XII - Intention
57. What does the word "intention" indicate? To whom or what does intention primarily and principally belong? Why is it properly an act of will? (a. 1, R)
58. Can one also intend a means to an end? Explain. (a. 2)
Note how in a. 3 "On the contrary" Thomas says that nature occasionally intends two uses for one instrument (in this case the bodily organ of the tongue). Note how this approach could be used to undermine arguments against sexual practices not aimed at reproduction on the grounds that they are contrary to the (single) purpose nature intends for sexual organs.
59. How does Thomas show that humans can intended more than one thing at a time, even if one of them is not intended as a means to another? (a. 3, R)
60. Why does Thomas deny that there is intention in the proper sense in nonhuman animals? (a. 5) Does this denial of intention to animals hold up given modern research into primate behavior?
Question XIII - Choice
61. In what way is choice a mixture of will and reason? Which of the two contributes form, and which contributes the matter of choice? (a. 1, R)
Aquinas answers this question by assuming that one of the powers is superior to the other and that the superior of the two contributes form while the inferior contributes matter. We are a long way away from the concreteness of the original Aristotelian examples of matter and form, like clay and pattern imposed by the potter's art.
62. Why does Thomas deny that nonhuman animals engage in choice? (a. 2, R)
63. How does Thomas defend Aristotle's distinction between willing (or wishing for) the end and choosing the means? What does it mean to say that the end is a like a principle? (a. 3, R) Explain the claim that the proper ends of the virtues can be means? (a. 3, r. 1)
64. An employer apparently chooses an employee. How would Thomas explain this event so as to preserve his view that choice is primarily about human acts rather than things or other persons? (a. 4, R and r. 3)
65. Given that one may wish for (=will, in one sense) what is impossible, why does Thomas maintain that choice is only about what is possible (for the moral agent)? (a. 5, R)
66. Why does Thomas say (a. 5, r.1) that the will is midway between the intellect and external activity? (What is the function of intellect here?)
67. What is the logic behind the objector's view that people choose with necessity? (a. 6, o.1-o.2) How does Thomas try to refute the objector's arguments? (a. 6, R and r.1-r.2)
Question XIV - Deliberation
68. Why does Thomas regard deliberation as an inquiry? (a. 1) hold that deliberation concerns the means only? (a.2) hold that deliberation is only about what we do? (a. 3) How does he reply to the o. 4 in a. 3?
69. Why does Thomas agree with Gregory of Nyssa that there is no deliberation about what is done by science or art? (a. 5)
70. Why does Thomas claim deliberation proceeds by way of resolution? (a. 5) See the Thomas Aquinas' glossary entries for resolution and composition.
71. Why does he claim that deliberation is "finite at both ends"? (a. 6, R)
Question XV - Consent
72. Why does Thomas hold that consent is an act of the appetitive power (faculty)? (a. 1) that it is not found in irrational animals? (a. 2) that consent is about the means rather than the end? (a.3) and that it comes from the superior part of the soul (will as an aspect of reason)? (a. 4)
Question XVI - Use
73. How does Thomas seem to understand "use"? (a.1 ff.) its relationship to the ultimate end? (a. 3) to choice? (a. 4)
Question XVIII - Goodness and Malice of Human Acts in General
74. How are good and evil related to fullness and lack? (a. 1, R) How does Thomas apply this approach to human beings and to human acts? (a 1, R)
75. In what way does the good or evil of an act depend upon its object? (a. 2, R) (The object of an act is not its actual result but how the intended result is understood.)
76. Do "circumstances" make an act good or bad, according to Thomas? Why or why not? (a. 3, R)
77. Does the end of action make it good or evil? Explain. What four aspects of human action can make an act good or bad, depending on what they are? (a. 4, R)
78. What two species of action is Thomas discussing? (a.5, R) To what genus, i.e., larger class, do they belong? (cf. a. 4, p. 165) Why do conjugal and adulterous acts fall into different species? (a. 5, r. 2 but see also R and the other replies)
79. What two objects are distinguished in a. 6, R? How is it possible for what seems to be a single act (viewed as a whole) to combine a single act of one type and several acts of another?
80. Can an act be indifferent according to its species, i.e., as an act of a particular physical type? Explain. (a. 8, R)
81. Thomas seems to think that all individual human acts are either good or bad and not indifferent. (a 9, R) How can he defend this? Note how he distinguishes human acts from other acts done by humans. (ibid.)
82. How does reason make a moral act good or bad? (a. 10) Relate circumstance to the form of an act.
83. Does a quantitative change in the circumstances of an action automatically change its (moral) species? (a. 11, R)
Question XIX - Goodness and Malice of the Interior Act of the Will
84. What does Aquinas mean when he says that the goodness of the will depends upon the object? (a. 1, esp. replies 1 and 3). Note that the will always apprehends its object as good but that only when it is in accord with (right) reason is this object a real good. Note also that "per se differences" seems to mean essential differences, i.e., differences that make the act of the will good or bad.
Note that in a. 2, o. 3 and r. 3, "excuses malice of the will" means something like "eliminates the basis for blaming the will"; "excuses malice" might suggest that the will has already been judged evil.
85. How does Thomas defend his claim that the goodness of the will depends upon its being subject to reason? (a. 3, on contrary, R, and r. 1) When Thomas speaks (r. 1) of the good under the aspect of the true, he seems to mean an object judged to be truly good rather than a merely apparent one. Note how that this gives reason a key role in directing the will.
86. Thomas recognizes that conscience (a function of reason) can be mistaken. Is the will necessarily good when it follows mistaken conscience (erring reason)? (a. 6) Is the will sometimes evil when it disobeys mistaken conscience? (a. 5) Explain Thomas' view. See the examples in a. 6, R.
87. What role does the intention of the end play in determining the goodness of the will? (a. 7)
88. Explain Thomas' view that the will's goodness depends upon its conformity to the divine will? (a. 9)
89. How does the question in a. 10 differ from the question in a. 9? Explain Thomas' answer to the question in a. 10. (Note that Thomas distinguishes various cases of what we might call the scope of the act-whether it is related to the family (private domestic good), the society (common good), or the universe-and uses this distinction to evaluate various wills.)
90. How would Thomas answer a religious Universalist who held that God, being good, would never will that people be subject to damnation? (a. 10, r. 2 and o. 2) In fact, the 19th century Universalists started out holding that God would not send people to eternal damnation, which Thomas does not explicitly discuss here.
Question XX - Goodness and Malice of External Human Acts
91. Is good or evil found in the will's act first or in the external act? Explain. (a. 1, R)
92. Is having a good end sufficient to make the act of the will good? Explain. (a. 2)
93. When is the good of an external act the same as the good of the corresponding interior act? (a. 3)
94. How can modification of external acts increase the goodness (or evil) of an interior act? (a. 4)
95. How does Thomas respond to the question in a. 5?
96. In what sense must a single act be either good or bad but not both? In what sense may an act be good and bad from a moral point of view? (a.6)
Question XXI - What Follows upon Human Acts by Reason of their Being Good or Evil
97. How does Thomas define sin (moral wrong)? What is its relationship to evil? (a. 1, R)
98. In voluntary actions, what is the relationship between sinfulness and evil? (a. 1, R)
99. Relate praiseworthiness and blameworthiness to good and evil in voluntary acts. (a. 2)
100. Explain Thomas' notion of recompense. What twofold merit or demerit arises in consequence of good or bad acts? (a. 3)
101. How does Thomas try to prove that human acts have merit or demerit in relation to God? (a. 4, R)