Randy and Libby Discuss the Implications
of Will Kymlicka's "Gardener and the Tennis Player" Case
for Rawls' Theory of JusticeContact: Dr. Jan Garrett
Last revised date: November 20, 2007
More Dialogues on Rawls and Libertarianism
Randy and Libby Discuss Libertarianism (basic)
Randy and Libby Discuss Rawls' Theory of Justice (basic)
Libby and Randy Discuss Rawls and Affirmative Action
Dramatis Personae
Randy, the libertarian:
The basic standard of what is permissible and impermissible is non-interference rights (to life, liberty, and property). Randy is named after the philosopher and novelist Ayn Rand.Libby, the egalitarian liberal:
Everybody has basic human rights, including a mix of non-interference rights, political participation rights, and some social and economic rights to assistance from society. Libby has been influenced by writings of the political philosopher John Rawls.
The Dialogue
R. Hey, Libby, have you read Will Kymlicka's book on Contemporary Political Philosophy? There's some interesting stuff in it about John Rawls.
L. Yeah, I read it a while ago. As a matter of fact, I've got the book in my backpack. I was taking it back to the library.
R. Did you notice he had a pretty devastating argument against Rawls' theory of justice?
L. I noticed he thought Rawls was inconsistent because he should have favored compensating people for disadvantages resulting from differences in their natural endowments, but in fact, according to Kymlicka, he only held that they should be compensated for social inequalities. But if you read further the same chapter you'll see that Kymlicka admits that no scheme any political philosopher has produced really fully addresses this issue. In fact, it may be an insoluble problem because some people are so severely handicapped that no amount of resources would give them a level-playing field. If it's an insoluble problem, it doesn't seem like a major objection to Rawls that he did not solve it.
R. That's not the problem I had in mind. I was thinking of the problem brought out by the scenario regarding Gardener and the Tennis Player. Here's what Kymlicka says (pp. 72-73):
Imagine that we have succeeded in equalizing people's social and natural circumstances. . . . Imagine two people of equal natural talent who share the same social background. One wants to play tennis all day and so only works long enough at a nearby farm to earn enough money to buy a tennis court, and to sustain his desired lifestyle (i.e., food, clothing, equipment). The other person wants a similar amount of land to plant a garden, in order to produce and sell vegetables for herself. Furthermore, let us imagine�that we have started with an equal distribution of resources, which is enough or each person to get their desired land, and start their tennis and gardening. The gardener will quickly come to have more resources than the tennis-player, if we allow the market to work freely. While they began with equal shares of resources, he will rapidly use up his initial share, and his occasional farm work only brings in enough to sustain his tennis playing. The gardener, however, uses her initial share in such a way as to generate a larger income through longer hours of work. The difference principle would only allow this inequality if it benefits the least well off-i.e., if it benefits the tennis player who now lacks much of an income. If the tennis player does not benefit from the inequality, then the government should transfer some of her income to him in order to equalize income.As Kymlicka argues, Rawls' Difference Principle implies that the Gardener must keep compensating the Tennis Player, even though the TP makes no effort to build up his own material assets.L. Oh, that. I guess I didn't take it as a serious objection to Rawls since Kymlicka himself says on the next page . . . let's see [she takes it out of the backpack and turns to chapter 3]. It's on p. 74. Rawls himself does not really want the G to have to compensate the TP.
R. But he says that the Difference Principle as Rawls himself states it requires the Gardener to do so.
L. Look at the text, Randy. If you look carefully you'll see that Kymlicka refers to many pages in Rawls' writings, including two places in his 1971 classic, A Theory of Justice, that support his observation that Rawls does not want the Gardener to have to compensate the Tennis PLayer? Have you looked up those pages?
R. Well, no, I haven't.
L. I think if you do you'll see that Rawls is so thoroughly committed to an approach that would rule out ad hoc subtractions from the Gardener's surplus that it would be utterly bizarre if the DP implied she had to give it over to the Tennis Player. I have a copy of p. 96 from Rawls' 1971 A Theory of Justice (1971):
We must keep in mind the fundamental problem of justice and the manner in which the two principles cope with it. The primary subject of justice � is the basic structure of society. The reason for this is that its effects are so profound and pervasive, and present from birth. This structure favors some starting places over others in the division of the benefits of social cooperation. It is these inequalities which the two principles are to regulate. Once these principles are satisfied, other inequalities are allowed to arise from men's voluntary actions in accordance with the principle of free association. Thus, the relevant social positions are, so to speak, the starting places . . . By choosing these positions to specify the general point of view one follows the idea that the two principles attempt to mitigate the arbitrariness of natural contingency and social fortune.R. What's going on? This passage seems to say that the Gardener ought not to be taxed just to support the Tennis Player's self-indulgent lifestyle.L. That's right. Once people are given a fair share to start their lives--say, adult lives--"inequalities are allowed to arise from men's voluntary actions in accordance with the principle of free association."
R. I am really confused.
L. Let's put this in context. What is Rawls doing, over all, in his Theory of Justice?
R. Trying to defend his two principles of justice, including the Difference Principle?
L. More basic than that. He is trying to develop principles of justice that could govern the basic social order of a society more or less like the U.S. or Canada or Japan or France in economic complexity. He defines a society as a system of cooperation over time, in fact, over many generations.
R. So?
L. He's concerned with developing principles that instruct society to assign individuals fair shares of social primary goods, the sorts of all-purpose means that enable people to pursue their own conceptions of the good, whatever they are.
R. OK, but what's the point?
L. He aims, so far as possible, to rule out inequalities that are beyond our control, especially those that shape our options at the start of our adult lives, because otherwise people don't have genuinely equal life chances.
R. Is that all?
L. He wants to do it with the minimum disruption to the productive output of society. If we brought about equal life chances by a method that brought the economy to a crashing halt, not even the least advantaged persons could gain by such a move. That's why the Difference Principle permits some inequalities--inequalities that reward the talented, hardworking persons and those who take on risky occupations insofar as they perform activities that benefit everybody.
R. You are saying that the reasoning behind the Difference Principle itself allows persons who are talented and willing to work hard a chance to gain material advantages, and that is what is meant when it says that "social and economic inequalities are permitted . . ." ?
L. It is part of what is meant by that phrase. The phrase also implies that society may permit certain talented or hardworking people to exercise special powers that go along with special social functions if those powers and functions are part of an arrangement that meets the equal opportunity clause and tends to lift the least advantaged members of society as much as possible.
Recall that the two principles of justice were chosen to ensure that persons in the actual social order are not disadvantaged by unequal endowments of social primary goods. The first principle guarantees everyone equal basic rights and liberties like freedom of conscience, personal security, due process, freedom of the press and assembly, and political liberties. The Equal Opportunity clause of the Difference Principle guarantees equal opportunity in access to the more desirable positions licensed by that principle.
Moreover, the existence of social and economic inequalities is justified by the D.P. only if they are part of an arrangement that is to the greatest advantage of the least advantaged persons.
But it is not in the interest of the least advantaged to insist on exactly equal shares of all social primary goods. A more productive economy is better for the least advantaged if they receive a share that is greater than what they would receive if it were less productive.
However, production of goods and services would likely be severely curtailed if the Gardener and Tennis Player scenario were generalized. With a severe decrease in production, the quantity that could be assigned to the least advantaged would likely be decreased. It would not be to the greatest advantage of the least advantaged.
R. Perhaps you'd better explain to me again what Rawls is really up to.
L. I think the Gardener/Tennis Player Scenario misrepresents what Rawls' Theory of Justice is about. Rawls� concern is not about cases in which persons who start out with essentially the same natural talents, access to resources, and opportunities to acquire skills end up with different quantities of material goods because of how they choose to use those initial endowments. Rawls himself is concerned with how the basic structure of society can distribute unequal endowments, especially in social primary goods, and how that inequality can deprive people of equal life chances. Justice is about blocking that possibility.
R. But the Different Principle does seem to authorize repeated transfers from the Gardener to the Tennis Player throughout their adult lives.
L. Actually, the D.P. says nothing about transfers. It talks about arrangements. Some transfers, of course, may be part of the process whereby an arrangement is maintained, as the flow of electricity through a wire is a precondition for keeping a light bulb lit. But the primary aim is maintaining the just arrangement, not performing the transfers. And another point: Do you remember what I told you in our previous discussions about how Rawls thought the two principles should actually operate to structure a just social order.
R. Remind me.
L. An important section of A Theory of Justice is entitled "The Four-Stage Sequence." The four stages are Selection of the Two Principles; the Constitutional Convention; the Legislative Stage; and the Judicial Stage.
Rawls suggests we think of the two principles of justice as guidelines that would frame the reasoning of delegates to an ideal Constitutional Convention. The basic framework of society, in considerable detail now, would be fleshed out by delegates who would gather to outline the general law of the land. The point is that the constitution should be considerably more detailed than the 60 or so words of the two principles of justice and 50 or so words of the two priority rules.
R. I happen to know that the U.S. Constitution, not including Amendments, consists of about 7500 words.
L. Then you understand what kind of detail would be possible in a Constitution that would not be possible in the roughly 110 words contained in the two principles and the two priority rules. A Rawlsian constitution would contain descriptions of legislative, executive, and judicial branches, plus a bill of rights to spell out the liberty principle and likely the equal opportunity principle.
The Veil of Ignorance would be partially lifted for the delegates to the Rawlsian Constitutional Convention. They would know many general facts about the country for which they were developing a Constitution, but they would still not know their own personal characteristics and thus their own personal or class interests.
R. Then there would have to be another step, right? Legislators would have to be elected and laws determined that further flesh out the Constitutional framework.
L. Yes, and at this stage, the Veil of Ignorance would be lifted still further, because the laws adopted would have to be workable for this particular population, with this particular set of resources, this particular history, this particular set of international relations. But at the same time the two principles of justice would operate in the background, partly through the way in which they were included in the design of the Constitutional framework, partly because they specify social goals contained in the Difference Principle, such as ensuring that the least advantaged members of society are given the type of attention that justice requires. These goals must be kept in mind in the design of actual laws.
At this point we are not far from an ideal version of the operation of the U.S. Federal Government--ideal because it would embody the two principles of justice. Lawmakers must know the facts about the country but they must also set aside their own personal interests in passing laws, trying to ensure that no group is given an unfair advantage and that our basic freedoms are protected and defended.
R. Might there be room at the Legislative level for a law, inspired by the Difference Principle, to require the Gardeners of the country to continuously transfer their above-average wealth to the Tennis Players, apart from securing fair starting points for individual lives.
L. Not if the perspective that guided the selection of the D.P. in the Original Position has not entirely been forgotten.
R. So why does Kymlicka claim the D.P. endorses compelling the Gardener to transfer much of her surplus to Tennis Player?
L. Maybe we ought to contact him and ask. Meanwhile, I can only guess. Perhaps he momentarily forgot how Rawls thought the two principles of justice were meant to work. The claim that the D.P. has this result seems to unconsciously detach the Difference Principle from the actual context in which it had meaning for Rawls. Because the D.P. has been detached from its place in the Rawlsian system, Kymlicka does not realize how wrong he is to claim that the D.P. requires the Gardener to repeatedly transfer her surplus to the Tennis Player.
One philosopher who writes about this case [Jonathan Wolff in 1998] says that K. developed his scenario from a similar case conceived by Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin is an egalitarian liberal like Rawls, but (as you can detect from what Kymlicka says after his discussion of Rawls in chapter 3) Dworkin is also a philosophical rival of Rawls. He wants to substitute his own approach for that of Rawls. Rather than say, as I think Kymlicka should have, why it is inappropriate to derive such cases from the D.P. Kymlicka included a version of it in his book.
R. So should Kymlicka turn in his Ph.D. in Philosophy?
L. No, I give him credit for pointing us in the right direction when he refers to the passages in Rawls' writings that lead in a contrary direction. He was astute enough to recognize, and honest enough to admit, that Rawls himself would not want the D.P. to support such a scenario.
Still, I think he failed at this one point to adequately apply a principle that he must know because it is so basic to what philosophers do when discussing the work of other philosophers: the Principle of Charity. The Principle of Charity requires that we try to interpret the writings of other philosophers so that our interpretation brings out the coherence and the plausibility of their reasoning, if we can do so without distorting what they actually wrote and likely meant.
R. Not easy to do that consistently.
L. I think it's especially hard to do when you are covering many thinkers in one book and working, as all writers must, with a deadline.
November 20, 2007