Toward Discovery of the Argument in Glaucon's Speech
in Plato's Republic 2.358c-360d

Partial Analysis by Dr. Jan Garrett

Last revised date: September 13, 2007

Important note: The term translated by "morality" in the Waterfield translation is normally translated as "justice."

This speech is part of Plato's dialogue The Republic, which is ten "books" (originally scrolls) in length.

It is not a dialogue, even if it is part of a dialogue.

Plato is its immediate author, but the views it contains are likely not those of Plato. Socrates, the primary speaker in the Republic as a whole, usually presents views likely to be shared by Plato; this is especially the case when he seems to be building a more or less systematic theory.

Glaucon's speech is actually aimed against the view Socrates maintains beginning near the end of book I. It represents a challenge Socrates will try to overcome. (The main part of Socrates' response is found in the Reason and Emotion section of VAP.)

There are some hints in the text that Glaucon is not himself entirely convinced by this argument, but this is the argument he presents. For that reason I'm describing it as if he really accepted it.

Although this speech begins with an explanation of the origin of "morality," it is, as a whole, an argument: it eventually reaches conclusions that contradict the view Socrates is defending. Socrates' view is, essentially,

Morality is desirable for its own sake in addition to being desirable as a means.

The contradictory of this is:

Morality is only instrumentally desirable (i.e., desirable as a means), or
Morality is not desirable not for its own sake.

Against Socrates' view Glaucon tries to show that

The rewards of immorality far outweigh those of morality.
Morality is only practiced reluctantly, by people who lack the ability to do wrong.

An important part of Glaucon's speech is his explanation of the origin of morality--actually what he takes to be the prevailing conception of morality. It is important because the theory of human nature that Glaucon uses to explain the prevalence of this conception is used later to advance his main argument.

Glaucon is trying to show that the (best) explanation for the origin and widespread acceptance of morality, understood as the rule that we should neither injure others nor be injured by them, are the general psychological "facts":

By nature doing injury is good
By nature being injured by another is bad. (358e)

What this seems to mean is that because of our human nature,

We necessarily regard doing injury to others as good.

We necessarily regard as bad being injured by another.

This theory seems to presuppose a doctrine of human nature known as psychological egoism: every person, in everything he or she does, seeks some good for himself or herself. (In other words, genuine altruistic action seems to be excluded.)

The definition of morality Glaucon is using is important:

Morality is a (potential or actual) agreement neither to injure nor to be injured.

He thinks that

In fact such an agreement is generally in force (in his own time).

This "fact" needs an explanation, he thinks, and that explanation is the theory of human nature Glaucon has introduced.

So, is morality for Glaucon sometimes an end in itself or is it at most a means or an instrument?

It's important to note that Glaucon not only considers the condition of humanity before the establishment of a state with laws, he also considers the present condition in which states already exist and try to enforce morality. I think we can assume, beginning at 359a8 (roughly the middle of VAP p. 384) that a general respect for morality (as defined by Glaucon) exists and familiar institutions (e.g., police) are set up to detect and punish immorality.

Against this background, Glaucon can assume (in fact, he would predict) that most people act morally, bearing in mind that Glaucon takes the "by nature" theory of motivation to have been established.

In other words, there are two main stages of Glaucon's case: one which explains the origin of conventional ideas about morality from a situation in which, presumably, a commitment to morality did not exist, a second in which conventional ideas about morality are widely although imperfectly enforced. (The same theory of human nature operates in both circumstances.)

Just about everything Glaucon says is aimed to support the main point of the speech and to argue against Socrates' position.