Although a straightforward Interest Model account of scientific belief no longer holds credibility, the Strong Programme continues to inspire case-study analyses in the history of science. Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer state that three of the four Strong Programme tenets--causality, impartiality, and symmetry--ground the methodology that underwrites their acclaimed study, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental Life. The study itself, or its claimed success in explaining the ascendancy of experimentalism in the 17th century, is heralded as a further success: confirmation that the Strong Programme's methods promise the "science of science".

But these successes accrue only if Shapin and Schaffer's analysis is essentially correct. I show that it is not. There are two significant flaws. First, the promised causal explanations-- required by the Strong Programme's methodology--are never achieved. Secondly, and most important for this paper, the methodological differences between Hobbes and Boyle are unacceptably exaggerated in service to the book's thesis. Consequently, the historiographical foundations of this study are controversial. Indeed, Shapin and Schaffer are guilty of unwarranted--and, heretofore, uncharged--bad history in their portrayal of the methodological standards advocated by Hobbes and Boyle. Given these flaws, Shapin and Schaffer's Leviathan can be neither cause to support the Strong Programme's bid to replace philosophy of science, nor an important historical contribution.

Cassandra Pinnick, Ph.D.
Department of Philosophy and Religion
Western Kentucky University
Questions or comments about this section of Western OnLine should be directed to Cassandra.Pinnick@WKU.EDU
Contents copyright © 1998, Cassandra Pinnick