Panaetius of Rhodes
On Appropriate Action
(Peri Tou Kathêkontos) Fragments

Part II

This material derives from Cicero's De Officiis Book II

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contact Dr. Jan Garrett

Latest modification: March 14, 2006



Source: Marcus Tullius Cicero. De Officiis. Translated by Walter Miller. Loeb Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913. Before using any portion of this text in any theme, essay, research paper, thesis, or dissertation, please read the disclaimer.

Transcription conventions: Page numbers in angle brackets refer to the edition cited as the source. The Latin text, which appears on even-numbered pages, is not included here. A slash followed by a small letter or a number indicates a footnote at the bottom of the page. Only notes of historical, philosophical, or literary interest to a general reader have been included. I have allowed Greek passages to stand as the scanner read them, in unintelligible strings of characters.

December 18th, 1999:  Index linked and missing final lines of  pp. 59-61 restored.

Disclaimer

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Republishing of material originally appearing on this site in any medium without giving credit to the site is plagiarism and may be prosecuted in a court of law. Similarly, using electronic material from this site in any theme, essay, term paper, research paper, thesis, or dissertation without acknowledging indebtedness to stoics.com may result in serious academic discredit to the student who does so.

Note by Dr. Jan Garrett

The source note above was by Professor Ben Schneider, who prepared a version of De Officiis for his website (www.stoics.com). I have used his web files as a basis for this effort. The transcription information and disclaimer are modified versions of his remarks. I am solely responsible for errors that may have been introduced by my alterations.

I have removed Prof. Schneider's indexing, which is still available in his online version of De Officiis at www.stoics.com.

Although Cicero is helpful in helping us discover where he was relying on Panaetius and where he was adding his own matter, extracting Panaetian material from De Officiis is still a hazardous business. It is likely that most of the Roman historical and Latin literary references are Cicero's additions. This is most certain, of course, with historical references after Panaetius' time.

The use of the first person, I suspect, is a sign of Cicero's additions, often small ones. I have left a few of them unremarked.

Insofar as I was able (given the limited amount of time I can invest in this effort) I have tried to follow Andrew Dyck's Commentary on Cicero's De Officiis (University of Michigan Press, 1996).



BOOK II+
Expediency

Cicero's self-reference removed

The preceding [sections of this work have explained] how duties are derived from moral rectitude, or rather from each of virtue's four divisions. [The] next step is to trace out those kinds of duty which have to do with the comforts of life, with the means of acquiring the things that people enjoy, with influence, and with wealth. [In this connection, the question is, as I said: (1) what is expedient, and what is inexpedient; and (2) of several expedients, which is of more and which of most importance.]

A few sections referring to Cicero, his and Rome's circumstances at the time of writing, and his conception of the role of philosophy for Rome have been removed.

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BOOK II.

5 II. . . . What, in the name of heaven, is more to be desired
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BOOK II. ii.

than wisdom? What is more to be prized? What is better for a man, what more worthy of his nature? Those who seek after it are called philosophers; and philosophy is nothing else, if one will translate the word into our idiom, than "the love of wisdom." Wisdom, morever, as the word has been defined by the philosophers of old, is "the knowledge of things human and divine and of the causes by which those things are controlled." And if the man lives who would belittle the study of philosophy, . . . what in the world he would see fit to

6 praise. For if we are looking for mental enjoyment and relaxation, what pleasure can be compared with the pursuits of those who are always studying out something that will tend toward and effectively promote a good and happy life? Or, if regard is had for strength of character and virtue, then this is the method by which we can attain to those qualities, or there is none at all. And to say that there is no "method" for securing the highest blessings, when none even of the least important concerns is without its method, is the language of people who talk without due reflection and blunder in matters of the utmost importance. Furthermore, if there is really a way to learn virtue, where shall one look for it, when one has turned aside from this field of learning?

More self-references by Cicero

7 I have removed Cicero's defense of undertaking an inquiry about rules of duty when he is a declared adherent of Carneades' skeptical Academy.
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BOOK II. ii.

8
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BOOK II. ii.-iii.

Let us now proceed to the task in hand.

9 III. Five principles, accordingly, have been laid down for the pursuance of duty: two of them have to do with propriety and moral rectitude; two, with the external conveniences of life - means, wealth, influence; the fifth, with the proper choice, if ever the four first mentioned seem to be in conflict. The division treating of moral rectitude, then, has been completed, and this is the part with which I desire you to be most familiar. The principle with which we are now dealing is that one which is called Expediency (utile). The usage of this word has been corrupted and perverted and has gradually come to the point where, separating moral rectitude from expediency, it is accepted that a thing may be morally right without being expedient, and expedient without being morally right. No more pernicious doctrine than this could be introduced into human life.

10 There are, to be sure, philosophers of the very highest reputation who distinguish theoretically between these three conceptions,/a although they are indissolubly blended together; and they do this, I assume, on moral, conscientious principles. [For whatever is just, they hold, is also expedient; and, in like manner, whatever is morally right is also just. It follows, then, that whatever is morally right is also expedient.) Those who fail to comprehend that
------
a That is, they make a false distinction between (1) moral rectitude that is at the same time expedient; (2) moral rectitude that is (apparently) not expedient; and (3) the expedient that is (apparently) not morally right.
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BOOK II. iii.

theory do often, in their admiration for shrewd and clever men, take craftiness for wisdom. But they must be disabused of this error and their way of thinking must be wholly converted to the hope and conviction that it is only by moral character and righteousness, not by dishonesty and craftiness, that they may attain to the objects of their desires.

11 Of the things, then, that are essential to the sustenance of human life, some are inanimate (gold and silver, for example, the fruits of the earth, and so forth), and some are animate and have their own peculiar instincts and appetites. Of these again some are rational, others irrational. Horses, oxen, and the other cattle, [bees,] whose labour contributes more or less to the service and subsistence of man, are not endowed with reason; of rational beings two divisions are made-gods and men. Worship and purity of character will win the favour of the gods; and next to the gods, and a close second to them, men can be most helpful to men.

12 The same classification may likewise be made of the things that are injurious and hurtful. But, as people think that the gods bring us no harm, they decide (leaving the gods out of the question) that men are most hurtful to men. As for mutual helpfulness, those very things which we have called inanimate are for the most part themselves produced by man's labours; we should not have them without the application of manual labour and skill nor could we enjoy them without the intervention of man. And so with many other things: for without man's industry there could have been no provisions for health, no navigation, no agriculture, no ingathering or storing of the
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BOOK II. iii.-iv.

13 fruits of the field or other kinds of produce. Then, too, there would surely be no exportation of our superfluous commodities or importation of those we lack, did not men perform these services. By the same process of reasoning, without the labour of man's hands, the stone needful for our use would not be quarried from the earth, nor would "iron, copper, gold, and silver, hidden far within," be mined.

IV. And how could houses ever have been provided in the first place for the human race, to keep out the rigours of the cold and alleviate the discomforts of the heat; or how could the ravages of furious tempest or of earthquake or of time upon them afterward have been repaired, had not the bonds of social life taught men in such events to

14 look to their fellow-men for help? Think of the aqueducts, canals, irrigation works, breakwaters, artificial harbours; how should we have these without the work of man? From these and many other illustrations it is obvious that we could not in any way, without the work of man's hands, have received the profits and the benefits accruing from inanimate things. Finally, of what profit or service could animals be, without the cooperation of man? For it was men who were the foremost in discovering what use could be made of each beast; and to-day, if it were not for man's labour, we could neither feed them nor break them in nor take care of them nor yet secure the profits from them in due season. By man, too, noxious beasts are destroyed, and those that can be of use are captured.

15 Why should I recount the multitude of arts without which life would not be worth living at all? For
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BOOK II. iv.-v.

how would the sick be healed? What pleasure would the hale enjoy? What comforts should we have, if there were not so many arts to master to our wants? In all these respects the civilized life of man is far removed from the standard of the comforts and wants of the lower animals. And, without the association of men, cities could not have been built or peopled. In consequence of city life, laws and customs were established, and then came the equitable distribution of private rights and a definite social system. Upon these institutions followed a more humane spirit and consideration for others, with the result that life was better supplied with all it requires, and by giving and receiving, by mutual exchange of commodities and conveniences, we succeeded in meeting all our wants.

16 V.

Here Cicero justifies not including a mass of material that must have been in Panaetius' original.

. . . [W]ho is there to whom those facts which Panaetius narrates at great length are not self- evident - namely, that no one, . . . could have accomplished great things for the benefit of the state, without the hearty co- operation of other men?

And yet, as, on the one hand, we secure great advantages through the sympathetic cooperation of our fellow-men; so, on the other, there is no curse so terrible but it is brought down by man upon man. There is a book by Dicaearchus on "The Destruction of Human Life." He was a famous
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BOOK II. v.

and eloquent Peripatetic, and he gathered together all the other causes of destruction - floods, epidemics, famines, and sudden incursions of wild animals in myriads, by whose assaults, he informs us, whole tribes of men have been wiped out. And then he proceeds to show by way of comparison how many more men have been destroyed by the assaults of men - that is, by wars or revolutions -than by any and all other sorts of calamity.

17 Since, therefore, there can be no doubt on this point, that man is the source of both the greatest help and the greatest harm to man, I set it down as the peculiar function of virtue to win the hearts of men and to attach them to one's own service. And so those benefits that human life derives from inanimate objects and from the employment and use of animals are ascribed to the industrial arts; the cooperation of men, on the other hand, prompt and ready for the advancement of our interests, is secured through wisdom and virtue [in men of superior

18 ability]. And, indeed, virtue in general may be said to consist almost wholly in three properties; the first is Wisdom, the ability to perceive what in any given instance is true and real, what its relations are, its consequences, and its causes; the second is Temperance, the ability to restrain the passions (which the Greeks call pathe) and make the impulses (hormas) obedient to reason; and the third is Justice, the skill to treat with consideration and wisdom those with whom we are associated, in order that we may through their cooperation have our natural wants supplied in full and overflowing measure, that we may ward of any impending trouble, avenge ourselves upon those who have attempted to
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BOOK II. v.-vi.

injure us, and visit them with such retribution as justice and humanity will permit.

19 VI. I shall presently discuss the means by which we can gain the ability to win and hold the affections of our fellow-men; but I must say a few words by way of preface. Who fails to comprehend the enormous, two-fold power of Fortune for weal and for woe? When we enjoy her favouring breeze, we are waited over to the wished-for haven; when she blows against us, we are dashed to destruction. Fortune herself, then, does send those other less usual calamities, arising, first, from inanimate Nature - hurricanes, storms, shipwrecks, catastrophes, conflagrations; second, from wild beasts - kicks, bites, and attacks. But these, . . . , are comparatively rare.

20 But think, on the one side, of the destruction of armies (Roman references), the loss of generals (Roman reference), the hatred of the masses, too, and the banishment that as a consequence frequently comes to men of eminent services, their degradation and voluntary exile; think, on the other hand, of the successes, the civil and military honours, and the victories, - though all these contain an element of chance, still they cannot be brought about, whether for good or for ill, without the influence and the cooperation of our fellow-men. With this understanding of the influence of Fortune, [one] may proceed to explain how we can win. the affectionate cooperation of our fellows and enlist it in our service. And if the discussion of this point is unduly prolonged, let the length be compared
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with the importance of the object in view. It will then, perhaps, seem even too short.

21 Whenever, then, people bestow anything upon a fellow-man to raise his estate or his dignity, it may be from any one of several motives: (1) it may be out of good-will, when for some reason they are fond of him; (2) it may be from esteem, if they look up to his worth and think him deserving of the most splendid fortune a man can have; (3) they may have confidence in him and think that they are thus acting for their own interests; or (4) they may fear his power; (5) they may, on the contrary, hope for some favour - as, for example, when princes or demagogues bestow gifts of money; or, finally, (6) they may be moved by the promise of payment or reward. This last is, I admit, the meanest and most sordid motive of all, both for those who are swayed by it and for those who venture to

22 resort to it. For things are in a bad way, when that which should be obtained by merit is attempted by money. But since recourse to this kind of support is sometimes indispensable, I shall explain how it should be employed; but first I shall discuss those qualities which are more closely allied to merit. Now, it is by various motives that people are led to submit to another's authority and power: they may be influenced (1) by good-will; (2) by gratitude for generous favours conferred upon them; (3) by the eminence of that other's social position or by the hope that their submission will turn to their own account; (4) by fear that they may be compelled perforce to submit; (5) they may be captivated by the hope of gifts of money and by liberal promises; or, finally,
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BOOK II. vi.-vii.

(6) they may be bribed with money, as we have frequently seen in our own country.

23 VII. But, of all motives, none is better adapted to secure influence and hold it fast than love, nothing is more foreign to that end than fear.

I have removed a quote from Roman poet Ennius and references to the recent death of the "tyrant" Caesar.

The death of [tyrants at the hands of those whom they have oppressed] illustrates the deadly effects of popular hatred; and the same lesson is taught by the similar fate of all other despots, of whom practically no one has ever escaped such a death. For fear is but a poor safeguard of lasting power; while affection, on the other hand, may be trusted to keep it safe for ever.

24 But those who keep subjects in check by force would of course have to employ severity - masters, for example, toward their servants, when these cannot be held in control in any other way. But those who in a free state deliberately put themselves in a position to be feared are the maddest of the mad. For let the laws be never so much overborne by some one individual's power, let the spirit of freedom be never so intimidated, still sooner or later they assert themselves either through unvoiced public sentiment, or through secret ballots disposing of some high office of state. Freedom suppressed and again regained bites with keener fangs than freedom never
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BOOK II. vii.

endangered. Let us, then, embrace this policy, which appeals to every heart and is the strongest support not only of security but also of influence and power -namely, to banish fear and cleave to love. And thus we shall most easily secure success both in private and in public life. Furthermore, those who wish to be feared must inevitably be afraid of those whom they intimidate.

25 What, for instance, shall we think of the elder Dionysius? With what tormenting fears he used to be racked! For through fear of the barber's razor he used to have his hair singed off with a glowing coal. In what state of mind do we fancy Alexander of Pherae lived? We read in history that he dearly loved his wife Thebe; and yet, whenever he went from the banquet-hall to her in her chamber, he used to order a barbarian - one, too, tattooed like a Thracian, as the records state - to go before him with a drawn sword; and he used to send ahead some of his bodyguard to pry into the lady's caskets and to search and see whether some weapon were not concealed in her wardrobe. Unhappy man! To think a barbarian, a branded slave, more faithful than his own wife! Nor was he mistaken. For he was murdered by her own hand, because she suspected him of infidelity. And indeed no power is strong enough to be last-

26 ing if it labours under the weight of fear. Witness Phalaris, whose cruelty is notorious beyond that of all others. He was slain, not treacherously (like that Alexander whom I named but now), not by a few conspirators (like that tyrant of ours), but the whole population of Agrigentum rose against him with one accord. Again, did not the Macedonians abandon Deme-
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BOOK II. vii.-viii.

trius and march over as one man to Pyrrhus? And again, when the Spartans exercised their supremacy tyrannically, did not practically all the allies desert them and view their disaster at Leuctra, as idle spectators?

VIII. Roman references removed

27
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BOOK II. viii.

. . .
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BOOK II. viii.-ix.

[S]ince it is manifest that the power of good-will is so great and that of fear is so weak, it remains for us to discuss by what means we can most readily win the affection, linked with honour and confidence, which we desire.

30 But we do not all feel this need to the same extent; for it must be determined in conformity with each individual's vocation in life whether it is essential for him to have the affection of many or whether the love of a few will suffice. Let this then be settled as the first and absolute essential -that we have the devotion of friends, affectionate and loving, who value our worth. For in just this one point there is but little difference between the greatest and the ordinary man; and friendship is to be cultivated almost equally by both.

31 All men do not, perhaps, stand equally in need of political honour, fame and the good-will of their fellow-citizens; nevertheless, if these honours come to a man, they help in many ways, and especially in the acquisition of friends.

IX. Reference to Cicero's other writings removed.

Let us now take up the discussion of Glory . . . on that subject also. Still, let us touch briefly on it here, since it is of very great help in the conduct of more important business. The highest, truest glory depends upon the fol-
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BOOK II. ix.

lowing three things: the affection, the confidence, and the mingled admiration and esteem of the people. Such sentiments, if I may speak plainly and concisely, are awakened in the masses in the same way as in individuals. But there is also another avenue of approach to the masses, by which we can, as it were, steal into the hearts of all at once.

32 But of the three above-named requisites, let us look first at good- will and the rules for securing it. Good-will is won principally through kind services/a; next to that, it is elicited by the will to do a kind service, even though nothing happen to come of it. Then, too, the love of people generally is powerfully attracted by a man's mere name and reputation for generosity, kindness, justice, honour, and all those virtues that belong to gentleness of character and affability
of manner. And because that very quality which we term moral goodness and propriety is pleasing to us by and of itself and touches all our hearts both by its inward essence and its outward aspect and shines forth with most lustre through those virtues named above, we are, therefore, compelled by Nature herself to love those in whom we believe those virtues to reside. Now these are only the most powerful motives to love - not all of them; there may be some minor ones besides.

33 Secondly, the command of confidence can be secured on two conditions: (1) if people think us possessed of practical wisdom combined with a sense of justice. For we have confidence in those who we think have more understanding than ourselves, who, --
a Cicero means by "kind services" the services of the lawyer; he was forbidden by law to accept a fee; his services, if he contributed them, were "acts of kindness."
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BOOK II. ix.-x.

we believe, have better insight into the future, and who, when an emergency arises and a crisis comes, can clear away the diffculties and reach a safe decision according to the exigencies of the occasion; for that kind of wisdom the world accounts genuine and practical. But (2) confidence is reposed in men who are just and true - that is, good men - on the definite assumption that their characters admit of no suspicion of dishonesty or wrong-doing. And so we believe that it is perfectly safe to entrust our lives, our fortunes, and our children to their care.

34 Of these two qualities, then, justice has the greater power to inspire confidence; for even without the aid of wisdom, it has considerable weight; but wisdom without justice is of no avail to inspire confidence; for take from a man his reputation for probity, and the more shrewd and clever he is, the more hated and mistrusted he becomes. Therefore, justice combined with practical wisdom will command all the confidence we can desire; justice without wisdom will be able to do much; wisdom without justice will be of no avail at all.

The next passage, obviously Cicero's, explains a method he claims to share with Panaetius. For that reason I have preserved most of it here.

35 X. But I am afraid someone may wonder why I am now separating the virtues - as if it were possible for anyone to be just who is not at the same time wise; for it is agreed upon among all philosophers, . . . that he who has one virtue has them all. The explanation of my apparent inconsistency is that the precision of speech we employ, when abstract truth is critically investigated in philosophic discussion, is one thing; and that employed, when we are adapting our language entirely to popular thinking, is another. And therefore I am speaking here in the popular sense, when
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BOOK II. x.

I call some men brave, others good, and still others wise; for in dealing with popular conceptions we must employ familiar words in their common acceptation; and this was the practice of Panaetius likewise. But let us return to the subject.

36 The third, then, of the three conditions I name as essential to glory is that we be accounted worthy of the esteem and admiration of our fellow-men. While people admire in general everything that is great or better than they expect, they admire in particular the good qualities that they find unexpectedly in individuals. And so they reverence and extol with the highest praises those men in whom they see certain pre-eminent and extraordinary talents; and they look down with contempt upon those who they think have no ability, no spirit, no energy. For they do not despise all those of whom they think ill. For some men they consider unscrupulous, slanderous fraudulent, and dangerous; they do not despise them, it may be; but they do think ill of them. And therefore, as I said before, those are despised who are "of no use to themselves or their neighbours," as the saying is, who are idle, lazy, and indifferent.

37 On the other hand, those are regarded with admiration who are thought to excel others in ability and to be free from all dishonour and also from those vices which others do not easily resist. For sensual pleasure, a most seductive mistress, turns the hearts of the greater part of humanity away from virtue; and when the fiery trial of affliction draws near, most people are terrified beyond measure.
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BOOK II. x.-xi.

Life and death, wealth and want affect all men most powerfully. But when men, with a spirit great and exalted, can look down upon such outward circumstances, whether prosperous or adverse, and when some noble and virtuous purpose, presented to their minds, converts them wholly to itself and carries them away in its pursuit, who then could fail to admire in them the splendour and beauty of virtue?

38 XI. As, then, this superiority of mind to such externals inspires great admiration, so justice, above all, on the basis of which alone men are called "good men," seems to people generally a quite marvellous virtue - and not without good reason; for no one can be just who fears death or pain or exile or poverty, or who values their opposites above equity. And people admire especially the man who is uninfluenced by money; and if a man has proved himself in this direction, they think him tried as by fire. Those three requisites, therefore, which were presupposed as the means of obtaining glory, are all secured by justice: (1) good-will, for it seeks to be of help to the greatest number; (2) confidence, for the same reason; and (3) admiration, because it scorns and cares nothing for those things, with a consuming passion for which most people are carried away.

39 Now, in my opinion at least, every walk and vocation in life calls for human co-operation - first and above all, in order that one may have friends with whom to enjoy social intercourse. And this is not easy, unless he is looked upon as a good man. So, even to a man who shuns society and to one who spends his life in the country a reputation for justice is essential - even more
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BOOK II. xi. -xii.

have no defence to protect them and so will be

40 the victims of many kinds of wrong. So also to buyers and sellers, to employers and employed, and to those who are engaged in commercial dealings generally, justice is indispensable for the conduct o business. Its importance is so great, that not even those who live by wickedness and crime can get on without some small element of justice. For if a robber takes anything by force or by fraud from another member of the gang, he loses his standing even in a band of robbers; and if the one called the "Pirate Captain" should not divide the plunder impartially, he would be either deserted or murdered by his comrades. Why, they say that robbers even have a code of laws to observe and obey. And so, because of his impartial division of booty, Bardulis, the Illyrian bandit, of whom we read in Theopompus, acquired great power,

Roman historical references removed

Since, therefore, the efficacy of justice is so great that it strengthens and augments the power even of robbers, how great do we think its power will be in a constitutional government with its laws and courts?

41 XII. Now it seems to me, at least, that not only among the Medes, as Herodotus tells us, but also among our own ancestors, men of high moral character were made kings in order that the people might enjoy justice.

Although Cicero refers in the preceding sentence to Roman history, a similar point was made by earlier Greek writers about early Greek history. So I left it in.

For, as the masses in their helplessness were oppressed by the strong, they appealed for protection to some one man who was
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BOOK II. xii.

conspicuous for his virtue; and, as he shielded the weaker classes from wrong, he managed by establishing equitable conditions to hold the higher and the lower classes in an equality of right. The reason for making constitutional laws was the same as that for

42 making kings. For what people have always sought is equality of rights before the law. For rights that were not open to all alike would be no rights. If the people secured their end at the hands of one just and good man, they were satisfied with that; but when such was not their good fortune, laws were invented, to speak to all men at all times in one and the same voice. This, then, is obvious: nations used to select for their rulers those men whose reputation for justice was high in the eyes of the people. If in addition they were also thought wise, there was nothing that men did not think they could secure under such leadership. Justice is, therefore, in every way to be cultivated and maintained, both for its own sake (for otherwise it would not be justice) and for the enhancement of personal honour and glory. But as there is a method not only of acquiring money but also of investing it so as to yield an income to meet our continuously recurring expenses - both for the necessities and for the more refined comforts of life - so there must be a method of gaining glory and turning it to account. And yet, as

43 Socrates used to express it so admirably, "the nearest way to glory - a short cut, as it were - is to strive to be what you wish to be thought to be." For if anyone thinks that he can win lasting glory by pretence, by empty show,
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BOOK II. xii.-xiii.

deep root and spreads its branches wide; but all pretences soon fall to the ground like fragile flowers, and nothing counterfeit can be lasting. There are very many witnesses to both facts

Roman historical reference removed.

XIII. If, therefore, anyone wishes to win true glory, let him discharge the duties required by justice. And what they are has been set forth in the course of the preceding book.

44 (XIII.) But, although the very essence of the problem is that we actually be what we wish to be thought to be, still some rules may be laid down to enable us most easily to secure the reputation of being what we are. For, if anyone in his early youth has the responsibility of living up to a distinguished name acquired either by inheritance from his father

Personal reference to Cicero and his son removed

or by some chance or happy combination of circumstances, the eyes of the world are turned upon him; his life and character are scrutinized; and, as if he moved in a blaze of light, not a word and not a deed of his

45 can be kept a secret. Those, on the other hand, whose humble and obscure origin has kept them unknown to the world in their early years ought, as soon as they approach young manhood, to set a high ideal before their eyes and to strive with unswerving zeal towards its realization. This they will do with the better heart, because that time of life is
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BOOK II. xiii.

accustomed to find favour rather than to meet with opposition. Well, then, the first thing to recommend to a young man in his quest for glory is that he try to win it, if he can, in a military career.

Personal references to Cicero's son removed

46 As, then, in everything else brain- work is far more important than mere hand-work, so those objects which we strive to attain through intellect and reason gain for us a higher degree of gratitude than those which we strive to gain by physical strength. The best recommendation, then, that a young man can have to popular esteem proceeds from self-
restraint, filial affection, and devotion to kinsfolk. Next to that, young men win recognition most easily and most favourably, if they attach themselves to men who are at once wise and renowned as well as patriotic counsellors in public affairs. And if they associate constantly with such men, they inspire in the public the expectation that they will be like them, seeing that they have themselves selected them
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BOOK II. xiii.-xiv.

47 for imitation.

Roman historical references removed.

48 XIV. But as the classification of discourse is a twofold one - conversation, on the one side; oratory, on the other - there can be no doubt that of the two this debating power (for that is what we mean by eloquence) counts for more toward the attainment of glory; and yet, it is not easy to say how far an affable and courteous manner in conversation may go toward winning the affections. We have, for instance, the letters of Philip to Alexander, of Antipater to Cassander, and of Antigonus to Philip the Younger. The authors of these letters were, as we are informed, three of the wisest men in history; and in them they instruct their sons to woo the hearts of the populace to affection by words of kindness and to keep their soldiers loyal by a winning address. But the speech that is delivered in a debate before an assembly often stirs the hearts of thousands at once; for the eloquent and judicious speaker is received with high admiration, and his hearers think
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BOOK II. xiv.

him understanding and wise beyond all others. And, if his speech have also dignity combined with moderation, he will be admired beyond all measure, especially if these qualities are found in a young man.

49 But while there are occasions of many kinds that call for eloquence, and while many young men in our republic have obtained distinction by their speeches in the courts, in the popular assemblies, and in the senate, yet it is the speeches before our courts that excite the highest admiration. The classification of forensic speeches also is a twofold one: they are divided into arguments for the prosecution and arguments for the defence. And while the side of the defence is more honourable, still that of the prosecution also has very often established a reputation.

Roman historical references removed.


50 But if it shall be required of anyone to conduct . . . frequent prosecutions, let him do it as a service to his country; for it is no disgrace to be often employed in the prosecution of her
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BOOK II. xiv.

enemies. And yet a limit should be set even to that. For it requires a heartless man, it seems, or rather one who is well-nigh inhuman, to be arraigning one person after another on capital charges./a It is not only fraught with danger to the prosecutor himself, but is damaging to his reputation, to allow himself to be called a prosecutor.

Roman historical references removed.

51 Again, the following rule of duty is to be carefully observed: never prefer a capital charge against any person who may be innocent. For that cannot possibly be done without making oneself a criminal. For what is so unnatural as to turn to the ruin and destruction of good men the eloquence bestowed by Nature for the safety and protection of our fellowmen? And yet, while we should never prosecute the innocent, we need not have scruples against undertaking on occasion the defence of a guilty person, provided he be not infamously depraved and wicked. For people expect it; custom sanctions it; humanity also accepts it. It is always the business of the judge in a trial to find out the truth; it is sometimes the business of the advocate to maintain what is plausible, even if it be not strictly true

Revealing remark by Cicero regarding Panaetius.

though I should not venture to say this, especially in an ethical treatise, if it were not also the position of Panaetius, that strictest of Stoics

Then, too, briefs for the defence are most likely to bring glory and popularity to the pleader, and all the more so, if ever it falls to him to lend his aid to one who seems to be oppressed and persecuted by the influence of someone in power.

Self-references by Cicero removed.


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BOOK II. xiv.-xv.

52 XV. Now that I have set forth the moral duties of a young man, in so far as they may be exerted for the attainment of glory, I must next in order discuss kindness (beneficientia) and generosity (liberalitas). The manner of showing it is twofold: kindness is shown to the needy either by personal service, or by gifts of money. The latter way is the easier, especially for a rich man; but the former is nobler and more dignified and more becoming to a strong and eminent man. For, although both ways alike betray a generous wish to oblige, still in the one case the favour makes a draft upon one's bank account, in the other upon one's personal energy; and the bounty which is drawn from one's material substance tends to exhaust the very fountain of liberality. Liberality is thus forestalled by liberality: for the more people one has helped with

53 gifts of money, the fewer one can help. But if people are generous and kind in the way of personal service - that is, with their ability and personal effort - various advantages arise: first, the more people they assist, the more helpers they will have in works of kindness; and second, by acquiring the habit of kindness they are better prepared and in better training, as it were, for bestowing favours upon many. In one of his letters Philip takes his son Alexander sharply to task for trying by gifts of Money to secure the good-will of the Macedonians: "What in the mischief induced you to entertain such a hope," he says, "as that those men would be loyal subjects to
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BOOK II. xv.

you whom you had corrupted with money? Or are you trying to do what you can to lead the Macedonians to expect that you will be not their king but their steward and purveyor?" "Steward and purveyor" was well said, because it was degrading for a prince; better still, when he called the gift of money "corruption." For the recipient goes from bad to worse and is made all the more ready to be constantly looking for one bribe after another.

54 It was to his son that Philip gave this lesson; but let us all take it diligently to heart. That liberality, therefore, which consists in personal service and effort is more honourable, has wider application, and can benefit more people. There can be no doubt about that. Nevertheless, we should sometimes make gifts of money; and this kind of liberality is not to be discouraged altogether. We must often distribute from our purse to the worthy poor, but we must do so with discretion and moderation. For many/a have squandered their patrimony by indiscriminate giving. But what is worse folly than to do the thing you like in such a way that you can no longer do it at all? Then, too, lavish giving leads to robbery;/b for when through over-giving men begin to be impoverished, they are constrained to lay their hands on the property of others. And so, when men aim to be kind for the sake of winning good-will, the affection they gain from the object of their gifts is not so great as the hatred they incur from those whom they despoil.

55 One's purse, then, should not be closed so tightly that a generous impulse
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BOOK II. xv. -xvx.

should be observed and that limit should be determined by our means. We ought, in a word, to remember the phrase, which, through being repeated so very often by our countrymen, has come to be a common proverb: "Bounty has no bottom." For indeed what limit can there be, when those who have been accustomed to receive gifts claim what they have been in the habit of getting, and those who have not wish for the same bounty?

XVI. There are, in general, two classes of those who give largely: the one class is the lavish, the other the generous. The lavish are those who squander their money on public banquets, doles of meat among the people, gladiatorial shows, magnificent games, and wild-beast fights - vanities of which but a brief recollection will remain, or none at all.

56 The generous, on the other hand, are those who employ their own means to ransom captives from brigands, or who assume their friends' debts or help in providing dowries for their daughters, or assist them in acquiring property or increasing what they (56) have. And so I wonder what Theophrastus could have been thinking about when he wrote his book on "Wealth." It contains much that is fine; but his position is absurd, when he praises at great length the magnificent appointments of the popular games, and it is in the means for indulging in such expenditures that he finds the highest privilege of wealth. But to me the privilege it gives for the exercise of generosity, of which I have given a few illustratio
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BOOK II. xvi.

the populace. "If people in time of siege," he says, "are required to pay a mina for a pint of water, this seems to us at first beyond belief, and all are amazed; but, when they think about it, they make allowances for it on the plea of necessity. But in the matter of this enormous waste and unlimited expenditure we are not very greatly astonished, and that, too, though by it no extreme need is relieved, no dignity is enhanced, and the very gratification of the populace is but for a brief, passing moment; such pleasure as it is, too, is confined to the most frivolous, and even in these the very memory of their enjoyment dies as

57 soon as the moment of gratification is past." His conclusion, too, is excellent: "This sort of amusement pleases children, silly women, slaves, and the servile free; but a serious-minded man who weighs such matters with sound judgment cannot possibly approve of them."

Roman references removed


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BOOK II. xvi.-xvii.

58 XVII. Still we should avoid any suspicion of penuriousness.

Roman reference removed

If, therefore, such entertainment is demanded by the people, men of right judgment must at least consent to furnish it, even if they do not like the idea. But in so doing they should keep within their means , as I myself did. They should likewise afford such entertainment, if gifts of money to the people are to be the means of securing on some occasion some more important or more useful object.

References to recent history removed.

The justification for gifts of money, therefore, is

59 either necessity or expediency. And, in making them even in such cases, the rule of the golden mean is best.

References to recent history removed.


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BOOK II. xvi. -xvii.

60 Again, the expenditure of money is better justified when it is made for walls, docks, harbours, aqueducts, and all those works which are of service to the community. There is, to be sure, more of present satisfaction in what is handed out, like cash down; nevertheless public improvements win us greater gratitude with posterity.

The following passage is clearly Cicero's but I preserve it because it reveals a Panaetian position and Cicero's method of using Panaetius.

Out of respect for Pompey's memory I am rather diffident about expressing any criticism of theatres, colonnades, and new temples; and yet the greatest philosophers do not approve of them - our Panaetius himself, for example, whom I am following, not slavishly translating, in these books;

So, too, Demetrius of Phalerum, . . . denounces Pericles, the foremost man of Greece, for throwing away so much money on the magnificent, far-famed Propylaea. But this whole theme is discussed at length in my books on "The

Reference to Cicero's Republic removed.

To conclude, the whole system of public bounties in such extravagant amount is intrinsically wrong; but it may under certain circumstances be necessary to make them; even then they must be proportioned to our ability and regulated by the golden mean.

61 XVIII. Now, as touching that second division of
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BOOK II. xviii.

gifts of money, those which are prompted by a spirit of generosity, we ought to look at different cases differently. The case of the man who is overwhelmed by misfortune is different from that of the one who is seeking to better his condition, though

62 he suffers from no actual distress. It will be the duty of charity to incline more to the unfortunate, unless, perchance, they deserve their misfortune. But of course we ought by no means to withhold our assistance altogether from those who wish for aid, not to save them from utter ruin but to enable them to reach a higher degree of fortune. But, in selecting worthy cases, we ought to use judgment and discretion.

Ennius citation removed

63 Furthermore, the favour conferred upon a man who is good and grateful finds its reward, in such a case, not only in his own good-will but in that of others. For, when generosity is not indiscriminate giving, it wins most gratitude and people praise it with more enthusiasm, because goodness of heart in a man of high station becomes the common refuge of everybody. Pains must, therefore, be taken to benefit as many as possible with such kindnesses that the memory of them shall be handed down to children and to children's children, so that they too may not be ungrateful. For all men detest ingratitude and look upon the sin of it as a wrong committed against themselves also, because it discourages generosity; and they regard the ingrate as the common foe of all the poor. Ransoming prisoners from servitude and relieving the poor is a form of charity that is a service to the
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BOOK II. xviii.

state as well as to the individual.

Reference to Roman orator removed.

This form of charity, then, [. . . is to be] prefer[red] to the lavish expenditure of money for public exhibitions. The former is suited to men of worth and dignity, the latter to those shallow flatterers, . . . who tickle with idle pleasure, so to speak, the fickle fancy of the rabble.

64 It will, moreover, befit a gentleman to be at the same time liberal in giving and not inconsiderate in exacting his dues, but in every business relation - in buying or selling, in hiring or letting, in relations arising out of adjoining houses and lands - to be fair, reasonable, often freely yielding much of his own right, and keeping out of litigation as far as his interests will permit and perhaps even a little farther. For it is not only generous occasionally to abate a little of one's rightful claims, but it is sometimes even advantageous. We should, however, have a care for our personal property, for it is discreditable to let it run through our fingers; but we must guard it in such a way that there shall be no suspicion of meanness or avarice. For the greatest privilege of wealth is, beyond all peradventure, the opportunity it affords for doing good, without sacrificing one's fortune. Hospitality also is a theme of Theophrastus's praise, and rightly so. For, . . . it is most proper that the homes of distinguished men should be open to distinguished guests.

Reference to Roman hospitality removed.

It is, moreover, a very
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BOOK II. xviii.-xix.

great advantage, too, for those who wish to obtain a powerful political influence by honourable means to be able through their social relations with their guests to enjoy popularity and to exert influence abroad. For an instance of extraordinary hospitality, Theophrastus writes that at Athens Cimon was hospitable even to the Laciads, the people of his own deme; for he instructed his bailiffs to that end and gave them orders that every attention should be shown to any Laciad who should ever call at his country home.

65 XIX. Again, the kindnesses shown not by gifts of money but by personal service/a are bestowed sometimes upon the community at large, sometimes upon individual citizens. To protect a man in his legal rights [to assist him with counsel,] and to serve as many as possible with that sort of knowledge tends greatly to increase one's influence and popularity. Thus, among the many admirable ideas of our ancestors was the high respect they always accorded to the study and interpretation of the excellent body of our civil law. And down to the present unsettled times the foremost men of the state have kept this profession exclusively in their own hands; but now the prestige of legal learning has departed along with offices of honour and positions of signity; ana this is the more deplorable, because it has come to pass in the lifetime of a man/b who in knowledge of the law would easily have surpassed all his predecessors, while in honour he is their peer. Service such as this, then, finds many to appreciate it and is calculated to bind people closely to us by our good services.
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BOOK II. xix.

66 Closely connected with this profession, furthermore, is the gift of eloquence; it is at once more popular and more distinguished. For what is better than eloquence to awaken the admiration of one's hearers or the hopes of the distressed or the gratitude of those whom it has protected?

References to Roman experience removed.

67 . . . But though not all - no, not even many - can be learned in the law or, eloquent as pleaders, still anybody may be of service to many by canvassing in their support for appointments, by witnessing to their character before juries and magistrates, by looking out for the interests of one and another, and by soliciting for them the aid of jurisconsults or of advocates. Those who perform such services win the most gratitude and find a most extensive sphere for their activities.

68 Of course, those who pursue such a course do not need to be warned (for
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BOOK II. xix.-xx.

offend others. For oftentimes they hurt those whom they ought not or those whom it is inexpedient to offend. If they do it inadvertently, it is carelessness; if designedly, inconsiderateness. A man must apologize also, to the best of his ability, if he has involuntarily hurt anyone's feelings, and explain why what he has done was unavoidable and why he could not have done otherwise; and he must by future services and kind offices atone for the apparent offence.

69 XX. Now in rendering helpful service to people, we usually consider either their character or their circumstances. And so it is an easy remark, and one commonly made, to say that in investing kindnesses we look not to people's outward circumstances, but to their character. The phrase is admirable! But who is there, pray, that does not in performing a service set the favour of a rich and influential man above the cause of a poor, though most worthy, person? For, as a rule, our will is more inclined to the one from whom we expect a prompter and speedier return. But we should observe more carefully how the matter really stands: the poor man of whom we spoke cannot return a favour in kind, of course, but if he is a good man he can do it at least in thankfulness of heart. As someone has happily said, "A man has not repaid money, if he still has it; if he has repaid it, he has ceased to have it. But a man still has the sense of favour, if he has returned the favour; and if he has the sense of the favour, he has repaid it." On
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BOOK II. xx.

conferred a favour by accepting one, however great and they even suspect that a claim is thereby set up against them or that something is expected in return. Nay more, it is bitter as death to them to have

70 accepted a patron or to be called clients. Your man of slender means, on the other hand, feels that whatever is done for him is done out of regard for himself and not for his outward circumstances. Hence he strives to show himself grateful not only to the one who has obliged him in the past but also to those from whom he expects similar favours in the future - and he needs the help of many; and his own service, if he happens to render any in return, he does not exaggerate, but he actually depreciates it. This fact, furthermore, should not be overlooked - that, if one defends a wealthy favourite of fortune, the favour does not extend further than to the man himself or, possibly, to his children. But, if one defends a man who is poor but honest and upright, all the lowly who are not dishonest - and there is a large proportion of that sort among the people - look upon such an advocate as a tower of defence raised up for

71 them. I think, therefore, that kindness to the good is a better investment than kindness to the favourites of fortune. We must, of course, put forth every effort to oblige all sorts and conditions of men, if we can. But if it comes to a conflict of duty on this point, we must, I should say, follow the advice of Themistocles: when someone asked his advice whether he should give his daughter in marriage to a man who was poor but honest or to one who was rich but less esteemed, he said: "For my part, I prefer a man without money to money without a man." But the moral sense of
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BOOK II. xx. - xxi. to-day is demoralized and depraved by our worship of wealth. Of what concern to any one of us is the size of another man's fortune? It is, perhaps, an advantage to its possessor; but not always even that. But suppose it is; he may, to be sure, have more money to spend; but how is he any the better man for that? Still, if he is a good man, as well as a rich one, let not his riches be a hindrance to his being aided, if only they are not the motive to it; but in conferring favours our decision should depend entirely upon a man's character, not on his wealth. The supreme rule, then, in the matter of kindnesses to be rendered by personal service is never to take up a case in opposition to the right nor in defence of the wrong. For the foundation of enduring reputation and fame is justice, and without justice there can be nothing worthy of praise.

72 XXI. Now, since we have finished the discussion of that kind of helpful services which concern individuals, we must next take up those which touch the whole body politic and the state. Of these public services, some are of such a nature that they concern the whole body of citizens; others, that they affect individuals only. And these latter are the more productive of gratitude. If possible, we should by all means attend to both kinds of service; but we must take care in protecting the interests of individuals that what we do for them shall be beneficial, or at least not prejudicial, to the state.

Roman historical references removed.


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BOOK II. xxi.

. . . 73 The man in an administrative office, however, must make it his first care that everyone shall have what belongs to him and that private citizens suffer no invasion of their property rights by act of the state.

Roman historical references removed. At this point in Cicero's text he refers to public speeches by a defender of an "agrarian bill." He condemns it "for it favoured an equal distribution of property; and what more ruinous policy than that could be conceived?" Now, a controversial issue among scholars is the extent to which the following claim about the chief purpose of the state can be attributed to Panaetius.

. . . [T]he chief purpose in the establishment of constitutional state and municipal governments was that individual property rights might be secured (ut sua tenerentur). For, although it was by Nature's guidance that men were drawn together into cornmunities, it was in the hope of safeguarding their possessions that they sought the protection of cities.

How much of this famous passage, echoed later in Locke's political philosophy, is Panaetius and how much is Cicero? Dyck 1996 thinks the passage is essentially Cicero's; he writes as follows (461-62):

The emphasis on guarding property as the motive for creating the state contrasts with the indubitable Panaetian account of the social instinct natural to the human being at 1.12, where protection of property is unmentioned, or the description of the benefits through the building of cities and founding of laws. Cicero's words [contained in the last sentence of the preceding passage from De Officiis] look like an attempt to harmonize his version with that of Panaetius. One suspects that 1.85 gives a clear statement of Panaetius' precepts for statesmen
first, to keep the good of the people so clearly in view that regardless of their own interests they will make their every action conform to that; second, to care for the welfare of the whole body politic [I have translated Dyck's Latin citation here--J.G.]
and that he gave Africanus and the Spartans as examples respectively of abstinence and avarice (his first point) and the Spartans Agis and Lysander as statesment who care for only a part of the body politic contrasted with Aratus of Sicyon, who cared for the whole (his second point). This was surely the skeleton of Panaetius' argument, filled in by Cicero with the other cases and examplies cited . . . In any case, the summary of the recommended policies at Section 85 could stand as an epitome of the concordia ordinum [harmony of the classes] itself.

74 The administration should also put forth every effort to prevent the levying of a property tax, and to this end precautions should be taken long in advance.

Roman historical reference removed.

But, if any state

Cicero's reference to his own view removed.

. . . ever has to face a crisis requiring the
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BOOK II. xxi.-xxii.

imposition of such a burden, every effort must be made to let all the people realize that they must bow to the inevitable, if they wish to be saved. And it will also be the duty of those who direct the affairs of the state to take measures that there shall be an abundance of the necessities of life. It is needless to discuss the ordinary ways and means; for the duty is self- evident; it is necessary only to mention the matter.

75 But the chief thing in all public administration and public service is to avoid even the slightest suspicion of self-seeking.

Roman historical reference removed.

76 XXII. Cicero's reference to Panaetius

Panaetius praises Africanus for his integrity in public life. Why should he not? But Africanus
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BOOK II. xii.

had other and greater virtues. (etc.)

Roman historical references removed.

77 There is, then, . . . no vice more offensive than avarice, especially in men who stand foremost and hold the helm of state. For to exploit the state for selfish profit is not only immoral; it is criminal, infamous. And so the oracle, which the Pythian Apollo uttered, that "Sparta should not fall from any other cause than avarice," seems to be a prophecy not to the Lacedaemonians alone, but to all wealthy nations as well. They who direct the affairs of state, then, can win the good-will of the masses by no other means more easily than by self-restraint and self-denial.

78 But they who pose as friends of the people, and who for that reason either attempt to have agrarian laws passed, in order that the occupants may be driven out of their homes, or propose that money
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BOOK II. xxii.-xxiii.

loaned should be remitted to the borrowers, are undermining the foundations of the connnonwealth: first of all, they are destroying harmony, which cannot exist when money is taken away from one party and bestowed upon another; and second, they do away with equity, which is utterly subverted, if the rights of property are not respected. For, as I said above, it is the peculiar function of the state and the city to guarantee to every man the free and undisturbed control of his own particular property.

79 And yet, when it comes to measures so ruinous to public welfare, they do not gain even that popularity which they anticipate. For he who has been robbed of his property is their enemy; he to whom it has been turned over actually pretends that he had no wish to take it; and most of all, when his debts are cancelled, the debtor conceals his joy, for fear that he may be thought to have been insolvent; whereas the victim of the wrong both remembers it and shows his resentment openly. Thus even though they to whom property has been wrongfully awarded be more in number than they from whom it has been unjustly taken, they do not for that reason have more influence; for in such matters influence is measured not by numbers but by weight. And how is it fair that a man who never had any property should take possession of lands that had been occupied for many years or even generations, and that he who had them before should lose possession of them?

80 XXIII. Now, it was on account of just this sort of wrong- doing that the Spartans banished their ephor Lysander, and put their king Agis to death - an act without precedent in the history of Sparta. From that time on - and for the same reason - disssensions
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BOOK II. xxiii.

so serious ensued that tyrants arose, the nobles were sent into exile, and the state, though most admirably constituted, crumbled to pieces. Nor did it fall alone, but by the contagion of the ills that starting in Lacedaemon, spread widely and more widely, it dragged the rest of Greece down to ruin.

Brief reference to the Gracchi, an episode from Roman history, removed.

81 Aratus of Sicyon, on the other hand, is justly praised. When his city had been kept for fifty in the power of its tyrants, he came over from Argos to Sicyon, secretly entered the city and took it by surprise; he fell suddenly upon the tyrant Nicocles, recalled from banishment six hundred exiles who had been the wealthiest men of the city, and by his coming made his country free. But he found great difficulty in the matter of property and its occupancy; for he considered it most unjust, on the one hand, that those men should be left in want whom he had restored and of whose property others had taken possession; and he thought it hardly fair, on the other hand, that tenure of fifty years' standing should be disturbed. For in the course of that long period many of those estates had passed into innocent hands by right of inheritance, many by purchase, many by dower. He therefore decided that it would be wrong either to take the property away from the present incumbents or to let them keep it

82 without compensation to its former possessors. So, when he had come to the conclusion that he must have money to meet the situation, he announced that he meant to make a trip to
Alexandria and gave
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BOOK II. xxiii.

orders that matters should remain as they were until his return. And so he went in haste to his friend Ptolemy, then upon the throne, the second king after the founding of Alexandria. To him he explained that he wished to restore constitutional liberty to his country and presented his case to him. And, being a man of the highest standing, he easily secured from that wealthy king assistance in the form of a large sum of money. And, when he had returned with this to Sicyon, he called into counsel with him fifteen of the foremost men of the city. With them he investigated the cases both of those who were holding possession of other people's property and of those who had lost theirs. And he managed by a valuation of the properties to persuade some that it was more desirable to accept money and surrender their present holdings; others he convinced that it was more to their interest to take a fair price in cash for their lost estates than to try to recover possession of what had been their own. As a result, harmony was preserved, and all parties went their way without a word of complaint.

83 A great statesman, and worthy to have been born in our commonwealth! That is the right way to deal with one's fellow- citizens.

Reference to sordid episodes of recent Roman history.

Yon Greek, like a wise and excellent man, thought that he must look out for the welfare of all. And this is the highest statesmanship and the soundest wisdom on the part of a good citizen, not to divide the interests of the citizens but to unite all on the basis of impartial justice.

Dyck 477-79 clearly thinks that the following passage refers to events close to the time of Cicero's writing. (If he is right, as I suspect, these are not from Panaetius.

"Let them live in their neighbour's
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BOOK II. xxiii.- xxiv.

house rent-free."/a Why so? In order that, when I have bought, built, kept up, and spent my money upon a place, you may without my consent enjoy what belongs to me? What else is that but to rob one man of what belongs to him and to give to

84 another what does not belong to him? And what is the meaning of an abolition of debts, except that you buy a farm with my money; that you have the farm, and I have not my money?

XXIV. We must, therefore, take measures that there shall be no indebtedness of a nature to endanger the public safety. It is a menace that can be averted in many ways; but should a serious debt be incurred, we are not to allow the rich to lose their property, while the debtors profit by what is their neighbour's. For there is nothing that upholds a government more powerfully than its credit; and it can have no credit, unless the payment of debts is enforced by law.

Cicero's references to his own struggles as consul and more recent events in Rome.

-----
a an assumed appeal to one of Caesar's edicts.
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BOOK II. xxxv.

85 Those, then, whose office it is to look after the interests of the state will refrain from that form of liberality which robs one man to enrich another. Above all, they will use their best endeavours that everyone shall be protected in the possession of his own property by the fair administration of the law and the courts, that the poorer classes shall not be oppressed because of their helplessness, and that envy shall not stand in the way of the rich, to prevent them from keeping or recovering possession of what justly belongs to them; they must strive, too, by whatever means they can, in peace or in war, to advance the state in power, in territory, and in revenues. Such service calls for great men;

generic reference to Roman history

if men will perform duties such as these, they will win popularity and glory for themselves and at the same time render eminent service to the state.

86 Cicero remarks on two points allegedly overlooked by Panaetius.

Now, in this list of rules touching expediency, Antipater of Tyre, a Stoic philosopher who recently died at Athens, claims that two points were overlooked by Panaetius - the care of health and of property. I presume that the eminent philosopher overlooked these two items because they present no difficulty. At all events they are expedient. Although they are a matter of course, I will still say a few words on the subject.

Dyck 1996 comments (p. 480): "Panaetius, however, did have something to say on these matters [health and money] . . . on health cf. 1.106; on property, 1.12, 20-21, 2.52ff."

Cicero's few sentences on care of health and of property deleted.
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BOOK II. xxiv.- xxv.

87
88 XXV.

Another revealing point about what Panaetius did not do.

But it is often necessary to weigh one expediency against another; - for this, as I stated, is a fourth point overlooked by Panaetius. For not only are physical advantages regularly compared with outward advantages [and outward, with physical], but physical advantages are compared with one another, and outward with outward. (remainder of section 88 and part of 89 deleted)

89
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BOOK II. xxv.

Cicero's transition to Book III of De Officiis deleted.
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