Lecture Notes on Sartre Chapter
Lectures on chapter 9 of Ten Theories of Human Nature: Sartre: Radical Freedom This page revised 12/10/2010
1. What three concerns are central to existentialism? (181)
* Concern with individual human beings, the uniqueness of their life situations-concern is that general theories of human nature or human essence ignore what is most important2a. Against what aspect of what thinker's thought did Kierkegaard define himself?* Concern with meaning and purpose of human lives rather than with scientific or metaphysical truth; inner or subjective experience rather than objective truth
* Emphasis on freedom, on the capacity of each individual to choose not only particular actions but also attitudes, projects, lifestyles, purposes, values; important that we act on this capacity use freedom.
Hegel. He compared Hegel's philosophical system to a mansion in which one did not actually live. (He thought Hegel too quickly resolved the tensions in life, and he did this on an unreal, abstract level. K, like other existentialists, tends to favor the type of person who does not flee from tensions but faces them, cultivates them, embraces them.2b. Upon what did he concentrate?The individual person and his or her life choices. (182)2c. What three basic attitudes to life did he distinguish?
1) the aesthetic-the search for pleasureHow does one reach the "highest" of the three?
2) the ethical-involving social commitment, marriage, family, work, and public responsibility
3) the religious-seeing life in relation to the eternal, the transcendent, and the divineBy faith, by a free nonrational "leap into the arms of God." (182)3. What is the most obvious difference between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche? (182)
Nietzsche is an atheist existentialist.4. What does N seem to mean by "God is dead"?
The intellectuals have seen through the illusions about God, the afterlife, and salvation; for the masses, the stories that used to be told, and believed, about God, have lost their force.What conclusion did he draw from this? (182)We have to rethink the whole foundations of our lives and find meaning and purpose in human or natural terms alone.5. How did life in France during the German occupation during World War II exemplify a central theme of existential philosophy?The choice that confronted each French citizen was a clear example of what Sartre saw as the always-present necessity for personal choice. Shall I collaborate with the Nazi occupation? Shall I resist and likely be imprisoned or executed? Shall I just lie low and focus on self-preservation. (184)6. What changes occurred in Sartre's thinking in period between the start of the Korean War (1950) and the Soviet invasion of Hungary (1956)?By 1950 he had modified (though not totally abandoned) the individualistic approach of his early philosophy. He affirmed the need for a classless, democratic society as a means to make genuine freedom possible for everyone. In the social context of the time, that aligned him in a general way with Marxism. Although he had already criticized some French Communists for their deterministic philosophy, which he thought undercut the importance of individual responsibility, he joined the French Communist Party for a period. He quit when the Soviet Union invaded Hungary to squelch a workers' democratic revolt in 1956.What sympathies characterize Sartre's later life? (184)A strong sympathy for the oppressed, the workers under capitalism and the population of countries in the global South under the domination of colonialism or imperialism. He supported Algerian war of independence against France and opposed the U.S. war in Vietnam.Questions 7-29 relate to Sartre's Being and Nothingness, written during World War II.7. How is Sartre's description of the two aspects of reality different from Descartes' dualism? (185)
Descartes' dualism radically distinguishes between the immaterial thinking mind and the extended, space-occupying body. Descartes is unable to explain persuasively how the two are related. Sartre affirms that the human being is a unified reality. For Sartre there are two modes of being, ways in which beings exist. Only humans are characterized by one mode, being-for-itself, but aspects of human life as well as nonhuman beings are characterized by the other mode, being-in-itself.8a. How can we distinguish being-for-itself from being-in-itself? (185)BFI is often equated with consciousness: consciousness is intentional; BII is not.8b. What sorts of things have only being-in-itself? Rocks, oceans, and tables. (What we call inanimate objects, including inanimate artifacts.)What entities also have being-for-itself? (185) Human beings.
Comment about being in itself: There are being-in-itself aspects of human beings. Whatever parts of our bodies are beyond our control and subject to the laws of nature are being in itself. Sartre says of being in itself "it is what it is," suggesting that in some sense it cannot be changed by willing it to be different, i.e., without physical manipulation. Our eye color is being in itself. The shapes of our faces are largely being in itself, although we might change them somewhat by constantly deciding to smile or frown, which affects muscle development, and that might change our faces.9. What does it mean to say that consciousness is intentional? (185)More significantly, the past is what it is, even if our actions have made it be what it is. We can seek forgiveness for our actions, we can try to make amends, we can apologize, we can pay compensation, but we cannot undo the fact that we did what we did. On the other hand, the future is radically open, according to Sartre in this period.
states of consciousness are of something conceived as distinct from the subject, though they include an implicit awareness (or consciousness) of self.10a. Distinguish between positional and nonpositional consciousness?Positional consciousness is about something distinct from the subject (the act of being conscious), e.g. of the person who is speaking to me.10b. Distinguish between prereflective and reflective consciousness.At the same time that we are positionally conscious of something, we are nonpositionally conscious of ourselves as conscious.
Whenever we are doing something, we tend to be explicitly conscious of only part of our activity and our surroundings, but we have prereflective consciousness of other parts. Sartre's example is counting his cigarettes; he's conscious of the cigarettes and the quantity he has counted so far, but only prereflectively conscious of counting them.10c. What is the evidence for the existence of pre-reflective consciousness? (186)Nonpositional consciousness differs from prereflective consciousness in that it concerns our constant presence to ourselves as conscious beings, even when we are not directly our attention to ourselves.
When he is asked what he is doing, he makes the fact that he is counting his cigarettes fully conscious right away, proving that he had a prereflective consciousness even before he was asked. Pre-reflective consciousness provides the material, so to speak, out of which we form a reflective notion of our selves.11. Sartre says humans desire to be God. Why is this impossible, according to him? Why, in his view, is the very idea of God self-contradictory? (186)He understands the idea of God as the idea of a being that is its own foundation, that does not depend upon any other being than itself. This is based on traditional theological descriptions of God as causa sui, literally, cause of Himself, which basically means that God exists although His existence is not caused by anything else. It is impossible for anything to be God because the very idea of God is self-contradictory.Why, in his view, is the very idea of God self-contradictory? (186)The idea of a being that is its own foundation is contradictory because it is an attempt to merge being for itself and being in itself. A being-for-itself is might capable of willing a being-in-itself into existence (as a potter is capable of willfully bringing a pot into existence, although of course the clay must exist first). But the two entities are not the same.12. What conclusion does Sartre draw from his view concerning God? (186)He denies the existence of God, understood as a being-for-itself-in-itself. He also denies the existence of transcendent objective values, such as commandments of God or the Platonic form of the Good.13. What does Sartre mean by the claim that "man's existence precedes his essence"? (187)We have no essence or human nature, in the sense of a definition implanted in us for a particular purpose, by God or evolution or something else. There are no general truths about what we want to be or what we ought to be.14. How is "nothingness" related to consciousness (and therefore to being-for-itself)? (187-88)But there are general descriptive claims that philosophy can make about the human condition, one of which is that we "are condemned to be free," that is, we can will anything, except not to be free and the source of our own choices.
1. We are nonpositionally aware that we (as subjects) are not the objects.15a. What two Freudian claims does Sartre reject?2. Through our judgments negativity enters the world: I plan to meet with a student in my office at a certain time about her paper, and the student is somewhere else at the time; I observe that she is not there. Such cases are pockets of nothingness, and they depend on the existence of human consciousness as BFI.
3. Freedom itself involves not-being—the ability to create, through our choices, what is not necessarily so, and what is not there now.
Sartre rejects determinism as applying to the mental life.15b. What, in Stephenson's view, is weak about his rejection of the second? (188)He also rejects the postulate of unconscious mental states, holding that consciousness is "necessarily transparent to itself."
Stephenson thinks Sartre is merely making a verbal point, that consciousness is by definition not unconscious. But, contrary to Sartre, there might be events taking place in the brain that are very much like conscious thoughts—they logically lead to thoughts that are conscious and we can become aware of them by asking ourselves what we must have been assuming, even though we were not at the moment aware of them.16a. What is striking about Sartre's view of the emotions? (188)For him emotions are not just moods that "come over us" without our cooperation but ways in which we interpret the world and somehow choose to have. Emotions involve an attempt to change the world.16b. How does this relate to his position on freedom? (188)We are free to have emotions that are contrary to those we actually have. We are responsible for our emotions.17. What, for Stephenson, seems to be correct about Sartre's view of the emotions? (188)Our judgments do affect our emotions. Anger requires the belief that the person at whom you are angry did something wrong; if that belief is changed, your anger will disappear.18a. Why is it wrong, according to Sartre, to disavow responsibility for long-lasting features of our personality or character? (188-89)Such features are repeated behaviors, behaviors require decisions or choices, and we are free to make different choices. We are not shy or a great lover or in possession of a full head of hair, independent of our behaviors. (The reference here is to aspects of our lives Sartre regards as BFI, to be contrasted with our height or skin color or biological sex, which pertain to our bodies insofar as they are part of the physical world, insofar as the body is a being in itself.)19a. When is our freedom clearly manifested to us?In moments of temptation or indecision.19b. How does Sartre understand the term translated "anguish"?The consciousness of one's own freedom. Former smokers feel this acutely. They may not be as addicted as they once were, but they remember the pleasures associated with smoking and still feel the temptation enough that they cannot be 100 percent confident that they will not relapse. Repeated acts of will are required not to start smoking again. Sartre thinks that even people are more or less virtuous—fair, reliable, courageous in their actions most of the time—are aware that nothing is forcing them to do the fair, reliable, or courageous thing today.Distinguish it from fear. (189)Fear is directed towards an external object (real or imagined). Anguish is the uneasy awareness of the unpredictability of one's own behavior. Sartre describes anguish as "the reflective apprehension of freedom by itself."20. What is Sartre's "metaphysical diagnosis of the human condition"? (189)We try to avoid anguish most of the time. We try to believe that we are not free, not beings for ourselves but being in itself. A rock has no freedom and therefore no responsibility. It is determined (by natural laws) to be what it is and do what it does. But in fact we nonpositionally (non-theoretically) know we are free.How does Sartre understand mauvaise foi (moh-VEZ fwah), usually translated "bad faith"? (189-90)The attempt to escape anguish by trying to describe our attitudes and actions as determined in some way by our situation or character or relationships to others (our job description or social role).21. Discuss either of the two cases presented on p. 190 in terms of how they supposedly illustrate "bad faith"?The girl is in "bad faith" because she pretends to herself that her hand is just an inert object, entirely subject to deterministic laws of nature but not to her choices.23. What kind of awareness do we have of other people's mental states?The café waiter is in "bad faith" because he is so totally into his role that he thinks of himself as nothing more than that role, thinking that it totally determines what he does. But in fact, he is free to do his job a little less enthusiastically; he is free to quit his job at any time.
When we see another human being or a nonhuman animal with two eyes directed at us, we know immediately, without reasoning from perceptual evidence to a conclusion about other minds, that we are being watched.What kind of power does the look (also: gaze) of another have over us? (191-92)We are aware of the other as able to judge us. Depending on how we understand what we are doing, and whether it is likely to be regarded as blameworthy or praiseworthy, we will feel ashamed or have a sense of pride.24a. For what disputable thesis does Sartre argue?That the relationship between any two human beings is inherently one of conflict.24b. Explain: the threat and the strategies Sartre recognizes to ward it off.Others constitute a threat to us. They tend to objectify us-by passing judgments upon us, to judge us as essentially friendly or arrogant or hostile, which reduce us to the status of a thing-in-itself in Sartrean terms. (This attack can succeed if we accept their judgments.)24c. Why does Stephenson say that Sartre's outlook "at this stage" (Being and Nothingness) is "bleak indeed"?Strategy 1: preemptive-objectify the other first.
Strategy 2: possess the other's freedom and use it for your own purposes (get the other to recognize one as his master). Interestingly, this seems to fit the capitalist's relationship to the workers in his hire.
He goes on to suggest that any relationship involves such problematic resolutions-that genuine respect for the freedom of others is an impossible ideal. (192)25. What contradiction does Sartre slip into, if Stephenson's rhetorical questions are on target?Sartre stresses human freedom and yet seems to say virtually that we are not free not to objectify others or use them as mere means to one's personal ends. (192)26. What does Sartre seem to recommend?We must make our choices with full awareness of our freedom and responsibility.What can't he recommend?
Any particular projects or way of life. (192-93)27. To what intrinsic value does Sartre commit himself? Authentic, self-conscious choice.What can we learn from Sartre about consciousness?
There is a point to the claim that we are responsible not only for our actions but for our attitudes, reactions, and emotions. Becoming more aware of them can be the first step toward changing them. (193)28. What does Sartre claim about each person (194, 3rd full para.)?Each person has a fundamental project that gives meaning to his or her life.Is this universally correct? (Why or why not?)It seems that we can have two or more projects that are not derived, as sub-projects, from a single fundamental project, say, to be a good student and a good friend.29. What problems does Stephenson note about the claim that no reasons can be given for fundamental [value] choices?These choices could be arbitrary; one could choose the project of exterminating a particular ethnic or religious group; or abusing children; or playing video games-and the only necessary condition would be doing it in full awareness of one's freedom.30. What did Sartre come to recognize more explicitly (after Being and Nothingness)?On the other hand, if a person devotes herself to helping others on the belief (mistaken from Sartre's view) that this is a transcendent value, would he criticize her as inauthentic. (194-95)
He talked about the possibility of radically escaping bad faith. He promised to explore it in a treatise on ethics, but never wrote that treatise. (195)