Study Questions on Will Kymlicka
Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction
Oxford University Press, 2002Instructor: Dr. Garrett
Last revised date: October 28, 2004
Chapter 3
Section 1
1. What are the basic characteristics of intuitionism, according to Rawls? (54)
2. According to Rawls, what does the intuitionist think the complexity of moral facts requires? What is the only way to dispute intuitionism in his view? (54)
3. What is the "central idea" of his "general conception of justice"? What does equal treatment require removing? What is the "single simple idea" at the heart of Rawls' theory? (55)
4. Why is this "general conception" not yet a full theory? What do we need? (55)
5. What priority rules does Rawls recognize and how do they affect the ranking of values in the theory? (56)
6. What does Rawls mean by "basic liberties"? Why does his view on this question make him a liberal? Is this a highly contentious part of his theory? (56)
Section 2
7. What is "the prevailing justification for economic distribution in our society"? How does this conflict with Rawls' theory? (57)
8. Why does the ideology of equality of opportunity seem fair to many people? What source of undeserved inequality does the prevailing ideology of equal pportunity ignore? In what sense is the prevailing ideal of equal opportunity "unstable"? (58)
9. What, according to Rawls, should we do instead of eliminating inequalities of natural assets or in persons' starting place in society? When is it "not unfair" to allow inequalities? (59)
10. What problem with Rawls' conclusion (derived from reflection on the ideal of equality opportunity) does Kymlicka note at top p. 60?
Section 3
11. Why are social contract arguments usually thought of as weak? (two arguments) (60-61)
12. What "other way" to interpret social contract arguments is there, according to Dworkin? (61) What does the idea of the state of nature in the Enlightenment period represent? (62)
13. What pressing question did the classical liberals try to explain by means of the social contract? What was the gist of their answer? (62)
14. Is Rawls' approach more abstract or more concrete than that of Locke and Rousseau? How does Rawls' original position differ from the usual state of nature conceived by earlier philosophers? (62)
15. Explain the original position (OP) and the veil of ignorance (VOI). If the VOI is not "an expression of a theory of personal identity," what is its function? (63)
16. What is the OP intended to represent? How can we characterize the resulting principles of justice? (63-64)
17. What does Kymlicka say would be the relevant way to criticize Rawls' argument from the OP? (64)
18. What is meant by "leading a life" and what are two kinds of primary goods? How are the primary goods related to "leading a life"? In choosing principles of justice, what do persons behind the VOI seek? Once behind the VOI, how does self-interest relate to benevolence? (64-65)
19. Why does Rawls deny that parties in the OP would choose an equal distribution of social primary goods for all social positions (strict egalitarianism) ? Why does he deny that they would choose a utilitarian principle? (65)
20. What is the maximin strategy and why does R think it would be rational to use it in the OP and select the difference principle? (66)
21. What "other side . . . to justifying a particular description of the OP" is there? (67) What does Rawls mean by "reflective equilibrium"? (See quotes from Rawls 1971 on p. 67 and pp. 69-70.)
22. What three useful functions does the contract device have? (68)
23. How does Rawls define "the worst-off position"? What problem does this raise? (70-71) What burden does the Difference Principle not remove?
24. Why would #3 be a better Rawlsian view than #2? (p. 72)
25. Why does the Difference Principle seem to be implausible when we consider the story of the Gardener and the Tennis-Player? Why is this an internal problem for Rawls' theory? (72-73) What does treating people with equal concern require? (74) Relate a person's "fate" to (1) ambition and (2) endowment. (74)
26. Does Rawls himself want the Gardener to subsidize the Tennis-Player? To what distinction does Rawls appeal? (74)
Section 4
27. How does Dworkin set up his "auction" thought-experiment? If his auction works, what will be true of everyone? Why does Kymlicka say that this idea "expresses the liberal egalitarian view in its most defensible form"? (75-76 top)
28. Why does Dworkin introduce his insurance scheme? Briefly explain the scheme. Why does it not work? (76-77)
29. What is Dworkin's solution to the dilemma that we don't want to ignore natural disadvantages but we cannot equalize them either? (77)
30. What is Narveson's objection and how does Kymlicka respond on Dworkin's behalf? (79)
31. How does Kymlicka summarize his chapter so far, especially in relation to the Difference Principle? (87)
Section 5.
32. Prior to Rawls, how did people tend to explain the liberal endorsement of the so-called welfare state? In what sense have Rawls and Dworkin offered a new, unified theory of the welfare state? (88)
33. What radical implications may be contained in liberal egalitarian theory? (89) How does Rawls understand "property-owning democracy"? Why does he think it would be superior to the welfare state? (89)
34. What familiar role distinctions might disappear if we took liberal egalitarian thought seriously? Explain. What is required to ensure that the advantaged do not have the power to define relationships of dominance in the workplace? (90)
35. What does Connolly mean by the "bifurcation of liberalism"? What "civilization" (ideology?) have Rawls and Dworkin failed to challenge and why has this reinforced inequalities? (91)
36. In what have liberal egalitarians gradually lost confidence, according to Kymlicka? Why? (91) What is the political context of this loss? Why is there a "surprisingly conservative" tenor to many of Rawls' and Dworkin's works? (92)
37. How have liberal egalitarians in recent years unintentionally reinforced the New Right's agenda? (93)
38. What dilemma do Jonathan Wolff and Elizabeth Anderson describe for liberal theorists of justice? (94)
39. What point does Kymlicka concede regarding "a scheme of justice that encourages everyone to view their co-citizens as putative cheats"? What does this suggest should be the main focus for the politics of liberal egalitarianism? What might a full implementation of Rawlsian justice require after all? What seems to be the most glaring omission of all the issues from which contemporary liberals like Rawls became disengaged? (95)
40 In what sense is it correct to call Rawlsian liberalism "mainstream"? In what sense is it inaccurate? (95-96)
41. What view does Kymlicka appear to hold regarding radical politics and liberal principles?