Study Guide (Part I) to Thomas Aquinas
Treatise on Human Actsfrom Summa Theologiae I-II, qq. 6-9
included in Saint Thomas Aquinas
Treatise on Happiness translated by John A. Oesterle
(University of Notre Dame Press, 1983)Instructor: Dr. Garrett
See study questions 1-3 and the explanation of notation given at the beginning of the Study Guide for Thomas on Happiness. Last revised date: August 22, 2005
See also, as needed, the Glossary for Thomas Aquinas S. T. qq. 1-21.
For the Study Guide for Remaining Questions, see Study Guide Part II,
Question VI - Voluntary and Involuntary
Article 1
1. How do the objectors defend a No answer to the question?
2. Explain the distinctions between things whose motion toward an end derives from intrinsic causes and things whose motion toward an end comes only from an external cause; the distinction, within the former between self-movers and things that are not self-movers. To which group belongs humans? plants? stones?
3. To what class of movements does the term "voluntary" apply?
4. In what sense is there a first principle of movement in the human being? (a. 1, r. 1)
5. In what two ways does exterior (external) motion precede a new movement of an animal? (r. 2)
Article 2
6. How does Thomas characterize the imperfect voluntariness found in nonhuman animals? (a. 2, R)
7. Do all animals possess the faculty of will? Explain. (r. 1)
8. Why does Thomas say man is the "master" of his actions? (r. 2)
Article 3
9. Thomas mentions "interior acts" (a. 3, R) What is the difference between an interior act and a regular or non-interior act? (Figure out from the context, or see article 4, R, on the distinction between immediate or proper acts of the will and acts commanded by the will.)
10. In what two ways is it possible to be a voluntary agent and yet not act? (a. 3, R)
Thomas does not speak of "responsibility for one's conduct," but this is the term we normally use now to describe a voluntary agent.
Article 4
11. In what way can the will undergo violence (being decisively affected by external force)? In what way can the will not undergo violence? (a. 4, R)
12. How does Thomas defend his view covered in question 11? (a. 4, R)
13. Why cannot God do violence to the human will? (r. 1)
14. What kind of natural movements are not caused by violent exterior causes? (r. 2)
Article 5
15. What is common to the voluntary and the natural? How does T define the involuntary? What does he conclude from this? (a. 5, R)
16. In what two ways is something said to be natural? Is it possible to voluntarily be passive (receptive of an action)? Explain. (r. 2)
Article 6
17. How, in terms of voluntariness, does Thomas distinguish an action done from fear and one done from compulsion? (a. 6, r. 1) Can we say that what is done from fear is somehow ("in a certain respect") involuntary? Explain. (a. 6, R)
Article 7
18. Concupiscence is a lustful desire for pleasure. Does Thomas think it causes involuntariness? (a. 7, R) Compared to fear, it is more or less likely to cause involuntariness? Explain. (r. 1)
Article 8
19. What kinds of ignorance do not cause involuntariness? What kind of ignorance causes involuntariness? (a. 8, R)
Question VII - The Circumstances of Human Acts
Article 1
20. What appears to be meant by "circumstances of an act"? (a. 1, R)
Article 2
Note: Thomas uses the term "theologian" to include the tasks Aristotle would have assigned to the moral philosopher. "Sin" seems to be approximately identical to moral error or fault perceived through theological lens. (See a. 2, r. 3)
21. For what three reasons should theologians consider circumstances of human acts? (a. 2, R)
22. What was the second objection and how does Thomas reply to it? (r. 2)
Article 3
23. What are the eight circumstances of action? (These are important because it is possible to be ignorant of these particulars.) What refers to the action and about what refers to the direct object of the action. Person X can think he is serving a harmless cup of tea to Person Y but actually (because the tea is poisoned) be poisoning Y. Person X can think he is killing a gorilla but actually (because the "gorilla" is a human being dressed in a gorilla suit) killing a human being. Discuss the other circumstances, giving examples. (a. 3, R)
The corresponding passage in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is 1111a3ff.
Article 4 24. Which circumstances of action are the most important? Why? (a. 4, R)
Question VIII - What the Will Wills
Article 1 25. How does the objector argue that the will does not only will the good? (o.1-o.3)
26. How does Thomas argue that the will tends to or seeks something understood as good? (a. 1, R)
27. How is the will related to evil? (a. 1, r. 1)
28. How does Thomas accommodate the idea that the will can be oriented to future events (at present non-existent), even though being and good and convertible (interchangeable)? (r. 3) Note: "beings of reason" might be rendered "mentally existent objects."
Article 2 Aristotle says we wish (Thomas' "will") the end but choose (or decide upon) the means. Thomas wants to broaden the range of his term "will" (volere) so as to cover both what Aristotle calls wish and what Aristotle calls choose. Thomas apparently wants to treat will as the faculty of practical reason as a whole, which includes both wishing (or intending) and choice, as well as deliberation that connects the two.
Article 3 29. Under what circumstance is the point made in o. 1 correct? (r. 1)
30. Why does T differentiate willing an end from willing a means? (a. 3, R)
31. Which often comes first in the order of time? (a. 3, R)
32. How does natural movement differ from willing? How does this support Thomas' claim that willing the end is distinct from willing the means? (r. 3)
Question IX - What Moves the Will
Article 1 33. In what two ways is a power of the soul (=mental capacity) in potency to different things? What conclusion does T draw regarding the requirement for a mover? (a. 1, R)
Note: when T speaks of the subject of an act, he is referring to that which sometimes acts and sometimes does not; e.g., the eye sometimes sees and sometimes does not. When he refers to the object of an act, he is referring to what particularizes the act; e.g., a black object makes an act of vision an act of seeing something black. The will would seem to relate to both the subject (agent) and object (end) of willing.
34. What point does T make about the arts of navigation and shipbuilding? How is this relevant to the will? How does the intellect move the will, according to Thomas? (a. 1, R)
35. In what sense does the will move the intellect? (r. 3)
Article 2 36. How does the objector try to prove that sense appetite does not move will?
37. Does our emotional state determine what "singular matters" we perceive as good? (a. 2, R)
38. What role does a hierarchical theory of soul play in o. 1 and r. 1?
39. In what way does reason move the irascible and concupiscible powers? (parts of soul with which we get angry and desire physical pleasure) (r. 3)
Article 3 40. How does the speculative intellect "move itself"? (a. 3, R) Does the will (practical intellect also move itself)? Does this require that the same aspect of the will do double-duty as mover and moved? (r. 1) Note how the distinction between end and means helps Thomas here.
Article 4 41. How are ends, means, willing and deliberation related to one another? See Thomas' example of curing and health? (a. 4, R)
42. Now, how does Thomas use what he has said about deliberation to show that there must be an exterior principle operating on the will? (a. 4, R)
43. How does T reply to objection 2? (r. 2)
Article 5 44. What is there about reason that, according to Thomas, implies that the will (a part of the rational faculty) cannot be directly influenced by heavenly bodies (sun, moon, planets, stars) ? Why does Thomas think the will can be indirectly influenced by heavenly bodies? (a. 5, R)
Article 6 45. For Thomas God is causally involved with the will in two ways. What are these? (a. 6, R and r. 3)