Lectures Notes on Chapter 2, Sections 3-4,
in Velasquez, PHILOSOPHY,

for PHIL 120 Spring 2002

April 10, 2002

The Traditional Rationalist View of Male and Female Human Nature
and The Feminist Critique

19a. What do we learn from the passage from Plato's Phaedo about the Platonic view of body and soul?

When body and soul are united, the function of soul is to rule and govern the body while the function of body is to serve the soul

There is happiness and virtuous conduct when the soul and body each do their respective tasks, but unhappiness and wicked conduct when the soul is fascinated by things of the body, experiences lusts and fears and hates . . .

Aristotle helps give the TRV a "sexist bias"

In describing the structure of the household, he prescribes the rule of the husband over his wife. He says that "the male is more qualified to lead than the female."

For Aristotle,

the (adult) free male is a natural leader (it is more likely that his rational capacities can be fully developed into leadership abilities than those of women) ; in the adult free male who is not corrupt the practical reason can deliberate and "has authority" (over the irrational parts of the soul).

The adult non-slave woman is a natural follower of the free male; her practical reason can deliberate but "lacks authority."

In the person who is a slave or servant by nature, reason is limited to understanding commands and obeying them.

In Aristotle's view, like the slave by nature, the female is better off being ruled by the male.

Aristotle's analogy: As the rational part of the soul should govern the spirited and appetitive, so the more rational male should govern women, children, and slaves.

19b. In the Christian philosophy of Augustine . . .

intellect should rule moral action

man should rule woman

20. How, according to feminist critics of TRV/JCV, do these philosophies rationalize subjugation of women?

In the TRV/JCV as feminist critics understand itt:

(1a) reason is male, feelings female;
(1b) so only men can be fully human
because only in men can reason govern.

(2a) Reason is regarded as superior to (and should rule) the feelings.
(2b) So, analogously, men must rule women.

(3a) For the TRV/JCV rationality (the male trait) is good, bodily desires and feelings are not good, and should be restrained.
(3b) So the TRV/JCV teaches lack of respect for the body, desires, and feelings.

Feminists say that the traditional rationalist view as a whole is biased against women.

Gender Stereotypes. In stereotypes influenced by the TRV (or does the influence go the other way, from the stereotypes to the TRV?)

MASCULINITY tends to be identified with the following qualities: assertiveness, rationality, hardness, challlenging, emotionally distanced (objective, fair, abstract)

FEMININITY tends to be identified with: being accomodating, emotion, softness, nurturing, caring, sensitivity to detail [concretely attentive)

21. Some "feminine" thinkers, rather than arguing that women are just as good as men in the traditional highly valued "male" qualities and activities, have argued that we should place more or equal value on so-called "female" qualities and activities.

What advantages and disadvantages does this approach have (from the perspective of women's liberation)?

(1) Adv. It is a way of opposing the current patterns of male domination over women.
(2) Adv. It might lead to a better understanding of the positive contributions of "female" attributes.
(3) Adv. It might lead to the creation of new theories of knowledge that do not involve the suppression of the emotions and desires, or greater respect for kinds of knowing not associated with traditional scientific reason.

(1) Disadv. It's not all that easy to overturn hundreds of years of effort to create these sexist connections between the ideas of reason and maleness, feeling and femininity. The image of femininity has been formed by contrast with the image of maleness. If we merely put a plus on "female" traits where before there was a minus, and leave matters at that, we may find that we are simply reinforcing rather than undermining the domination of men by women. Suppose meekness and obedience, traditional traits attributed to women, are praised instead of being criticized as not being masterful and assertive. This may have the effect of reinforcing domination by males. (See discussion by Lloyd and Velasquez's comments on 103-104.)


2.3 How Do Mind and Body Relate?

22a. In what way is it obvious we have bodies? We spend a lot of time and energy on our bodies, for purposes of health and appearance to others. We measure its weight and make comments about its volume. We observe our bodies, and even more the bodies of others.

22b. Minds? (104) We study, travel to expand its experiences, see specialists to cure its illnesses, pay attention to its beliefs, emotions, doubts, etc. Its special attribute seems to be what we call consciousness

23a. What sort of awareness is consciousness, according to Velasquez?

The kind of awareness we have of ourselves and others when we are awake. It is what we lack when we are sleepwalking, under anaesthesia, knocked out. Since there seems to be no other kind of awareness than consciousness, it must have to do with this aboutness--consciousness about others, consciousness about ourselves.

What does it mean to say that it is "subjective"? We are directly or immediately aware of our own consciousness, in a way that we are not immediately aware of others'.

23b. Why does it seem not to be physical?

It is not like bodies, which in many cases can be observed by others. It seems to have no weight, taste, color, mass, or dimensions.

What view of human nature seems obvious to most of us according to Velasquez? Human nature consists of both mind and body.

23c. On what kind of occasions does mind seem to interact with body? (105)

When we feel pain because of something that has happened to the body, or when we decide to move a limb.

24a. How does Descartes "prove" the existence of a mind distinct from body?
It's possible to conceive that I do not have a body, but not that I do not have a mind. (If I can conceive of X without Y, then X is different from Y.) Therefore mind is distinct from body.

24b. What is the essence of mind for Descartes?
Thinking, by which is meant a vast range of kinds of thought (from feeling, imagining, getting angry, desiring, anticipating, remembering, doubting, believing, reasoning, calculating). I do not have to be angry to have a mind, but I do have to be thinking in some way or other.

24c. What is the essence of body, according to Descartes? (106) Ability to fill a given space such that other bodies are excluded from it.

Is Descartes a dualist? Yes Explain. (106) He believes that humans are composed of two things, a physical body and an immaterial mind.

25a. What problem arises for the dualist view of Descartes? (106) How can an immaterial mind move a physical body, and how can a body consisting of space-occupying matter influence an immaterial mind.

How does he try to resolve this problem? By claiming that the two interact in the pineal gland, a small gland near the brain that had no other known function.

Why was his solution ridiculed? The pineal gland is a body too. If the question is how an immaterial thing can move a body, then to speak of the pineal gland instead of the larger body is just to postpone the question: how does the pineal gland, which is a body, get moved by the mind.

25b. How does Descartes' disciple Nicholas Malebranche try to resolve the problem? (108) The mind and the body do not really interact. When I decide to say something--a mental action, God steps in to cause appropriate physical motion. In other words, God synchronizes body and mind.

26a. What is Hobbes' position on the mind-body problem? Hobbes is a materialist. The human body is a complex material body much like a machine.

26b. What is "reductionism"? The idea that we can understand one kind of reality in terms of another kind. In this case, it is the view that processes like thought and life are really nothing but processes at the chemical or physical level. The mind is really nothing more than a physical thing.

What is materialism? The metaphysical position that reality is ultimately composed of matter.

Is reductionism widespread today, over 300 years after Descartes? (108-109) It has been encouraged by the success of scientific efforts to explain observed phenomena in terms of physics and chemistry. It is not necessary for a scientist to be a reductionist, but the success of science has helped to keep reductionism alive and plausible for many.

27a. What does the identity theory maintain? States of consciousness (being angry, being in love, thinking that A=pr squared) are identical with states of the brain.

What are states of the brain? What are states of anything?

When we say that something is in a state, we mean that the thing X has a particular attribute S; for example,

A human being can be in a waking state, or a sleeping state.
A cup can be in an empty state, partially filled state, or a full state.
A switch can be in "on" or an "off."
A wooden wall could be in a painted state or an unpainted state.
A painted wooden wall could be in a green painted state or a yellow painted state, etc.

Believing that God exists is a different state of consciousness from Questioning whether God exists; generally, belief states are different from doubt states.

To say that states of consciousness are identical with states of the brain is to say

1) that the brain, or parts of the brain, can be in different states (because of chemical differences, different connections between nerves, different electrical activity, etc.), and that
2) if we really knew what consciousness was, we would be able to describe what is happening in the brain when we have a particular state of consciousness.
What claim do identity theorists make about the future of scientific discovery? (109-110) Scientists will someday discover which mental states are identical with which brain states.

27b. What two objections does Norman Malcolm raise about identity theory? (111)

(1) It makes no sense to assign spatial locations to thoughts, but it always makes sense to assign spatial locations to brain states.
(2) Any thought, for its meaning, requires a cultural background--practices, agreements, assumptions, the kind of thing social scientists and historians discuss. But brain states can be described in terms of the things physicists and chemists talk about,.
27c. Recently, scientists discovered that when people are feeling especially loving (e.g., mothers nursing infants) their brains are excreting unusually high amounts of a certain hormone. How is this relevant to the position of identity theory? It gives it a bit of plausibility. The theory claims that a mental state is identical to a physical state. A brain location infused with a special hormone would be in a special state because of the presence of that hormone. If the hormone is there only when the person is feeling loving, then, identity theorists will say, love may be nothing but the presence of this hormone.

28a. What is the key idea of behaviorism as a materialist position on the mind-body problem?

Physical states of the brain being difficult to observe, behaviorists said that mental states were nothing but dispositions (or readinesses) to behave in certain ways. The mind is just behavior or dispositions toward behavior.

28b. How does Hilary Putnam criticize behaviorism? (112)
He asks us to consider a "superactor" who can pretend to be in extreme pain, although he feels no real pain at all. And he asks us to consider a "superspartan" who is in extreme pain but endures it without giving any external sign that he is in such pain. The fact that we can conceive such examples shows that we do not really agree with the behaviorist. Behaviorism is odd in that it seems to make consciousness disappear.

Explain the joke at the bottom of p. 112. According to behaviorists, things like pleasure, a mental state, would have to be behaviors or dispositions to behave; as such they would be easier for others to observe than oneself. The joke shows how odd this theory is: normally, we think persons have more direct access to their own mental states than others do.

29a. According to functionalism, how should humans be understood? As complicated computers. Functionalism is the view that mental states and activities are links between physical inputs and outputs, or between other mental states and activities ultimately linked to physical inputs and outputs.

I-M-O or I-M-M-O or I-M-M-M-O

What is a belief according to functionalism? (113) A connection that the body makes between certain inputs (for example, perceptions) and outputs (overt actions).

29b. How is functionalism an advance over earlier forms of behaviorism?
It allows some mental states to explain others, although ultimately mental states must be linked to physical inputs and outputs. (An intention may be linked to desire and belief, but in the end the whole complex must be tied back to physical states and activities.)

What does functionalism leave out?(114) The inner conscious states of which we are directly aware. Two people could have different experiences of color, yet because of their training they would react in exactly the same way to the different color experiences.

30. What does eliminative materialism maintain?
We should eliminate our belief in the existence of consciousness. Eliminative materialism claims we are nothing but matter, and consciousness does not exist.

What do materialists of this type mean by "folk psychology"? (114-15) Folk psychology is to science of the brain as the belief that the sun rises is to modern astronomy. Folk psychology includes the notions that we feel pains, have desires, emotions, and beliefs, notions that support the view that there is such a thing as consciousness. But these notions are deceptive and should be abandoned.

Velasquez's response: This view seems to misunderstand how science works. Science does not deny that people have experiences they think they have. It provides a new explanation for the experience. Modern astronomy does not deny that people experience the sun as rising. Rather it explains this experience in terms of the rotation of the Earth.


2.4 Is There an Enduring Self

31. What assumption about our selves do we typically make? Humans are enduring selves; we last continuously through time

Why is this important for friendship and for ethical practices such as promise-keeping? The friendship of A and B requires that A and B remain the same in some basic sense across time. A friendship is, by definition, a relation that lasts over time; it is hard to see how the relationship could last if the either or both of the two members so related could cease to be who they were at the start. Promise keeping also requires enduring selves: if A promises to do something for B tomorrow and in the meantime changes from A into another person A', A' (as another person) would not be obliged to keep the promise: promise-keeping normally assumes that the promise keeper is the same as the promise-maker.

32. What other things would be impossible if we were not the same persons from one moment to the next?

No life projects, no long-term plans, no commitments like marriage. It would not make any sense to ask somebody what he did yesterday: the very idea of memory would make no sense. What one supposedly remembers would be something that occurred to a different person.

33. What questions about personal identity do some accidents and Alzheimer's disease raise? (119-20) Personalities can drastically change from accidents; does not mean that the persons are not the same? People with Alzheimer's may not remember what happened a short time ago--are they still the same persons, in spite of the fact that they have no memory?

34. Is there any plausibility to Lisa's claim that she and John are not the same as the two persons who married 20 years ago? Explain. (120)

Yes, Lisa's claim is plausible. When changes in knowledge, awareness, skills, desires, etc. significantly change, a person can in many respects be a new person. Nevertheless, part of the point of promise-making is that we agree to abide by our promises even if we do change quite a bit. It is hard to determine exactly how much change counts as enough to free us from our promises.

35. What is the point of the comparison of the human body to a ship that is rebuilt plank by plank while it is sailing on the ocean? (121)

If every molecule in the body were replaced, say, every seven years, so that in 1999 no molecule from 1992 would remain, we might say that the human being is still the same because of the continuity or similarity from one day to the next. Also patterns such as fingerprints can remain the same even if the skin cells are constantly being replaced.

36a. Consider the idea that bodily continuity proves personal identity over time. Is this idea completely plausible in all cases? Explain. (122)

The person with Alzheimer's, the person who has changed dramatically as a result of an accident, and even the spouses who have gradually grown apart call this into question.

36b. If bodily continuity is needed for personal identity, what does this imply for personal immortality? (122)

There would not be any. If you think the idea of personal immortality makes sense, then you seem committed to some other basis for personal identity.

36c. Consider the fictional story about Manny and Maryann. What does this "thought experiment" show us about the equation of personal identity with bodily continuity? (122-23)

Brain transplant thought experiments like this suggest that personal identity does not require bodily continuity. A possible comeback is that this thought-experiment does not show this; that in fact there is bodily continuity of the brain. The author is actually pointing to the older view that not the brain but the nonmaterial soul might be detached from the body and, if God willed it, associated with another body.

37. What is the chief answer of the traditional Western view regarding the problem of the enduring self? (123)

The soul is an immaterial, thinking substance, that exists so long as some form of thought is going on in it. (Plato and Descartes are philosophers who have held this view.)

38a. What is John Locke's solution to the problem of personal identity? (124)

What makes a person at one time the same as a person at another time is memory, or continuity of consciousness. Eve at time 1 is the same person as Eve at time 2 because the second contains mental states (memories) that are the same as mental states of the first (perceptions), and between time 1 and 2 those mental states have been continuously present (at least as dispositions).

38b. What are the advantages of this solution?

It seems to fit differences of personality that arise out of radical amnesia, such as the woman who no longer remembers being married, though she actually was. It fits the idea that criminals who are punished should understand the link between the punishment and the crimes they committed.

What problems does it seem to leave unresolved?

The problem of transitivity: if A=B, and B=C, then A=C, but a person at age 10 may remember some of what happened at age 5, and a person at age 20 may remember some of what happened at age 10, without the person at age 20 remembering what happened at age 5. Is the 20-year-old who now remembers nothing from age 5 the same as the former 5-year-old or not?

39. How is the Theravada Buddhist view of the self radically different from the Western notion of the enduring self?

The Western view tends to prize the self as a unique being with immeasurable dignity and worth. This notion is alien to a number of Eastern philosophies including Theravada Buddhism.

What is the source of all pain and suffering on this view? the delusion that the self exists.

What is the "self" according to this view? nothing more than a composite or collection of constantly changing elements: sensations, perceptions, attitudes, conscious thoughts.

40a. According to David Hume, do we really have any idea of the self? Explain. (128) We never actually perceive the self. Our consciousness is composed of various impressions that are constantly changing.

40b. How is Hume's view like the Theravada Buddhist's? (129) There is no fixed human nature; and there is no self with a fixed or definite existence, just a flow of one perception, impression or experience after another.

In what way does Hume's view of the idea of the self differ from that of the Buddhist? (130) Buddhists: salvation is possible through giving up the craving for self-identity and the striving for personal success and self-fulfillment. Hume draws no ethical conclusions from his discovery that the self is an illusion; in fact he thinks we won't be able to really take his conclusion seriously.

Note that Hume treats the problem of the self as chiefly an epistemological problem, while for Buddhism it is especially an ethical problem.