Translation of the "Stoic Bible" According to Von Arnim

Traces of the Early Stoics: Chrysippus

A Work in Progress
Not for citation in works of rigorous scholarship
Date of last modification: February 2, 2006

Translations compiled and partly created by Dr. Jan Garrett
Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, compiled by Hans Von Arnim and first published in 1903-1905, is a collection in Greek and Latin of the Greek and Latin evidence regarding the views of the early Stoic philosophers, from the founder Zeno through Boethus Sidonus. The material below is a translation of some material from volume III, the section pertaining to Chrysippus, the third and perhaps most capable of the scholarchs, or heads, of the Stoic school. "Loeb" refers to the translation in the Loeb Classical Library series published by Harvard University Press. Occasionally I have made minor modifications in the excerpts from Loeb translations. I have translated several of the other passages myself, and these will need to be polished or replaced by better translations as soon as I can locate them or revisit the translations I have already done.

Not all this material is equally revealing of the views of Chrysippus. Chrysippus was probably the most influential of the early Stoic writers and what came to be regarded as mainline Stoicism was thought to stem from him. Thus von Arnim includes passages in this section whose ideas are thought to reflect mainline Stoicism, even if he has no direct evidence that the writers are copying or paraphrasing Chrysippus. Moreover, many of these writers are non-Stoics and their peculiar agendas affect how they paraphrase the early Stoic material. This is true not only in the case of Plutarch, whose hostility is close to the surface. Some of the ideas may be filtered through the teachings of Stoics several generations later than Chrysippus. Philo of Alexandria (Judaeus) was a Jewish Middle Platonist who lived from 30 BC to 45 AD. Dio Chrysostom, according to Long and Sedley, is an orator and a Cynic who lived from the mid-first to early second century AD.

I provide this material rather hastily in the expectation that it may be useful to the curious student. Scholars of course should consult official hard-copy sources, such as the Loeb Classical Library series, or if they know Greek and Latin, Von Arnim's SVF itself.

Ethica I. On the End of Goods

Section I. The "End of Goods" according to the Stoics is explained

3, 4 - Diogenes Laertius 7.87 (LCL)
Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with the experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accorance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe.
3, 12 - Galen de H. et Plat decr. V 6 (168) p. 450 M.

3, 16 - Stobaeus Ecl. II 77, 16 W

Section 2. Ends of other philosophers are discussed

3, 20 - Cic. de Fin. 4 11, 28

3, 23 - Plut. de Stoic. Rep. cp. 15 p. 1040 c.

Again in the books concerning Justice after suggesting that for those who regard pleasure as a good but not a goal it is possible to preserve justice as well he has affirmed this position and said in so many words: "For, if it is held to be a good and not a goal and if the fair too is among the things that are of themselves objects of choice, we could perhaps preserve justice by maintaining that the fair and just is a greater good than pleasure."
3, 23 -Plut. de comm. not. 25.1070d.
Also in the books concerning Justice he thinks that while justice could not be preserved if one should set up pleasure as the goal, it could be if one should take pleasure to be not a goal but simply a good. I don't think you need to hear me now recite the passage word for word, for the third book concerning Justice can be had everywhere.
3, 24 - Plu SR 15.1040e-f
In order to leave his self-contradictions not even a plea of defence, when writing against Aristotle concerning Justice he declares him to be wrong in asserting that, if pleasure is a goal, justice is annulled and along with justice each of the other virtues also. This is wrong according to him because, while justice is in truth annulled by them (who so treat pleasure), nothing prevents the other virtues from existing, since they would at any rate be good and approved even though not per se objects of choice; and then he gives each of them by name. It is better, however, to repeat his own words: "For while pleasure is indicated as a goal in such a theory, that does not, I think, have all this kind of implication. That is why it must be stated that neither is any of the virtues an object of choice per se nor any of the vices an object of avoidance but all these must be referred to the aim one has assumed. Nothing in their theory, however, would prevent courage, prudence, continence, endurance and the virtues similar to these from being classified as goods and the contrary from being objects of avoidance."

Section 3. That only the noble (kalon) is good

3, 29 Plu SR 13.1039c. 3, 30 DL 7.101 (LCL)
And they say that only the morally beautiful is good. So Hecato in his treatise On Goods, book iii, and Chrysippus in his work On the Morally Beautiful. They hold, that is, that virtue and whatever partakes of virtue consists in this: which is equivalent to saying that all that is good is beautiful, or that the term "good" has equal force with the term "beautiful," which comes to the same thing. "Since a thing is good it is beautiful; now it is beautiful, therefore it is good."

Section 5. That virtue suffices for the happy life

Ethica II. On goods and evils

Ethica III. On indifferent things

Section 5. On rightly evaluating particular indifferents

3, 157 - Plu SR 15.1040d

3, 159 - Cic. de Fin. 3 17, 57

But in the books [concerning Justice] against Plato he denounces him for appearing to hold that health is good and says that not only justice but magnanimity are annulled if we hold that pleasure or health or anything else that is not fair is good.

Ethika IV - On Impulse and Selection

Section 2. On first impulse and first oikeiosis

3, 178 - DL 7.85

Ethica V. On Virtue

Section 7. On particular virtues

3, 288 - Plu SR 16.1041b
Since Plato had said of injustice that, being discord of the soul and intestine strife, it does not lose its force within those who themselves harbour it either but sets the wicked man at variance with himself, Chrysippus objects and says that to speak of doing oneself injustice is absurd, for injustice exists in relation to another and not to oneself.
3, 288 - 1041c
In the books against Plato this is what he has said concerning injustice as a term used in relation not to oneself but to another: "For isolated individuals [are not unjust nor are] unjust men composites of several such individuals contradicting one another, injustice being understood anyhow as obtaining in the case of several persons so disposed to one another and in no conditions pertaining to the individual save in so far as he stands in such relation to his neighbours."
3, 289 - Plu SR 16.1041c.
This he forgot, and later in the Demonstrations concerning Justice he says that the wrong-doer is wronged by himself and does himself injustice whenever he wrongs another, for he has become a cause of transgression for himself and is injuring himself undeservedly.
3, 289 - Plu SR 1041d
In the Demonstrations, however, he has propounded arguments like the following concerning the unjust man's doing injustice to himself as well: "The law prohibits one from becoming accessory to a transgression; and to do injustice is a transgression. Now, he who has become his own accessory in doing injustice transgresses in relation to himself; and he who transgresses in regard to an individual also does that individual injustice. Therefore he who does anyone at all injustice does himself injustice too." Again he argues: "Wrong action is a kind of injury, and everyone in doing wrong does wrong in violation of himself. Therefore, every wrong-doer injures himself undeservedly; and if so, he also does himself injustice." Furthermore he argues as follows: "He who is injured by another injures himself and injures himself undeservedly. This, however, is to do injustice. Therefore, everyone who is done injustice by anyone at all does himself injustice."

Section 8. On the mutual interrelation of the virtues

3, 297 - Plu SR 15.1041a

Moreover, in the Demonstrations concerning Justice he says expressly: "Every right action is a lawful act and an act of justice; but what is done in accordance with continence or endurance or prudence or courage is right action; consequently it is also an act of justice."

Ethika VI

Section 1. On justice and law

3, 308 (DL 7.128; see B. Inwood and L. Gerson, eds., Hellenistic Philosophy, 2nd edition, p. 202, modified)

And justice is natural and not conventional, as are the law and right reason, as Chrysippus says in On the Noble (Peri tou kalou).
3, 309 Cicero de Finibus 3, 21, 71. (Loeb trans. modified)
Right (ius) moreover, properly so styled and entitled, exists (they aver) by nature; and it is foreign to the nature of the Wise Man (sapiens) not only to wrong but even to hurt anyone. Nor again is it righteous (rectum) to enter into a partnership (consociare) in wrongdoing with one's friends or benefactors; and it is most truly and cogently maintained that equity should never be disjoined from utility, and that whatever is fair and just is also honourable (honestum), and conversely whatever is honourable will also be just and fair.
3, 310 Proclus in Plat. Alcib. Pr. P. 318 Creuzer. [my translation--JG]
The whole syllogism proving that what is just is expedient proceeds as follows: all that is just is admirable (kalon), all that is admirable is good; therefore all that is just is good. But also the good is the same as the expedient; therefore all that is just is expedient (another syllogism follows, with an inverse order of terms). For the good of the soul does not subsist in anything other than in virtue, nor does the admirable, but all good is defined by virtue, and the same [holds for] the admirable as for the good, and both things are just. For the moderate and courageous too are just because of the reciprocal implication through virtue: for not to think soberly is to live unjustly, and not to live courageously, and to be deprived of justice at some time, but the same [good] form of life derives from every one of the virtues.
3, 311 Cicero de Legibus 1, 16 44-45 (Loeb trans.)
Indeed, it is not merely justice (ius) and injustice (iniuria) which are distinguished by nature, but also and without exception things which are honourable (honesta) and dishonourable (turpia). For since an intelligence (intelligentia) common to us all makes things known to us and formulates them in our minds, honourable actions are ascribed by us to virtue, and dishonourable actions to vice; and only a madman would conclude that these judgments are matters of opinion and not fixed by nature. For even what we, by a misuse of the term, call the virtue of a tree or of a horse, is not a matter of opinion, but is based on nature. And if that is true, honourable and dishonourable actions must also be distinguished by nature. For if virtue in general (universa virtus) is to be tested by opinion, then its several parts must also be so tested; who, therefore, would judge a man of prudence, and if I may say so, hard common sense, not by his own character but by some external circumstance? For virtue is reason completely developed; and this certainly is natural; therefore everything honourable is likewise natural.
3, 312 Cicero de Legibus 1, 17, 45 (Loeb)
For just as truth and falsehood, the logical and illogical, are judged by themselves and not by anything else, so the steadfast and continuous use of reason in the conduct of life, which is virtue, and also inconstancy, which is vice, [are judged] by their own nature. Shall we not use the same standard in regard to the characters [ingenia] of young men? Then shall we judge character by nature, and judge virtue and vice, which result from character, by some other standard? But if we adopt the same standard for them, must we not refer the honourable and the base to Nature also? Whatever good thing is praiseworthy must have within itself something which deserves praise, for goodness itself is good by reason not of opinion but of Nature. For, if this were not true, men would also be happy by reason of opinion; and what statement could be more absurd than that? Wherefore since both good and evil and judged by nature and are natural principles, surely honourable and base actions must also be distinguished in a similar way and referred to the standard of nature.
3,313 Plutarch On Stoic Self-Contradictions cp. 15 p. 1040a. (Loeb)
At the very beginning of the books concerning Justice directed against Plato himself, [Chrysippus] pounces upon the argument about the gods and says that Cephalus was wrong in trying to make fear of the gods a deterrent from injustice and that the argument about divine chastisements is easily discredited and, [as it produces] many distractions and conflicting plausibilities, is an inducement in the opposite direction, being in fact no different from the Bogy and Hobgoblin with which women try to keep little children from mischief. Yet, having thus disparaged Plato's words, in other places he praises and frequently quotes these lines of Euripides:
In fact there are, though one deride the words,
Zeus and the gods, who mark our mortal woes.

Section 2. On the eternal law and the laws of particular cities.

3,314 Marcian Institutes book 1.

Chrysippus, the philosopher of the highest Stoic wisdom, begins thus in his book On Law [translation that follows is from Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge University Press), 1987, p. 432]:

Law is king of all things human and divine. Law must preside over what is honourable and base, as ruler and as guide, and thus be the standard of right and wrong, prescribing to animals whose nature is political what they should do, and prohibiting them from what they should not do.

3,315 Cicero de Legibus 1 6, 18 (Loeb)
But the most foolish notion of all is the belief that everything is just which is found in the customs or laws of nations. Would that be true, even if these laws had been enacted by tyrants? . . . For Justice (ius) is one; it binds all human society, and is based on one Law, which is right reason applied to command and prohibition. Whoever knows not this law, whether it has been recorded in writing anywhere or not, is without Justice.
3,316 Cicero de Legibus 2, 8 (Loeb)
Law is not a product of human thought, nor is it any enactment of peoples, but something eternal which rules the whole universe by its wisdom in command and prohibition. Thus they have been accustomed to say that law is the primal and ultimate mind of God, whose reason directs all things either by compulsion or restraint. Wherefore that Law which the gods have given to the human race has been justly praised; for it is the reason and mind of a wise [lawgiver] applied to command and prohibition. . . . 9. . . . This and other commands and prohibitions of nations have the power to summon to righteousness and away from wrong-doing; but this power is not merely older than the existence of nations and states, it is coeval with that God who guards and rules heaven and earth. 10. For the divine mind cannot exist without reason, and divine reason cannot but have this power to establish right and wrong. . . . Wherefore the true and primal law, applied to command and prohibition, is the right reason of supreme Jupiter.
3, 317 Cicero de Legibus 1, 12, 33 (Loeb)
but if the judgments of men were in agreement with nature, so that, as the poet says, they considered "nothing alien to them which concerns mankind," then Justice would be equally observed by all. For those creatures who have received the given of reason from nature have also received right reason, and therefore they have also received the gift of law, which is right reason applied to command and prohibition. But all men have received reason; therefore all men have received justice. Consequently Socrates was right when he cursed, as he often did, the man who first separated utility from justice; for this separation, he complained, is the source of all mischief.
3, 318 Cicero de Legibus II, 5, 11 (Loeb)
for every law which truly deserves the name is truly praiseworthy, as they prove by approximately the following arguments. It is agreed, of course, that laws were invented for the safety of citizens, the preservation of States, and the tranquility and happiness of human life, and that those who first put statutes of this kind in force convinced their people that it was their intention to write down and put into effect such rules as, once accepted and adopted, would make possible for them an honourable and happy life; and when such rules were drawn up and put in force, it is clear that men called them "laws." From this point of view it can readily be understood that those who formulated wicked and unjust statues for nations, thereby breaking their promises and agreements, put into effect anything but "laws." 12. It may thus be clear that in the very definition of the term "law" there inheres the idea and principle of choosing what is just and true. I ask you then . . . according to the custom of the philosophers: if there is a certain thing, the lack of which in a state compels us to consider it no state at all, must we consider this thing a good? - One of the greatest goods, certainly. - And if a state lacks Law, must it for that reason be considered no State at all? - It cannot be denied. - Then law must necessarily be considered one of the greatest goods.
3, 319 Cicero de Legibus I 15, 42 (Loeb)
But the most foolish notion of all is the belief that everything is just which is found in the customs or laws of nations. Would that be true, even if these laws had been enacted by tyrants? . . . For Justice is one; it binds all human society, and is based on one Law, which is right reason applied to command and prohibition. Whoever knows not this Law, whether it has been recorded in writing anywhere or not, is without Justice.
3, 320 Cicero de Legibus I 15, 42 (Loeb)
But if justice is conformity to written laws and national customs, and if, as the same persons claim, everything is to be tested by the standard of utility, then anyone who thinks it will be profitable to him will, if he is able, disregard and violate the laws. It follows that Justice does not exist at all, if it does not exist in Nature, and if that form it which is based on utility can be overthrown by that very utility itself.
3, 321 Cicero de Legibus I 16, 43-44 (Loeb)
But if the principles of justice were founded on the decrees of peoples, the edicts of princes, or the decisions of judges, then Justice would sanction robbery and adultery and forgery of wills, in case these acts were approved by the votesor decrees of the populace. But if so great a power belongs to the decisions and decrees of fools that the laws of Nature can be changed by their votes, then why do they not ordain that what is bad and baneful shall be considered good and salutary? Or, if a law can make justice out of injustice, can it not also make good out of bad? But in fact we can perceive the difference between good laws and bad by referring them to no other standard than Nature.
3, 322 Cicero Tusculan Disputations I 45, 108 (Loeb, slight mod)
But why should I notice the beliefs of individuals, since we may observe the varied deceptions under which the nations [in the sense of peoples] labor? The Egyptians embalm their dead and keep them in the house; the Persians even smear them with wax before burial, that the bodies may last for as long a time as possible; it is the custom of the Magi not to bury the bodies of their dead unless they have first been mangled by beasts; in Hyrcania the populace support dogs for the benefit of the community, while the nobles keep them for family use: it is as we know a famous breed of dogs, but in spite of the cost, each householder procures animals in proportion to his means, to mangle him, and that they consider the best mode of burial. Chrysippus collects a large number of other instances as suits his inquisitive way in making any investigation, but there are details so disgusting that language avoids them with abhorrence.
3,323 Philo Judaeus, Loeb edition, VI, pp. 155-57 (mod.), p. 161
Polity as seen in the various peoples is an addition to nature which is invested with universal sovereignty. For this world is the "great city" (megalopolis) and it has a single polity and a single law, and this is the . . . reason of nature, commanding what should be done and forbidding what should not be done. But the local cities which we see are unlimited in number and subject to diverse polities and laws by no means identical, for different peoples have different customs and regulations which are extra inventions and additions. The cause of this is the reluctance to combine or have fellowship with each other, shown not only by Greeks to barbarians and barbarians to Greeks but also within each of them separately in dealing with their own kin. And we find them alleging causes for this which are no real causes, such as unfavorable seasons, infertile soil or how the state is situated, whether it is maritime or inland or whether it is on an island or on the mainland and the like. The true cause they never mention, and that is their greed and mutual mistrusts, which keep them from being satisfied with the ordinances of nature and lead them to give the name of laws to whatever approves itself as advantageous to the communities which hold the same views. Thus it stands to reason (eikotos) that particular polities are additions to the single polity of nature, for the laws of different cities are additions to the right reason of nature. . . . [VIII] For a house is a city compressed into small dimensions, and household management may be called a kind of state management, just as a city too is a great house and statesmanship the household management of the general public. All this shows clearly that the household manager is identical with the statesman, however much what is under the purview of the two may differ in number and size.
3, 324 Diogenianus according to Eusebius Praep. Evang. VI (p. 264b). [My rough translation]
D. attributes to Chrysippus: and you say that all the laws laid down and the regimes [of human cities] are in error.
3, 325 Cicero de Republica III 33 (Loeb. Trans. slight mod by me)
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations . . . and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder and interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all peoples [gentes] and all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment.
3, 326 Plutarch On Stoic Self-Contradictions cp. 9 p. 1035c (Loeb. Slight mod)
Hear what he says about this in the third book [of] "On the Gods: 'It is not possible to discover any other beginning of justice or any source for it other than that from Zeus and from the universal nature (koines phuseos), for thence everything of the kind must have its beginning if we are going to have anything to say about good and evil [things].'

Section 3. On the city

3, 327 Clement of Alexandria. Strom IV 26 p. 642 Pott. (trans. Schofield 1999, 61, mod.)
For the Stoics also say that the universe [ouranos] is in the proper sense a city, but that those here on the earth are not - they are called cities, but are not really. For a city or a people is something morally good, an organization or group of human beings administered by law which exhibits refinement (asteion).
3, 328 (Stobaeus anthology; see Inwood and Gerson, 2nd edition, pp. 224-25)
And they say that the base person is a fugitive in all things, insofar as he is deprived of law and a polity that corresponds to nature. For the law, as we said, is virtuous (spoudaion), and the city likewise. And concerning what is virtuous, it was enough that Cleanthes posed this argument about the city: if the city is a contrived dwelling-place in which those who take refuge to give and receive justice, then is not the city a good (asteion) place? But the city is such a dwelling-place; thus the city is a good place. And the city is described in three ways, in one way with respect to dwelling place, in another as a complex system of human beings, and thirdly as both of the previous two senses taken together. In two senses, the city is described as good, as a complex system of human beings, and in the sense of both [the place and the system of humans] together, by reference to the [human] inhabitants.
3, 329 Dio Chrysostom or. XXXVI #20 (vol. II p. 6, 13) [my trans.]
They say that the city is a multitude of humans dwelling together in this [place?] and governed by law. [see Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City 77-78]
3, 330 Philo de septen. et fest dieb. P. 284 vol. II Mang. [my translation--JG]
For in general the regime is virtuous and with laws which only lead into the beautiful and the noble.
3, 331 Dio Chrysostom or. III #43 (cf. Loeb vol. I, p. 125)
For government [arche] is said [to be] "lawful administration of human beings" and "oversight [pronoia] of human beings in accord with law."
3,332 Clemens Alex. Strom II p. 420 Pott.[my translation--JG]
     In which some . . . say the law is right reason, commanding what is to be done, forbidding what should not be done.
     Regime (politeia) - and it is a fine upbringing of humans with respect to community (sharing a life together).
     The judicial art (dikastike) - knowledge being correction of moral errors for the sake of justice (the just).
     Corresponding to it is the art of punishment (kolastike) a sort of knowledge of measure in relation to punishment. And punishment is a correction of the soul . . .
     At any rate, the philosophers proclaim that only the sage is king, lawgiver, general, righteous (dikaion), pious, dear to the gods (theophile).

Section 4. On the bond between gods and human beings

3, 333 Cicero de Finibus III 19, 64 (Loeb)

Again they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and law-abiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves.
3, 334 Dio Chysostom or. 36, section 23 (vol.II, p. 7, 7 Arnim) [my translation--JG]
For we must call one and the same thing a city and a purely happy regime, the community that the gods share with one another, and if someone includes the rational altogether, counting human beings with gods, as children are said to share the city with men (andrasi), being citizens by nature, not in their thinking and doing the business of citizens nor sharing in the law, being alien to it.
3, 335 Dio Chrysostom or. 1, section 42-43 (Loeb, vol. I, trans. by J. W. Cohoon 1932, "First Discourse on Kingship")
I might well speak next of the administration of the universe and tell how the world--the very embodiment of bliss and wisdom--ever sweeps along through infinite time in infinite cycles, guided by good fortune and a like power divine, and by a governing purpose most righteous and perfect, and renders us like itself since, in consequence of the mutual kinship of ourselves and it, we are marshaled in order under one ordinance and law and partake of the same polity. He who honors and upholds this polity and does not oppose it in any way is law-abiding, devout, and orderly; he, however, who disturbs it, as far as that is possible to him, and violates it or does not know it, is lawless and disorderly whether he be called a private citizen or ruler.
3, 336 Philo Judaeus, "On the Creation of the World" (de mundi opificio), I.3 (Loeb, trans. F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker, 1929, rpt. 1962, vol. I, p. 7)
The man who observes the law is constituted thereby a loyal citizen of the world, regulating his doings by the purpose and will (boulema) of nature, in accordance with which the entire world itself (sumpan kosmos) is also administered.
3, 337 Philo Judaeus, section 142-43; Loeb op. cit., p. 113 (mod.)
If we call that original forefather (archegetes) not only the first man but also the only citizen of the world we shall be speaking with perfect truth. For the world (kosmos) was his city and dwelling place. [143] Now since every well-ordered city has a constitution, the citizen of the world enjoyed of necessity the same constitution as did the whole world: and this constitution is nature's right reason, more properly called an ordinance (thesmos), . . . seeing it as a divine law, in accordance with which there was duly apportioned to each entity that which rightly befalls to them. This city and polity must have had citizens prior to the appearance of human beings. These might be justifiably termed people [citizens] of the Great City (megalopolitai) . . . And who should these be but spiritual and divine natures, some incorporeal and visible to mind only (noetai), some not without bodies, such as are the stars?
3, 338 Cicero de Republica I 13, 19 (Loeb)
Do you not think it important for our homes that we should know what is happening and being done in that home which is not shut in by the walls we build, but is the whole universe, a home and a fatherland which the gods have given us the privilege of sharing with them?
3, 339 Cicero de Legibus I 7, 22 (Loeb, mod.)
That animal which we call human, endowed with foresight and quick intelligence, complex, keen, possessing memory, full of reason and prudence, has been given a certain distinguished status by the supreme god who created him; for he is the only one among so many different kinds and varieties of living beings who has a share in reason and thought, while all the rest are deprived of it. But what is more divine, I will not say in the human being only, but in all heaven and earth, than reason? And reason, when it is full grown and perfected, is rightly called wisdom. Therefore, since there is nothing better than reason, and since it exists both in human beings and gods, the first common possession of humans and gods is reason. But those who have reason in common must also have right reason in common. And since right reason is Law, we must believe that humans have Law also in common with the gods. Further, those who share Law must also share Justice; and those who share these are to be regarded as members of the same commonwealth. If indeed they obey the same authorities and powers, this is true in a far greater degree; but as a matter of fact they do obey this celestial system, the divine mind, and the god of superior power (praepotenti). Hence we must now conceive of this whole universe as one commonwealth of which both gods and humans are members.

Section 5. On what binds human beings

3, 340 Cicero de Finibus III 62 (Loeb)
Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. [63] From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another to be akin to him.
3, 341 Cicero de Finibus III 64 (Loeb mod.)
And as we feel it wicked and inhuman for [people] to declare (the saying is usually expressed in a familiar Greek line) that they care not if when they themselves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake. [65] this is the feeling that has given rise to the practice of making a will and appointing guardians for one's children when one is dying.
3, 342 Cicero de Finibus III 65 (Loeb mod.)
And the fact that no one would care to pass his life alone in a desert, even though supplied with pleasures in unbounded profusion, readily shows that we are born for society and intercourse, and for a natural partnership with our fellow [human beings]. Moreover, nature inspires us with a desire to benefit as many people as we can, and especially by imparting information and the principles of wisdom. [66] Hence it would be hard to discover anyone who will not impart to another any knowledge that he may himself possess; so strong is our propensity not only to learn but to teach. And just as bulls have a natural instinct to fight with all their strength and force in defending their calves against lions, so those [persons] of exceptional gifts and capacity for service, like Hercules and Liber in the legends, feel a natural impulse to be the protectors of the human race. . . . Therefore just as we actually use our limbs before we have learnt for what useful purpose they were bestowed upon us, so we are united and allied by nature in the common society of the state. Were this not so, there would be no room either for justice or benevolence.
3, 343 Cicero de Legibus I 10, 28. (Loeb mod.)
Surely there comes nothing more valuable than the full realization that we are born for Justice, and that right is based, not upon [human] opinions, but upon Nature. This fact will be immediately plain if you once get a clear conception of [human beings's] fellowship and union with [each other]. For no single thing is so like another, so exactly like its counterpart, as all of us are to one another. Nay, if bad habits and flase beliefs did not twist the weaker minds and turn them in whatever direction they are inclined, no one would be so like his own self as all [humans] would be like all others. And so, however we may define the human being, a single definition will apply to all. This is a sufficient proof that there is no difference in kind [between one human being and another]; for if there were one definition could not be applied to all; and indeed reason, which alone raises us above the level of the beasts and enables us to draw inferences, to prove and disprove, to discuss and solve problems, and to come to conclusions, is certainly common to all, and though varying in what it learns, at least in the capacity to learn it is [equal]. For the same things are invariably perceived by the senses, and those things which stimulate the senses, stimulate them in the same way in all [human beings]; and those rudimentary beginnings of intelligence, to which I have referred, which are imprinted on our minds, are imprinted on all minds alike; and speech, the mind's interpreter, though different in the choice of words, agrees in the sentiments expressed. In fact, there is no human being of any nationality [gens] who, if he finds a guide, cannot attain to virtue.
3, 344 Cicero de Legibus I 15, 43 (Loeb mod.)
And if Nature is not to be considered the very foundation of Justice, that will be mean the destruction [of the virtues on which human society depends]. For where then will there be a place for generosity, or love of country, or loyalty, or the inclination to be of service to others or to show gratitude for favours received? For these virtues originate in our natural inclination to love our fellow [human beings], and this is the foundation of Justice. Otherwise not merely consideration for human beings but also rites and pious observances in honor of the gods are done away with; for I think that these ought to be maintained, not through fear, but on account of the close relationship which exists between [human beings] and [the gods].
3, 345 Lactantius divine institutes V 18 []
For we see that in all animals, because they are destitute of wisdom, nature is the provider of supplies for itself. Therefore they injure others that they may profit themselves, for they do not understand that the committing an injury is evil. But man, who has the knowledge of good and evil, abstains from committing an injury even to his own damage, which an animal without reason is unable to do; and on this account innocence is reckoned among the chief virtues of man. Now by these things it appears that he is the wisest man who prefers to perish rather than to commit an injury, that he may preserve that sense of duty by which he is distinguished from the dumb creation.
3, 346 Origen Contra Celsum VIII 50 (Vol. II, p. 265, 22 Ko (p. 778 Del.) [my translation]
For what is social (koinonikon) is not circumscribed as it is with the irrational animals and the most vulgar human beings. But the creator who created us equally in relation to all human beings made us social animals.
3, 347 Proclus in Plat. Alcib. Pr. Vol. III p. 64 ed. Cousin. [my trans.]
On the one hand those from the Stoa directly represent all such things as wicked. For not to deceive (seduce, beguile?) is rightly not to do violence nor to persist stubbornly but each of these actions spring from wicked habits and is unjust. But the ancients regard all such things as indifferents etc.
3 , 367 Diog. Laert. VII. 129
Further it is their doctrine that there can be no question of right between us and the other animals, because of dissimilarity, as Chrysippus said in the first book concerning Justice

Ethica VII. On Pathe

Section 1. The notion of pathos and definitions of particular pathe

3, 390 - Plu de virt. mor. ch. 10, p. 450c.

Section 5. Chrysippus Peri Pathon Book IV
(where it is demonstrated that the pathe are judgments of the hegemonikon)

3, 455 - Plu CN 25.1070e
Yet Chrysippus does admit that there are certain fears and griefs and deceptions which injure us but do not make us worse. Read the first of his books concerning Justice writing against Plato, for it worth while for other reasons also to observe the man's verbal ingenuity there sparing absolutely no fact or doctrine at all, either his own or another's.
3, 462 Galen de H. and Plato decr. IV 2 (136) p. 338 Mu
(only part of the item; this trans. from Long & Sedley 65J) [Chrysippus in On Passions book I] (I) "First of all we should bear in mind that a rational animal follows reason naturally, and acts in accordance with reason as if that were its guide. (2) Often, however, it moves towards and away from certain things in a different way, pushed to excess in disobedience to reason. (3) Both definitions [i.e. the definitions of passions both as 'irrational' and as 'excessive impulses,' cf. A I (=3, 378, 389 [part]--JG)] refer to this movement: the movement contrary to nature which occurs irrationally in this way, and the excess in impulses . . . (4) For this irrationality must be taken to mean 'disobedient to reason' and "reason turned aside"; with reference to this movement we even speak in ordinary language of people "being pushed" and "moved irrationally, without reason and judgment". What we mean by these expressions is not as though a person moves in error and overlooking something that accords with reason, but we refer chiefly to the movement of which the expression provide an outline account, since it is not a rational animal's natue to move in his soul in this way, but in accordance with reason . . . (5) This also explains the expression "the excess of impulse", sinc epoeple overstep the proper and natural proportion of their impulses. (6) My meaning can be made more intelligible in th is way. Whens omeone walks in accordance with his impulse, the movement of his legs is not excessive but commensurate with the impulse, so that he can stop or change whenever he wants to. (7) But when people run in accordance with their impulse, this sort of thing no longer happens. The movement of their legs exceeds their impulse, so that they are carried away and unable to change obediently, as soon as they have started to do so. (8) Something similar, I think, takes place with impulses, owing to their going beyond the rational proportion. The result is that when someone has the impulse he is not obedient to reason. (9) The excess in running is called "contrary to the impulse" but the excess in the impulse is called "contrary to reason". For the proportion of a natural impulse is what accords with reason and goes only so far as reason itself thinks right.

3, 476 Galen de H. and Plato dogm. IV 4 (141) p. 356 Mu

Ethika IX. On the Sage and the Fool

3, 545 - Plu. de Stoic. rep. 17.1041f
. . . he has said in the third book concerning justice : "That is why also because of its exceeding sublimity and beauty what we say seems like fiction and not on the level of man and human nature."
3, 617 - DL 7.122
Moreover, according to them not only are the wise free, they are also kings; kingship being irresponsible rule, which none but the wise can maintain; so Chrysippus in his treatise vindicating Zeno's use of terminology. For he holds that knowledge of good and evil is a necessary attribute of the ruler, and that no bad man is acquainted with this science.
3, 662 - Plu SR 31.1048e 3, 668 - Plu SR 31

Plu CN 10,1062f

Diogenianus acc to Eusebius praep. evang. VI 264b

Ethika X

Precepts to Follow in Life

Section 5. On Simple Eating

3, 705 - Plu. SR 32.1049a
Some of the Pythagoreans object to him for writing of cocks in the books concerning Justice that they have come into being for a useful purpose, for they wake us up and pluck out scorpions and arouse us for battle by inducing an eagerness for valour; but all the same they too must be eaten in order that the number of chicks may not exceed what is useful.
3, 709a - Athenaeus Deipn. IV p. 158a

Section 10. On Matters Related to Cynic Teachings (Cynica)

3, 747 - DL 7.188.
In the third book of his treatise On Justice, at about line 1000, he permits eating of the corpses of the dead
3, 748 - Sextus Emp. Adv. Math. 11.192