A Sample Topical Ethics Paper (Draft)
Last modified September 12, 2002
The comments in orange are introduced only to call attention to what the author is trying to do at that point. They would not be included in a regular paper.This paper is not a perfect example of the sort of paper I am asking you to compose since it does not carefully discuss any of the articles in the textbook. It does refer, however, to the concepts of person introduced in two of them to illustrate a method of documentation.
I have not had time to polish the essay from the perspective of style. My purpose in rushing this version to the web site is to give you something that illustrates the nuts and bolts of looking at ethical arguments on opposite sides of an issue and gives an example of one possible way to organize a paper. For questions contact Dr. Garrett.
On the Morality of Torture
I. Introduction
[Importance of issue.] It may seem obvious that torturing people is wrong. But the fact is that torture is not as rare as we might like to think. It often occurs in situations characterized by hostility between groups, and therefore in conditions where an unpopular dictatorship or government is trying to keep the lid on dissent; it is often used in conditions of warfare, and therefore it is not surprising that it is found where there is ethnic conflict and "ethnic cleansing" (as in the former Yugoslavia). It also is frequently found in situations where there are "popular" victim groups (as in the torture deaths in the United States reported within the last few years of gays by people who hate gays or minorities by racists). Police brutality often involves what might be called torture, and it is often directed against minorities (as in the famous Rodney King beating in Los Angeles).
Torture or something that amounts to the same thing, though it may not be called torture, is frequently practiced by "professionals" who tell themselves that they are acting "in the line of duty." The police who beat Rodney King may have begun their pursuit of Mr. King more or less in accord with police procedure. The soldiers in Algeria and in Vietnam who tortured persons suspected of aiding the rebellion probably thought, at least at first, that they were just carrying on their military duty by slightly unusual means.
II. [Clarifying the issue.] What does it mean to torture people?
A. Let's begin by clarifying this phrase. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1956) defines "torture" as "the infliction of severe pain, especially . . . in order to extort confession or in revenge." [This might be a place to reflect on elements of the definition.]
B. [Clarification of issue continued.] The other word in the phrase "torture people," i.e., "people," is important too. [Many ethical issues involve the value of persons or people and therefore some discussion of this is often useful, or even required.]
A more technical term in ethics that comes close to capturing the relevant meaning here is "persons," although some theorists consider social units such as corporations to be persons (French 1992, 12-23).
"People" refers to human beings. And what is important here is not merely their biological status, that they are primates, mammals, animals, and living beings.
The psychological dimension is equally if not more important than the biological. Most people, and surely almost all those affected by torture, are sentient beings (capable of feeling pleasure and pain). They have emotional capacities. They have powers of memory and anticipation. They can learn skills and develop moral habits, good or bad. They have a capacity for communication; they can produce and understand messages of a variety of kinds and complexity. They can reason, at least sometimes, about technical problems and even moral issues (Warren 2002, 16). They have life plans (more or less defined) that they may be trying to carry out, or at least hopes. Their outlooks on life depends heavily upon their past experiences. They perceive the world, people, and living beings, around them, act on it and observe how it responds. Their memories are built up through experiences, and their attitudes on life are shaped by their experiences, even those they have forgotten or repressed. Most people are self-conscious, that is, they have a sense of who they are (Warren, 16). This affects how they relate to others, how they "know" what they should do and can do. They also form voluntary relationships with other persons, and the series of such relations that an individual has formed is a primary determinant of who they think they are (Sherwin 2002, 54-55). It is plausible that happiness, whatever it is, is built upon this complex psychological life.
III. Arguments against torture.
A. The Duty of Non-injury
[Statement of basic principle.] The prima facie duty of Non-Injury asks us to avoid the actions or policies that will tend to injure others by undermining their security, health, character, and well-being. Taken by itself this duty creates a strong presumption against our engaging in torture.
[Facts relevant to application of principle.] Torture involves pain to victims and usually psychological damage that will decrease their chances for mental health and thus for happiness later in life. It is an injury not only to the victim but also to the victim's family members and others who are part of his social network. Torture reduces the sense of security even of people who merely find themselves in situations similar to those of the victim. (For example, it is not hard for urban black males to identify with Rodney King or gays to identify with Matthew Sheppard.) Moreover, those who hear about the torture may take it as an example of what is permitted or expected in society and act on that example. Suffering and injury is again multiplied. For people who belong to groups likely to be victimized, hearing about torture will increase their fears and anxieties.
B. The Duty of Self-Improvement
[Statement of basic principle.] This duty asks us to act in such a way that will promote our own security, health, character, and well-being. But engaging in torture seems to have the opposite effect, especially on character.
[Application.] In fact, the practice of torture has subtle long-term consequences in those who engage in it. It creates vices in the torturer, for example, a moral habit of cruelty. This vice is reinforced every time the torturer engages in torture.
For people in groups likely to be in positions of power over others, learning that torture is "customary" or "accepted practice" (because it is done and not punished) will make it more likely that they too will engage in torture, worsening their character.
C. The Prima Facie Duty of Justice. [Statement of basic principle.] This duty is the duty to distribute benefits and burdens fairly and, so far as possible, to prevent the unfair distribution of benefits and burdens.
On the face of it, torture might not seem to involve the issue of justice. (It could be involved in retributive justice, or justice related to punishment. In fact it was once--but is no longer--a common and rather public punishment for certain offenses against a law.)
[Application.] But torture tends to be used most often in situations where systematic injustice is working in the background. Torture tends to reinforce this systematic injustice. Police brutality, for instance, is typically directed against racial minorities. Since other things equal, police brutality is more likely to be applied against blacks and Hispanics than whites, it involves a distributive injustice. Torture is often used by repressive governments to maintain racial or class oppression against members of subordinate races or classes (the recently overturned apartheid system is South Africa is a good example). The social structure is already an unjust one; torture makes the situation worse for those who are already victims in other ways; it is rarely applied against members of already privileged groups.
D. The Prima Facie Duty to Respect Freedom. [Statement of Principle.] One of the ways we respect freedom is to seek persons' consent for what we do to them that may be costly for them.
[Application.] Torture usually violates the liberties of the persons to whom it is applied. Thus it seems to go against the prima facie duty to respect freedom. It is obvious that torture normally involves a violation of liberty: the torturee does not consent to being tortured. Often the person tortured is suspected of wrongdoing, even of violation of a law. But the torture is usually carried out before the suspect is given a trial of any sort, much less a fair one.
E. Utilitarian arguments. [Statement of basic principle.] Act utilitarianism tells us to choose the act, out of the available options, that will produce the best balance of good consequences over bad for all those affected (taken collectively). Act utilitarianism seems to dictate that we not engage in torture. In its hedonistic form, utilitarianism measures good consequences in terms of pleasure and bad consequences in terms of pain.
[Facts relevant to application of principle.] Torture involves pain to victims, psychological damage that will decrease their chances for happiness later in life; it causes distress not only to the victim but also to the victim's family and friends, and even people who merely find themselves in situations similar to those of the victim. (Note that utilitarian reasoning is similar to but subtly different from the reasoning that goes with Ross' beneficence and non-injury duties.)
The act of torture also has more subtle long-term consequences. As noted above, it creates vices in the torturer, for example, a habit of cruelty. This result makes it more likely that the torturer will torture again, producing further suffering. Moreover, those who hear about the torture may take it as an example of what is permitted or expected in society. Suffering is again multiplied. For people who belong to common "victim" groups , hearing about torture will increase their fears and anxieties. For people likely to be in positions of power, learning that torture is "customary" or "accepted practice" will make it more likely that they too will engage in torture. This result too will increase suffering.
G. Immanuel Kant's duty ethics. [Statement of principle.] At the heart of Kant's duty ethics is respect for persons as ends. It is implied in his version of the categorical imperative that states: "Act in such a way that you treat humanity [rational nature] . . . always at the same time as an end and never as a means only." (Kant 1981, 36.)
[Application of the principle.] Torture is almost always justified, by those who wish to justify it, in terms of the social "good" it is supposed to do (restore social order by putting fear in the minds of rebels; discover terrorist conspiracies by forcing sympathizers to confess; protect officers or soldiers themselves by disabling those perceived to be hostile toward them), but all these justifications seem to treat the victim as a mere means toward the end (restoring social order, eradicate terrorism, protecting officers) which might be desirable and defensible if it were only considered by itself. This violates Kant's duty ethics.
H. Libertarian arguments. Torture usually violates the rights to life and liberty. [Statement of principle.] Libertarianism holds that we have non-interference rights to life and liberty. (Roughly these rights may be understood as the right not to be killed by another person and the right not to be deprived of one's liberty so long as we respect the non-interference rights of others).
[Application of principle of right to life.] Torture is inflicted upon the body of the person being tortured. It is designed to cause pain and suffering. The "science" of torture (and yes, there are people who study how to apply it as if it were a "science") is at best an inexact "science." Therefore it can produce death, even where that is not intended. Where it does not produce death, it can cause serious, lasting psychological damage to its victims, reducing their abilities to cope even with the simplest problems of life. Torture therefore reduces people's general chances at survival.
[Application of principle of right to liberty.] Even more obvious is that torture normally involves a violation of liberty. See comment above in relation to prima facie duty to respect freedom. The same observations apply here.
IV. Arguments in defense of torture. [Author tries to state fairly the strongest arguments. This section might need to be more complex in a more advanced paper.]
A. The duties of beneficence and non-injury. The arguments in favor of torture are usually arguments from beneficence or non-injury. When non-injury is invoked, it is usually in connection with prevention of a serious possible future injury. The ends (suppression of the unlawful rebellion, discovery of the terrorist conspirators, restoring law and order) are said to justify the means; the benefits or "goods" are alleged to override the costs (injury, suffering). Because the ends sought by those who resort to torture are regarded as highly significant, indeed extraordinary, the claim is that extraordinary means are justified. This is the general strategy of Alan Dershowitz (cited in Schulz 2002).
B. The duty of fidelity. Another argument that might be used is based on Ross's prima facie duty of fidelity. People have duties to keep promises, to carry out their agreements. Indeed, professionals have contracts to carry out special duties, and these duties "kick in" and become more "binding" in special circumstances. The police officer or detective has a duty to go out of his or her way to protect the public. Police who use torture to extract confessions from suspected criminals may try to justify doing this by saying that torture is sometimes necessary to carry out their duties quickly and effectively. These duties are said to arise from contracts that police officers make with the government, and indirectly with society, when they agree to accept the authority and salary that comes with their roles.
V. Evaluation of the arguments. [Author responds to arguments stated in IV.]
A. The beneficent/non-maleficent argument in defense of torture are usually quite one-sided. They do not function well even as arguments of this type because they focus on some benefits and injuries and ignore or minimize others that are equally real or probable. They also ignore history. The use of torture by the French to put down the Algerian rebels did not succeed in preventing the Algerian Revolution and the expulsion of the French colonists. But it did succeed in reinforcing an element of brutality in the culture of Algeria that continues to this day, with the use of brutal methods by both factions (religious fundamentalist rebels and more secular nationalist government) in the ongoing social struggles in postcolonial Algeria.
B. The fidelity argument is weak because the contractual duty of professionals is not to produce narrowly defined good results regardless of the costs in other areas and regardless of whether justice and freedom are respected in the process. Basic moral norms of justice respect for freedom place moral limits upon what professionals may do in carrying out their professional commitments.
[The author did not return to evaluate the arguments against torture as he did with the arguments in defense of it. This might not be a glaring omission for this particular issue, if indeed the arguments against torture are collectively much better than the arguments against it. But with other, more controversial issues (e.g., abortion, capital punishment), such an omission would clearly weaken the paper.]
French, Peter A., et al., 1992. Corporations in the Moral Community. Fort Worth: Harcourt Bibliography
Brace Jovanovich.Kant, Immanuel, 1981. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.
Schulz, William, 2002. "The Torturer's Apprentice: Civil Liberties in a Turbulent Age." The Nation. May 13, 2002.
Sherwin, Susan, 2002. "Abortion: A Feminist Perspective." In Social Ethics: Morality and
Social Policy. Eds. T. A. Mappes and J. S. Zembaty. New York: McGraw-Hill.Warren, Mary Ann, 2002. "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion." In Social Ethics:
Morality and Social Policy. Eds. T. A. Mappes and J. S. Zembaty. New York:
McGraw-Hill.