Study Guide to Saint Thomas Aquinas
Treatise on Happinessfrom Summa Theologiae I-II, qq. 1-5
translated by John A. OesterleInstructor: Dr. Garrett
Last revised date: August 22, 2005
A separate Study Guide (in two parts) is provided for the second Treatise in the textbook, the Treatise on Human Acts.
I have provided a Glossary for many of the key terms that Thomas Aquinas uses in these two treatises.
Notation
q. = Question (in Thomas' sense)
a. = Article
o. = objectionR = response
r. = reply (to objections)
p. = page in the Notre Dame Press edition1. What two treatises does this translation actually cover? What are the topics of the four parts of the second treatise? (pp. xiv-xv)
2. How are the Questions in these treatises divided? (Note that "question" here tends to mean topic.) In each article, where do the "objections," "response," "on the contrary" (sed contra), and "replies" occur? In which parts of an article is Thomas presenting his own view? How are objections and replies related to one another? (p. xv)
Normally "according to Thomas Aquinas" is implied in these study questions. My purpose is to help you understand the thinker's position and how it coheres, not to make Thomists out of you. (We can, of course, occasionally discuss whether Thomas' views are plausible, all things considered.)
Examples and Analogies Thomas frequently (perhaps not often enough!) gives examples or uses analogies to explain his position. Understanding them may be key to understanding his point. Look for them.
Treatise on Happiness
Question I
3. What are Thomas' answers to the questions in the first eight articles? (Usually, they can be expressed in one sentence that rewords the question associated with the article.)
Article 1
4. What is the difference between man and irrational creatures? Thanks to what faculties is this possible? How does Thomas distinguish between human acts and acts of man? (R, p. 4) How does that help him defend his position in a. 1?
5. What is the gist of the third objection in q. 1, a. 1? (p. 3) How does Thomas reply to that objection? (p. 4)
6. In what two ways are actions voluntary? (r. 2, p. 4)
Note: the will is a complex human faculty discussed in detail in the Treatise on Human Acts (See especially qq. 9-10, 12-13). It is the first principle of human action and internal to a rational agent. See glossary.
Article 2
7. How does the second objection support a Yes answer to the question of the article?
8. How does matter attain form? (How does the potency/act distinction relate to matter and informed matter?) Think of a sculptor shaping clay. Relate agency, motion, intention, and end. (a.2, R)
9. What determines the agent to an end in rational beings? What does this in irrational creatures? In what two ways do things tend to an end (by motion or action)? (a.2, R) Illustrate using archer and arrow, or pot-maker and clay being shaped.
10. How does Thomas distinguish the behavior of irrational animals toward an end from the conduct of rational animals toward an end, when he looks at this issue theologically? (p. 6)
Note: A rational agent can "order something to an end," i.e., create or perform something for the sake of some end. A nonrational thing, on the other hand, can be "ordered to" an end, i.e., be designed or structured so as to serve, or act for the sake of, an end.
Article 3
11. Thomas claims that human acts receive their species (roughly: proper description) from the end. How do you think this works in the case of killing, mentioned by Thomas on p. 8?
12. What is the difference between proximate end and remote end? See Thomas' discussion of killing, upholding justice, and satisfying anger on p. 8)
13. Does an act's natural end determine its moral end, according to Thomas? (p.8) Do you think Thomas holds that all killing is wrong?
Article 4
14. How does T support his main position in this article? (a. 4, R, pp. 8-9)
15. Distinguish the "order of intention" from "order of execution." What is the principle with respect to intention? with respect to execution? (p. 9) What does "principle" seem to mean here?
16. What is claimed in o. 1? How does Thomas reply to o. 1? (r. 1, p. 9)
Article 5
17. Paraphrase at least one of the arguments Thomas gives in a.5, R in support of his position on whether a man can have several ultimate ends. (Put the conclusion at the bottom and list the premises and intermediate steps above it.)
Article 6
18. What two arguments does Thomas provide in a. 6, R for his position on the matter of this article?
19. What is the second objection and how does Thomas respond to it (r. 2)? Note: "speculative science" is contemplative knowing, desirable for its own sake. Aquinas thinks that this is the sort of knowledge we hope to have of God. (One can also have speculative knowledge of nature, e.g., of the movements of heavenly bodies.)
Article 7
20. What is the gist of o.2 in Article 7? (Of the three objections this one is probably the most powerful for moderns.)
21. How does Thomas defend his position in this article (a. 7, R)?
22. Given that men do differ about the kind of thing in which the ultimate good is found, how does Thomas describe "the most complete good absolutely"? (a. 7, R)
Article 8
23. In what sense do all creatures share the same ultimate end? What is unique about human beings' relation to this end (as distinct from nonhuman beings' relation to it) ?
Question II
Article 1
24. State the case for the proposition that human happiness consists in wealth, showing that you understand o.1-o.3.
25. Explain the difference between natural and artificial wealth. Why cannot natural wealth be man's ultimate end? Why cannot artificial wealth?
26. How does Thomas reply to o.1 and o.2? (See also question 34 below.)
27. What sort of desire for wealth is finite? What sort infinite? Is there an infinite desire for the ultimate good in Thomas' view? How does that differ from the infinite desire for a certain kind of wealth?
Article 2
28. State the case for the proposition that man's happiness consists in honors. (o. 1-o.3)
29. How does Thomas try to refute this view? (See also question 34 below.)
Article 3
30. State the case for the proposition that man's happiness consists in fame or glory.
31. How does Thomas try to refute this view? (See also question 34 below.)
Article 4
32. State the case for the proposition that man's happiness consists in political or physical power.
33. State Thomas' argument against this proposition. [Note that in the first argument "principle" means efficient cause, as a potter is the efficient cause of the pot's coming to be.]
34. What four general reasons does Aquinas give against the view that happiness consists in wealth, honor, fame or glory, or power? (pp. 19-20)
Article 5
35. State the case that man's happiness consists in some good of the body.
36. How does Aquinas argue that human happiness does not consist in preservation of the body?
37. Even if it is granted that the end of man's reason is the preservation of the human being, why does it not follow that happiness consists in goods of the body?
Article 6
38. State the case that man's happiness consists in pleasure.
39. What is the difference between the essence of a thing and its proper accident, according to Aquinas? (Here he closely follows Aristotle.) What is "delight"? What is its relationship to happiness? How does bodily pleasure differ from delight?
40. Why is a good suitable to the body that causes bodily delight (pleasure) not the complete good?
Article 7
41. State the case that man's happiness consists in some good of the soul. (This view, which is roughly that of Aristotle, is challenged by Thomas.)
42. How does Aquinas, following Augustine, argue against this view?
Although he seems to be arguing against an Aristotelian position, he uses Aristotelian concepts-potency, first act, and second act. The soul by itself is the first act of an organized body. But first act is characterized by a degree of potency or incompleteness, as a good habit not in use at the moment falls short of the perfection of the good habit in use. See glossary for more on potency, first act, and second act.
His argument seems to require separating the highest object of human desire (i.e., the ultimate good, God, whom we desire to know) from the soul that is happy when it knows Him. Aquinas admits that "happiness consists in something belonging to the soul" (i.e., its activity when it contemplates God) but insists that "the object of happiness is . . . outside the soul."
Article 8
43. On what basis does Aquinas deny that human happiness consists in any created good?
Question III
Article 1
44. In what sense is happiness created? In what sense is it not created? (a. 1, R)
Article 2
45. Is happiness an activity, according to Thomas? Distinguish first act from second act, using the analogy related to knowledge. Is happiness first or second act? (a. 2, R)
46. What two kinds of action does T distinguish in a. 2, r. 3? To which does happiness as activity correspond?
47. How does T describe God's happiness? (r. 4) How does T describe man's ultimate perfection in this life? What conclusions does he draw from this? (r. 4)
Article 3
48. Does T think happiness essentially involves the senses? Does it involve the senses "antecedently" or "consequently"? (Of course, to answer this one must understand antecedent/ essential/ consequent distinction.) (a. 3, R)
Article 4
49. How might one argue that happiness is an act of the will? (o. 1-o. 5) See also a. 5, o. 1-3.
Aquinas understands the intellect (roughly, the rational part of the soul in Plato) as consisting of a speculative part, that can know truth valuable for its own sake, and a practical part. The will is associated with the practical part.
50. How does Aquinas argue that in its essence (or "very being") happiness cannot consist in an act of the will? (a. 4, R)
51. How does his discussion of delight enable him to partly accommodate the view he is criticizing? (a. 4, R)
Article 5
52. What is man's highest activity? What does this imply for the issue addressed in a. 5? How does contemplation differ from the act of practical intellect? What does this imply for the issue addressed in a. 5?
53. Distinguish ultimate and complete happiness from imperfect happiness. Distinguish primary (principal) and secondary forms of imperfect happiness. (a. 5, R)
54. If we were to set aside theological premises or assumptions, what would remain of Thomas' argument here?
Article 6
55. Summarize the case for happiness' consisting in scientific knowledge (of physical nature). Thomas' reply to o. 1 is meaningful within Thomas' framework, not Aristotle's. (Aristotle does not think we can know invisible divine beings-although we can reason analogically or with degree of probability about them.)
56. How does Aquinas use notions of a natural or metaphysical hierarchy to refute the proposition that happiness consists in scientific knowledge (of physical nature)? (a. 6, R)
Article 7
57. What is Thomas' main point in this article?
Article 8
58. What two points does Thomas make at the start of a. 8, R? (p. 39) Under what condition is the (speculative) intellect perfected? If the intellect knows some object and knows that it has a cause, what does it desire to know next? What does Thomas' conclude about what perfect happiness requires? How does he get to this conclusion?
Question IV
Article 1
59. Does Thomas think delight is required for happiness? Why?
Article 2
60. Why does Thomas think that (intellectual) vision is primary and delight secondary in happiness?
Note: "charity" means properly directed love in o. 3 and r. 3.
Article 4
61. Why might one think that one can be happy without rectitude of the will? (o. 1-o.3)
62. How does Thomas defend his rejection of that position? (a, 4, R)
Article 6
63. State the case for a yes answer to the question of this article. (a. 6, R) How does Thomas' distinction between the spiritual and the corruptible body help to align his position with traditional Christian doctrine? (r. 3)
Article 7
64. Why are external goods required for the imperfect happiness that can be had in "this life"? (a.7, R) Why are they not required for the perfect happiness of which Thomas speaks? (a.7, R)
Article 8
65. Explain Thomas' nuanced (two-part) answer to this question?
Question V
Article 1
66. How does the intellectual nature surpass rational nature?* (a. 1, R) How does the hypothetical objector use this distinction to argue that humans cannot attain happiness? (a. 1, o. 1) Aristotle says that humans grasp universals in phantasms (i.e., with the help of images). How does this support the argument that humans cannot attain happiness?
*This distinction is not original with Aquinas; it goes back at least to Boethius' On the Consolation of Philosophy, where it seems to be inspired by Plato's discussion of mental activities corresponding to two highest sections of the "Divided Line" (Republic vi).
67. How does Thomas reply to these objections while arguing that humans can attain happiness? (R and r.1-r.3)
Article 2
68. The objector seems to argue that everyone who is happy is equally happy. On what basis? (o.2-o.3)
69. On what basis does Thomas affirm degrees of happiness? (a. 2, R)
Article 3
70. Why does Thomas give a No answer to this question? (a. 3, R) Note that in r. 3 Thomas modifies the sharpness of his negative answer. (See also the reference to "imperfect happiness" in the fourth article.)
Article 4
71. State the case for a Yes answer to the question and Thomas' case for a No answer, focusing on Thomas' argument from the common notion of happiness (the argument that does not seem to require any theological premises).
What is the difference between the common notion of happiness and the particular notion? (a.4 R) This distinction will be important in Article 8.
Article 5
72. State the case for a Yes answer to the question. (a. 5, oo. 1-3) If imperfect happiness is understood, would Thomas disagree with this Yes? (a. 5, R)
73. Why does he give a No answer if perfect happiness is understood? (a. 5, R)
Article 6
74. Why does Thomas deny that angels ("higher creatures") can make humans happy? (This article might be used for a case study of Thomas' understanding of the metaphysical hierarchy of beings.)
Article 7
75. Why does Thomas argue that humans have to do good deeds in order to receive happiness from God? (a. 7, R) Is this requirement a limitation on the power of God? (r.1)
Article 8
76. If happiness is understood in terms of the common notion, how does Thomas argue that everyone desires it? Does everyone desire happiness when it is understood in terms of the particular notion? Why or why not? (a. 8, R)