

Preface

I

The realm of activity that is generated by face-to-face interaction and organized by norms of co-mingling—a domain containing weddings, family meals, chaired meetings, forced marches, service encounters, queues, crowds, and couples—has never been sufficiently treated as a subject matter in its own right. In fact, a convenience has often been made of it. Whenever a concrete illustration has been needed of how it is with a social establishment, or a bit of social structure, or even a society, interaction vignettes have been fetched in to provide vivid evidence and, incidentally, a little obeisance to the fact that there are people out there moving about. Thus interaction practices have been used to illuminate other things, but themselves are treated as though they did not need to be defined or were not worth defining. Yet the nicest use for these events is the explication of their own generic character.

Recently this neglected field—the field of public life¹—has begun to receive very active attention, this being an aspect no doubt of a complex unsettling expressed variously in the current unsafety and incivility of our city streets, the new political device

¹ This choice of terms is not much better than any other. "Public life" can mean the career associated with political office, a definition here to be excluded, and can exclude face-to-face interaction within a private domestic establishment, here definitely to be included. Current alternatives—proxemics, micro-sociology, face-to-face interaction, human ethology—all have weaknesses, too.

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of intentionally breaking the ground rules for self-expression during meetings and contacts, the change in rules of censorship, and the social molestation encouraged in the various forms of "encounter group" and experimental theater. Indeed, concern about public life has heated up far beyond our capacity to throw light on it.

The realm of face-to-face interaction, then, which was a field to borrow from, has become one to do battle in. In both cases an account is drawn upon that hasn't yet been established. It would seem a good time to develop the interaction ethology needed if we are to study this domain naturalistically.

In this book I want to focus on one issue, a conceptually delicate one: the connections between an element of social structure, in this case social relationships, and public life. Attention will be given to those aspects of social relationships that figure when the related persons are in one another's immediate presence. A double care will therefore be required, ours being a dual subject matter commonly accorded none. Before beginning, however, I would like to add a brief note about public order and about method.

II

The dealings that any set of actors routinely have with one another and with specified classes of objects seem universally to become subject to ground rules of a restrictive and enabling kind. When persons engage in regulated dealings with each other, they come to employ social routines or practices, namely, patterned adaptations to the rules—including conformances, by-passings, secret deviations, excusable infractions, flagrant violations, and the like. These variously motivated and variously functioning patterns of actual behavior, these routines associated with ground rules, together constitute what might be called a "social order."

The study of social order is part of the study of social organization; however, a weakened notion of organization is involved. The

concern is with the conditions and constraints placed upon the manner in which ends are sought or activity carried out and with patterned adaptations associated with these pursuits, with little concern for the choice of ends or the manner in which these ends may be integrated into a single system of activity. A certain atomization is involved: the interest is in the norms and practices employed by any particular participant in the channel of mutual dealings and not in the differentiation and integration of participants.² Ground rules are an important organizational device, but only one component of an organization. Moreover, ground rules can regulate dealings when those who participate share hardly any additional organization at all.

It should be apparent that thinking about social orders has been subject to a conservative bias, a bias that many would see as operative in the very selection of the topic and title. There is the political doctrine that order is "natural," that any order is good, and that a bad social order is better than no order at all. There is also the belief that the rules of an order are such as to make mutual dealings possible. And in truth, the rules of an order *are* necessarily such as to preclude the kind of activity that would have disrupted the mutual dealings, making it impractical to continue with them. However, it is also the case that the mutual dealings associated with any set of ground rules could probably be sustained with fewer rules or different ones, that some of the rules which do apply produce more inconvenience than they are worth, and that some participants profit considerably more than others from the order. It is also the case that a large number of infractions are compatible with maintaining an order and that the issue of how many this might be is a nice theoretical problem that has exercised passions, not minds. Finally, in a complex society the disorganization of a social order is a breakdown in but one component of the whole, and the whole is not so closely integrated as to break down because of this.

² The rules of an order may themselves, of course, form a system and exhibit typical system properties such as mutual consistency and exhaustiveness.

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In spite of the fact that there is much to suspect in an interest in order, the subject matter has a defense. It is possible to imagine a society without many of the ground rules sustained by Americans. Indeed, it is easy to imagine a society being the better off for this. But it is not possible to imagine a society that does not make extensive use of various sets of ground rules. Furthermore, the seventeenth-century model of the state which justifies constraints on the grounds that everyone profits from them does have some validity in regard to orders. Unlike many organizations and structures, an order can benefit almost all of its participants individually, often equitably, and sometimes immensely compared to the individual cost, and in fact may be consciously supported (even established) because the mutual benefits are apparent. Persons *can* come together and voluntarily agree to abide by certain ground rules, forming a norm-generating coalition, the better to free attention from unimportant matters and get on with the business at hand.³ Also, when an order actually does break down, a great flood of social disturbance can result, the participants then being forced to appreciate all the uses they had made of the prior order and all the

³ Of course, nice issues are involved here. Agreement to conform can be arrived at tacitly as well as openly, and this increases the number of possible cases. But the conditions that could provide the individual with self-interested warrant for adhering to a rule are sometimes ineffective because no device is available through which each participant can assure the others that he appreciates the circumstances, believes they appreciate the circumstances, and is confident that they are aware of his appreciation and belief. In actual life, the notion of enlightened self-interest seems more important as an argument than as an analysis. When an individual finds himself dependent on the operation of a ground rule, he can tell himself—or he told by others—that he must not break it, for if everyone were to, he himself would suffer from the consequences. And so he would. However, in many circumstances his breaking the rule would not appreciably undermine the support which others give it, and should their support be undermined for other reasons, his maintenance of the rule would be unlikely to bring it back into force. In fact, pure self-interest should lead the individual to encourage others to guide their conduct by an image of what would happen were everyone to cease to support the rule, and while thus encouraging the others, he himself should quietly disregard the rule. Note, if everyone else were to follow *this* maxim, his not doing so would still be unlikely to have an appreciable effect.

dependency they had developed on it. And these claims about order are valid in spite of the fact that the imagery involved seems to have been used to justify the doing of every unnecessary and coercive arrangement in the world, and that feelings about a breakdown in order can be excited in connection with minor disturbances whose consequences are largely restricted to this over-reaction.

Ground rules can be found in channels of mutual dealings that allow the participants to be outside of each other's immediate physical presence. An example is the etiquette governing business correspondence, or the regulations governing stock market transactions, or the syntax of a written language. My concern in this volume is with the ground rules and the associated orderings of behavior that pertain to public life—to persons co-mingling and to places and social occasions where this face-to-face contact occurs. My special concern then is with "public order."

It is possible to study public order in domestic establishments and other places where entree and the desire to enter are restricted, for these settings certainly have rules and practices regarding co-mingling.⁴ But on the whole, our concern with households has been in how they manage their relationships and not their passageways. And on the whole (and no doubt properly), interest in public order has focused on those situations where the unacquainted and the merely acquainted become physically accessible to one another—situations where order as such may be a central issue.

III

Throughout the papers in this volume unsubstantiated assertions are made regarding the occurrence of certain social practices in certain times and among peoples of various kinds. This description

⁴ In the Project on Human Communication at Broux State Hospital, Albert E. Schefflen is directing the videotaping of hundreds of hours of

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by pronouncement is claimed to be a necessary evil. I assume that if a broad attempt is to be made to tie together bits and pieces of contemporary social life in exploratory analysis, then a great number of assertions must be made without solid quantitative evidence. (Admittedly this license has greater warrant in traditional ethnographic work than in the study of "small behaviors." Face-to-face interaction generates many natural indicators nicely subject to measure and count. Further, much of expressive behavior disappears from mind as soon as it is observed, and only a randomly scheduled use of appropriate recording equipment is likely to be fully successful in sampling it.)

A second weakness, perhaps not necessary, is the effort made to correct for the first. Verbal hedges are involved.

One hedge, rightly notorious, is the occurrence qualifier. Instead of making absolute generalizations or ones in statistical form, I will assert that a given practice occurs among a set of individuals "routinely" or "often" or "on occasion," thereby admitting to a want of organized evidence even while pretending carefulness. Statements qualified in this way are hard to prove false, which is nice, but the same qualification weakens the sense in which they might be true, which isn't.

The second hedge is the distribution qualifier known familiarly as "In our society. . . ." Thus, I use the phrases "In Western society," "In the American middle classes," and so forth. The issue here is deeper than that of the questionability of using a pat device to guard against ethnocentric overgeneralizations. To say that a particular practice is found *in* a given place (or a given class of places) leaves a great deal unspecified even when systematically collected data are available. For it is often unclear whether it is claimed that the practice occurs throughout the place or only somewhere in it, and if throughout, whether this is the only place it occurs. Furthermore, the social arrangements and small behaviors considered in this book have the awkward property of per-

kitchen mingling in several working-class households, and for the first time—for good or bad—has made possible the close study of public order in private places.

aining not to a set of individuals that can be bounded nicely, like the citizens of a particular nation state, but to groupings whose boundaries we know very little about. Class, region, ethnic group, and age-grade are involved, and these are familiar enough. But the other reference units cause trouble. There is "epoch," which carries the difficulty that persons in certain parts of the world are more old-fashioned than their age mates in other parts. And the other reference units are not much better. There is the English-speaking world, the Anglo-American community, West European nations, Protestant countries, Christian society, and the West. Such are the units we are led to if we are interested in the *full* location of the practices to be considered in this volume. In any case, the reference unit, "American society" (which I use throughout), is something of a conceptual scandal, very nearly a contradiction in terms; the social unit "civilization" (whatever that might mean) is as relevant as that of nation state.

So the problem is not merely that of having to make statements about groups and communities without sufficient data, but that of not knowing very much about the identity and boundaries of the groupings about which there are insufficient data. I employ the term "our" but do so knowing that in regard to small behaviors the "our" cannot be conventionally or conveniently specified. I can with least lack of confidence make assertions about my "own" cultural group, the one with which I have had the most first-hand experience, but I do not know what to call this grouping, what its full span or distribution is, how far back it goes in time, nor how these dimensions might have to be changed, according to the particular bit of familiar behavior under question. (But note, in making claims about what various half-defined groups consider proper and improper, I do not mean to be read as agreeing with any of them, although often my sentences will allow this reading. I mean to make statements from within other people's point of view without repeatedly explicating the frame, and ask to be accused of laconicity, not morality.)

Certainly, then, the method that often is resorted to here—unsystematic, naturalistic observation—has very serious

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limitations. I claim as a defense that the traditional research designs thus far employed in this area have considerable limitations of their own. In spite of disclaimers, the findings of these studies are assumed to hold more broadly than the particularities of their execution can immediately warrant; in each case a second study would be necessary to determine of whom and what the results are true. The variables which emerge tend to be creatures of research designs that have no existence outside the room in which the apparatus and subjects are located, except perhaps briefly when a replication or a "continuity" is performed under sympathetic auspices and a full moon. Concepts are devised on the run in order to get on with setting things up so that trials can be performed and the effects of controlled variation of some kind or other measured, the science of which is assured by the use of lab coats and government money. The work begins with the sentence, "We hypothesize that . . .," goes on from there to a full discussion of the biases and limits of the proposed design, reasons why these aren't nullifying, and culminates in an appreciable number of satisfyingly significant correlations tending to confirm some of the hypotheses: as though the uncovering of pattern in social life were that simple. A sort of sympathetic magic seems to be involved, the assumption being that if you go through the motions attributable to science then science will result. But it hasn't. (Five years after publication, many of these efforts remind one of the experiments children perform with Gilbert sets: "Follow instructions and you can be a real chemist, just like the picture on the box.") Fields of naturalistic study have not been uncovered through these methods. Concepts have not emerged that reorder our view of social activity. Frameworks have not been established into which a continuously larger number of facts can be placed. Understanding of ordinary behavior has not accumulated; distance has.

Finally, a note is necessary about the use of ethological suggestions. In contemporary social science, the only students as a group who seem to have the capacity to study the small behaviors of their own society and to treat the conduct of their own familiars objectively are linguists, the traditional drawback of these scholars

for my concerns being the relatively narrow range of theirs. They are strong on supplying methodological inspiration but weak in regard to content. The work of ethologists provides a trickier model.

Social groups of animals—bands, flocks, herds, prides, troops, packs—have the special feature that the members of any particular group usually remain in perceptual range of one another. Thus, almost all activity is socially situated; social life and public life are coterminous. Therefore, ethologists perforce end up being students of face-to-face interaction. So they are a source. More important, they have developed a field discipline that leads them to study animal conduct in very close detail and with a measure of control on preconception. In consequence, they have developed the ability to cut into the flow of apparently haphazard animal activity at its articulations and to isolate natural patterns. Once these behavioral sequences are pointed out to the observer, his seeing is changed. So ethologists provide an inspiration. It must be said that many ethologists are quick to apply a Darwinian frame, accounting for any behavioral routine in terms of its current (and even vestigial) survival value, and that earlier work was rather quick in making species-wide imputations. When these biases are brought to the study of human behavior, some very unsophisticated statements result. But if we politely disattend this feature of ethology, its value for us as a model stands clear.

The Territories of the Self

I *Preserves*

At the center of social organization is the concept of claims, and around this center, properly, the student must consider the vicissitudes of maintaining them.

To speak closely of these matters, a set of related terms is needed. There is the "good," the desired object or state that is in question; the "claim," namely, entitlement to possess, control, use, or dispose of the good; the "claimant," that is, the party on whose behalf the claim is made; the "impediment," meaning here the act, substance, means, or agency through which the claim is threatened; the "author" (or "counter-claimant"), namely, the party—when there is one—on whose behalf the threat to claims is intended; and finally, the "agents," these being the individuals who act for and represent the claimant and counter-claimant in these matters involving claims.

When we restrict our attention to activity that can only occur

during face-to-face interaction, the claimant tends to be an individual (or a small set of individuals) and to function as his own agent. The same can be said of the counter-claimant, but in addition the impediment that occurs in his name is likely to involve his own activity or body. Therefore, conventional terms such as "victim" and "offender" will often be adequate. And one type of claim becomes crucial: it is a claim exerted in regard to "territory." This concept from ethology seems apt, because the claim is not so much to a discrete and particular matter but rather to a field of things—to a preserve—and because the boundaries of the field are ordinarily patrolled and defended by the claimant.

/ Territories vary in terms of their organization. Some are "fixed"; they are staked out geographically and attached to one claimant, his claim being supported often by the law and its courts. Fields, yards, and houses are examples. Some are "situational"; they are part of the fixed equipment in the setting (whether publicly or privately owned), but are made available to the populace in the form of claimed goods while-in-use. Temporary tenancy is perceived to be involved, measured in seconds, minutes, or hours, informally exerted, raising constant questions as to when the claim begins and when it terminates. Park benches and restaurant tables are examples. Finally, there are "egocentric" preserves which move around with the claimant, he being in the center. They are typically (but not necessarily) claimed long term. Purses are an example. This threefold division is, of course, only valid in degree. A hotel room is a situational claim, yet it can function much like a house, a fixed territory. And, of course, houses in the form of trailers can move around.

The prototypical preserve is no doubt spatial and perhaps even fixed. However, to facilitate the study of co-mingling—at least in American society—it is useful to extend the notion of territoriality into claims that function like territories but are not spatial, and it is useful to focus on situational and egocentric territoriality. Starting, then, with the spatial, we shall move by steps to matters that are not.

1. *Personal Space*: The space surrounding an individual, any-

where within which an entering other causes the individual to feel encroached upon, leading him to show displeasure and sometimes to withdraw.¹ A contour, not a sphere, is involved, the spatial demands directly in front of the face being larger than at back.² The fixed layout of seats and other interior equipment may restrictively structure available space around the individual in one dimension, as occurs in line or column organization. When two individuals are alone in a setting, then concern about personal space takes the form of concern over straight-line distance.

Given that individuals can be relied upon to keep away from situations in which they might be contaminated by another or contaminate him, it follows that they can be controlled by him if he is willing to use himself calculatedly to constitute that object that the others will attempt to avoid, and in avoiding, move in a direction desired by him.³ For example, we read of the engaging action of a pickpocket "stall" who uses his body to "pratt in" a mark, that is

¹ Sociological versions of this territory of the self are provided by Robert Sommer, "Studies in Personal Space," *Sociometry*, XXII (September 1959): 247-260, and Kenneth B. Little, "Personal Space," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, I (August 1965): 237-247. An ethological source is H. Hediger, *Studies of the Psychology and Behaviour of Captive Animals in Zoos and Circuses* (London: Butterworths Scientific Publications, 1955). A precursive statement is the 1936 paper by Kurt Lewin, "Some Social-Psychological Differences between the United States and Germany," in his *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1948), pp. 3-33.

² This is nicely illustrated in Eastern seaboard parlor cars designed with a wide, longitudinal aisle and single seats at intervals on either side, the seats arranged to swivel. When there is crowding, travelers maximize their "comfort" by turning their seats to exactly that direction that will allow the eyes, when oriented in the direction of the trunk, to gaze upon the least amount of passenger flesh. Standing passengers may crowd right up against the seats but in doing so will find themselves ringed in by two rows of backs. In ordinary railway or bus seating in America, passengers who feel overcrowded may be able to send their eyes out the window, thereby vicariously extending their personal space.

³ This argument derives from H. Hediger's well-known discussion of "flight distance" and "escape distance" and its bearing on lion taming. See his *Studies of the Psychology and Behaviour of Captive Animals in Zoos and Circuses*, *op. cit.*, pp. 40, 123.

to cause the mark to hold himself away from a body that is pressing on him, and incidentally hold himself in a position from which his wallet can be reached; similarly we read of the "pratting out" of one bystander whose position prevents theft from another.⁴

It is a central feature of personal space that legitimate claim to it varies greatly according to the accountings available in the setting and that the bases for these will change continuously. Such factors as local population density, purpose of the approacher, fixed seating equipment, character of the social occasion, and so forth, can all influence radically from moment to moment what it is that is seen as an offense. Indeed, in human studies it is often best to consider personal space not as a permanently possessed, egocentric claim but as a temporary, situational preserve into whose center the individual moves.

Take, for example, the social organization of co-waiting. Obviously, to stand or sit next to a stranger when the setting is all but empty is more of an intrusion than the same act would be when the place is packed and all can see that only this niche remains. In theory we might expect also a continuous process of adjustment whereby each arrival and each departure causes alterations throughout.⁵ What seems to occur in middle-class society is that arrival creates sequential reallocation but departure leads to somewhat more complex behavior, since an individual who leaves his current niche to take up a freed one produces an open sign that he is disinclined to be as close to his neighbor as he was. (When the two are of opposite sex, there exists the added complication that failure to move away when possible can be taken as a sign of undue interest.) In consequence, a departure may leave an empty place and no change in the remaining allocation, or at least an appropriator may wait for some tactful moment before making use

⁴ David W. Maurer, *Whiz Mob* (Publications of the American Dialect Society, No. 24, Gainesville, Florida, 1955), pp. 61-65.

⁵ See J. H. Crook, "The Basis of Flock Organization in Birds," and his discussion of arrival distance, settled distance and distance after departure, in W. H. Thorpe and O. L. Zangwill, eds., *Current Problems in Animal Behaviour* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), pp. 140 ff.

of the newly available resource. In brief, moving in on someone or having oneself moved in on is a less delicate task than removing oneself from proximity to him. In consequence, as say a streetcar empties, there will be a period when two individuals signal by proximity a relationship that does not in fact exist.

All of this may be seen in miniature in elevator behavior. Passengers have two problems: to allocate the space equably, and to maintain a defensible position, which in this context means orientation to the door and center with the back up against the wall if possible.⁶ The first few individuals can enter without anyone present having to rearrange himself, but very shortly each new entrant—up to a certain number—causes all those present to shift position and reorient themselves in sequence. Leave-taking introduces a tendency to reverse the cycle, but this is tempered by the countervailing resistance to appearing uncomfortable in an established distance from another. Thus, as the car empties, passengers acquire a measure of uneasiness, caught between two opposing inclinations—to obtain maximum distance from others and to inhibit avoidance behavior that might give offense.

2. *The Stall*: The well-bounded space to which individuals can lay temporary claim, possession being on an all-or-none basis.⁷ A

⁶ There are other general features of body behavior in elevators. In a useful unpublished paper ("Behavior in Elevators," 1965), John Gueldner suggests that the general practice is for male riders to be somewhat at attention, with hands to the side and no side involvements, with an equivalent posture for women—as if all activity had halted while individuals were in transit. Gueldner suggests that the seeking of a defensible niche establishes standard priorities: first entrant takes up the corner near the controls or one of the rear corners; the next entrant is likely to take up the corner diagonally across from the taken one. The third and fourth passengers take up the remaining corners, the fifth the middle of the rear wall, the sixth the center of the car. Members of withs, however, tend to stay together, retaining an ecological expression of their status even though eyes are front. Gueldner also suggests that there is a point of crowding when effort to maintain space is rather suddenly given up and something approaching indiscriminate packing occurs.

⁷ The term has been used by ethologists who study the daily round of the domestic cow.

scarce good will often be involved, such as a comfortable chair, a table with a view, an empty cot, a telephone booth. In the main, stalls are fixed in the setting, although, for example, at beaches devices such as large towels and mats can be carried along with the claimant and unrolled when convenient, thus providing a portable stall. When seats are built in rows and divided by common armrests (as in theaters), then personal space and stall have the same boundaries. When there is space between seats, then personal space is likely to extend beyond the stall. And, of course, there are stalls such as boxes at the opera which allocate several seats to the exclusive use (on any one social occasion) of a single "party." The availability of stalls in a setting articulates and stabilizes claims to space, sometimes providing more than would have been claimed as personal space, sometimes less—as can be seen, for example, in regard to seats when a class of six-year-olds attends an adult theater or when parents have a meeting in an elementary school room.

It should be noted that a stall can be left temporarily while the leave-taker is sustained in a continuing claim upon it; personal space cannot.⁸ Furthermore, often the claimant to a stall will not be an individual but two or more of them who properly share it, as illustrated nicely in public tennis courts and commercial bowling alleys, these being designed to provide a large, well-equipped stall to parties of players for stipulated periods of time. (In our society the most common multi-person stall is the table, there being relatively few too small for more than one person or too large to be claimed by a party of only two.) Personal space, on the other hand, is largely a one-person possession, although in crowded places, such as packed elevators, a small child grasped to a parent

⁸ In gentlemen's clubs, mental hospitals, old folks' homes, and domestic living rooms, proprietary claims tend to grow up around chairs and other stalls so that although these start out as part of situationally provided territories available on a first-come basis for any continuous period of use, they soon take on the character of fixed territories possessed by one individual whether or not he is present to claim by use. See Michael A. Woodbury, "Ward Dynamics and the Formation of a Therapeutic Group," *Chestnut Lodge Symposium*, Rockville, Maryland, mimeo (1958), and Alan Lipman, "Chairs as Territory," *New Society*, XX (April 1967): 564-566.

may be treated as part of the latter's personal space, and couples engaged in affectional entwinings may also be treated as claiming a single personal space.

The point about stalls, as suggested, is that they provide external, easily visible, defensible boundaries for a spatial claim. Stalls provide a contrast in this regard to personal space, the latter having ever-shifting dimensions. This points up a problem in the organization of American public places. Here, for practical considerations, equipment such as picnic tables or park benches is often built to a size to suggest that each can be claimed as a stall by a participation unit, a "single" or a "with." However, when crowding is such that this allocation would leave some individuals standing, then a rule is understood to apply that gives unaccommodated participation units the right to enforce a fictional division of a stall into two (and occasionally more than two) stalls. Obviously, then, as crowding increases, those already ensconced will begin to have to give up exclusive claim to a stall. An ambiguity results, because there is no well-established principle to order the sequence in which various claimants, already ensconced, will be obliged to give up their exclusiveness. A field is thus opened for personal enterprise. Hence, on buses, streetcars, and trains, seats designed to hold two persons, and fully recognized to be designed to accommodate two strangers when necessary, nonetheless establish for the first arrival a territory he may attempt to retain for himself by standard ruses: he may leave his own possessions on the empty place, thereby marking it for his own and obliging competitors to move (or ask to have moved) something that symbolizes another; he may deny his eyes to those seeking a seat, thereby preventing them from obtaining the fleeting permission that they tend to seek, failure to receive which can cause them to move on to the next available place; he may expose some contaminating part of himself, such as his feet, or allow part of his body to fall on the disputed place, so that those who would use the place must invite contamination; and so forth.

3. *Use Space*: The territory immediately around or in front of an individual, his claim to which is respected because of apparent

instrumental needs. For example, a gallery goer can expect that when he is close to a picture, other patrons will make some effort to walk around his line of vision or excuse or minimize their momentarily blocking it. Persons holding a conversation over a distance can expect a similar accommodation from non-participants whose bodies might block the giving and receiving of conversation management cues. Sportsmen of all kind expect some consideration will be given to the amount of elbow room they require in order to manipulate their equipment, as do convicts using pickaxes to break stone. Gymnasts using a vaulting horse expect that others will "stay out of their way." A crewman obliged to scrub and polish a designated portion of the surface of his warship expects, especially on the day before weekly inspection, to be able to keep everyone away during and right after the cleaning.⁹ Note that circumstances can allow the individual to offer instrumental grounds for demanding limits on the level of noise and sound, especially when the source is physically close by.

4. *The Turn*: The order in which a claimant receives a good of some kind relative to other claimants in the situation. A decision-rule is involved, ordering participants categorically ("women and children first," or "whites before blacks"), or individually ("smallest first, then next smallest"), or some mixture of both.¹⁰ Typically

⁹ See Philip D. Roos, "Jurisdiction: An Ecological Concept," *Human Relations*, XXI (1968): 75-84. Roos provides a case history argument for making a sharper distinction than I have done between territoriality, involving exclusion and possession, and "jurisdiction," involving only exclusion.

¹⁰ Upon fuller consideration, we are likely to find that the means employed to manage the allocation of a minor good (such as a turn) involve more than one rule. And rules about rules may develop to cover standard problems, determining what should be done when no rule seems to apply, or when one that should apply cannot, or when mutually incompatible rules apply. One rule may be defined as overruling another on all occasions when they both apply, or each may be accorded a sphere where it overrides the other. One rule may serve to rank categories of persons and another to rank members within a category thusly ranked. Note, individuals often identify a social order by a well-known rule that figures in it, but the viability of this rule is often dependent on a complex of associated rules

claimants are required to have been present in order to establish their claim on a turn, but once this has been done and marked in some way, they may be allowed to absent themselves until their turn comes up. In our Western society, perhaps the most important principle in turn organization is "first come, first served," establishing the claim of an individual to come right after the person "ahead" and right before the person "behind."¹¹ This decision rule creates a dominance ranking but a paradoxical one, since all other forms of preference are thereby excluded.¹²

Turn-taking requires not only an ordering rule but a claiming mechanism as well. This may be formal, for example, number-tickets, names on a receptionist's list, or informal, as when the individual remains close to the place of service and assumes that a tacit

covering the natural range of contingencies. The longer and the more widely a given rule is in force, the more developed, presumably, is the complex of rules that buttresses it.

¹¹ In many cases, a claimant is allowed at will to let the party behind go ahead of him; he may even be allowed to pick any place lower down in the line, presumably on the assumption that those behind his original place and above the place he picks will have gained a turn and those below this point will have lost nothing. And in all cases, the claimant apparently can give up his turn entirely. In brief, turn as here defined is a right but not a duty. This raises the issue of "negative queues," namely, an ordering of persons who are to receive something they do not want, such as a place in a gas chamber. (Similarly, some prisons have seats that cannot be given up for a lady.) A dialectical way of assimilating such organization to the notion of preserves is to describe the good that is involved as a claim to postponement. Naturally, here one would be allowed to take any turn ahead of one's position but disallowed from stepping behind or giving up entirely one's position.

¹² It might be said—with apologies to Simmel—that it is the essential character of everyday turn-taking to be a middle ground, the claims of property and contract being held in check at one end, the claims of social rank at the other. To take one's turn is neither to take one's property nor to take one's social place. Utilitarian goods are involved, but typically ones so minor that it would have been easy to put their allocation into the service of ceremonial expression. Whereas ceremonial expression provides bodily expression of social position when things go right, turns in daily life do so only when things go wrong.

consensus will operate. Sometimes a line or row formation (a queue) will be employed as a collective, mnemonic device, and sometimes this formal device allows the participant to sustain a formally unmarked turn during brief absences.¹³ Many queues qualify a with as a claimant, especially where one member can transact all of its business (as in movie queues), and this often leads to permission to join an acquaintance ahead of where one otherwise would have been, since in these cases a single already established in line will be able to act as though he is merely the agent

¹³ A useful paper on turn-taking in one type of extremity is Leon Mann, "Queue Culture: The Waiting Line as a Social System," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXXV (November 1969): 340-354. Some turn-taking merely involves a decision between two users as to which will use a road or walk first, but in most cases, it appears clear that a service of some kind is the good that must be allocated. Service systems are one of the fundamental organizational devices of public order, and their close study has hardly begun. The complete paradigm involves at least five roles: supervisor, server, served, next-up, member of the line. There are, of course, automated systems without supervisors and servers, and many systems which frequently have neither next-up nor member of the line. A service system is the collective form of which the individual's part is the service stop, this involving one complete cycle whereby a participation unit (a with or a single) moves off from some base of operation, seeks out and obtains some service, and then returns to the base.

It might be added that many services are provided in such a manner that an encounter, a ritually ratified face-to-face contact, occurs only if something out of the ordinary happens and must be managed, providing us with a clear case where server and served can be in contact but not in conversational touch. (Indeed, the server need not even look at the served, but only at, say, the article chosen for purchase, the customer's money, and perhaps his hand.) This sort of deritualization of transactions is sometimes cited as a mark of incivility and urban impersonality, an allegation that is half true and half nonsense. A great deal of consensus and mutual understanding is required to support service transactions executed without the help of social ritual. In some shops a year or so of patronage is required before patron and server each knows that talk and eye contact can be dispensed with and actions allowed to do all the speaking. (Of course in other service settings, such as better-cashier dealings at race tracks, newcomers quickly learn to sustain "blind" transactions.) On the prevalence of deritualized service transactions, I am indebted to a useful paper by Marilyn Merritt, "On the Service Encounter," unpublished (1968).

for a with that is just now fully arrived. I want only to add that when turns are held by bodies standing in single file, then each participant will be involved both in maintaining his turn and his personal space. However, since the taking of turns provides a clear reading of events, great reductions of personal space can be tolerated along with attendant bodily contact.

5. *The Sheath*: The skin that covers the body and, at a little remove, the clothes that cover the skin. Certainly the body's sheath can function as the least of all possible personal spaces, the minimal configuration in that regard; but it can also function as a preserve in its own right, the purest kind of egocentric territoriality. Of course, different parts of the body are accorded different concern—indeed this differential concern tells us in part how the body will be divided up into segments conceptually. Among the American middle classes, for example, little effort is made to keep the elbow inviolate, whereas orifice areas are of concern. And, of course, across different cultures, the body will be differently segmented ritually.

6. *Possessional Territory*: Any set of objects that can be identified with the self and arrayed around the body wherever it is. The central examples are spoken of as "personal effects"—easily detachable possessions such as jackets, hats, gloves, cigarette packs, matches, handbags and what they contain, and parcels.¹⁴ We must also include a claimant's co-present dependents because, territorially, they function somewhat like his personal possessions. Finally, there are objects that remain tethered to a particular setting but can be temporarily claimed by persons present, much as can stalls: ashtrays, magazines, cushions, and eating utensils are examples. One might also include here regulative command over mechanical creature-comfort devices: control over radio, television sets, temperature, windows, light, and so forth.

7. *Information Preserve*: The set of facts about himself to which

¹⁴ In the matter of territoriality, a distinction in law has some relevance. The issue is that of possession, not ownership; the exertion of current, not ultimate control. See also Roos, *op. cit.*

an individual expects to control access while in the presence of others.¹⁵ There are several varieties of information preserve, and there is some question about classing them all together. There is the content of the claimant's mind, control over which is threatened when queries are made that he sees as intrusive, nosy, untactful. There are the contents of pockets, purses, containers, letters, and the like, which the claimant can feel others have no right to ascertain. There are biographical facts about the individual over the divulgence of which he expects to maintain control. And most important for our purposes, there is what can be directly perceived about an individual, his body's sheath and his current behavior, the issue here being his right not to be stared at or examined.¹⁶ Of course, since the individual is also a vehicular unit and since pilots of other such units have a need and a right to track him, he will come to be able to make an exquisite perceptual distinction between being looked at and being stared at, and, God

¹⁵ Traditionally treated under the heading of "privacy." See the current review by Alan F. Westin in *Privacy and Freedom* (New York: Atheneum, 1967). See also Oscar M. Ruebhausen and Orville G. Brim, Jr., "Privacy and Behavioral Research," *Columbia Law Review*, LXV (November 1965): 1184-1211.

¹⁶ No doubt there is a link here between having the body touched and having it seen, as in the biblical sense of "knowing" someone or the legal sense of having carnal knowledge. This is not the only ambiguity. Name, both Christian and family, can function like a bit of discretionary information whose divulgence one would like to be able to control but cannot always do so. Here see, for example, A. C. Reich, "Police Questioning of Law-Abiding Citizens," *Yale Law Journal*, LXXV, no. 7 (1966). Name can also function as a self-identified personal possession whose use by others the individual may be prepared to license providing they stand in the right relationship to him. In this regard, note the situation of the English better classes at the turn of the century as described by Harold Nicolson, *Good Behaviour* (London: Constable and Company, 1955), p. 272:

In my own youth, had I been addressed by my Christian name at my private or even my public school, I should have blushed scarlet, feeling that my privacy had been outraged and that some secret manliness had been purloined from me, as if I had been an Andaman Islander or a Masai.

In general, there is the fact that concern for preserves such as the spatial can be partly based indirectly on a concern for information preserves, the former supporting the latter.

help us, learn to suspect, if not detect, that the latter is being masked by the former; and he will learn to conduct himself so that others come to respond to him in the same way. Incidentally, wherever we find such fine behavioral discriminations, we should suspect that what is at work is the need to keep two different behavioral systems functioning without interference in the same physical area.

8. *Conversational Preserve*: The right of an individual to exert some control over who can summon him into talk and when he can be summoned; and the right of a set of individuals once engaged in talk to have their circle protected from entrance and overhearing by others.

I have touched on eight territories of the self, all of a situational or an egocentric kind: personal space, stalls, use space, turns, sheath, possessional territory, information preserve, and conversational preserve. One general feature of these several forms of territoriality should be noted: their socially determined variability. Given a particular setting and what is available in it, the extensivity of preserves obviously can vary greatly according to power and rank. Patients in a charity hospital may have to wait until dying before being given a privacy screen around their bed; in middle-class private hospitals, the patient may enjoy this privilege at other times, too, for example, when breast feeding a child.¹⁷ Similarly, clinic patients in a hospital may be discussed by physicians by name, while private patients in the same hospital are given the privacy rights of being referred to by room number.¹⁸ In general, the higher the rank, the greater the size of all territories of the

¹⁷ David Sudnow, *Passing On* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966). W. Rosengren and S. DeVault report that clinic patients in a studied hospital were obliged to accept having the delivery door open; private patients, however, frequently enjoyed the privacy of a closed door. See W. Rosengren and S. DeVault, "The Sociology of Time and Space in an Obstetrical Hospital," in Eliot Freidson, ed., *The Hospital in Modern Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 278.

¹⁸ W. Rosengren and S. DeVault, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

self and the greater the control across the boundaries. (Within a given household, for example, adults tend to have vastly larger territorial claims than do children.) Cutting across these differences, however, there is another—the variation that occurs in the understandings sustained by any one set of individuals as they move from situation to situation. For example, middle-class Americans at Western ski lodges allow their bodies to be stared at and touched-in-passing to a degree that would be considered quite intrusive were this to occur in the public places of their home town.¹⁹ Finally, there are group-cultural differences that crosscut these cross cuttings. For example, there is some evidence that lower-class blacks are more concerned to obtain eyeing avoidance than are lower-class Italians.²⁰

II *Markers*

The claim to a preserve by a putative possessor is made visible by a sign of some kind, which, following ethological practice, may be called a "marker."²¹

Markers are of various kinds. There are "central markers," being objects that announce a territorial claim, the territory radiating outward from it, as when sunglasses and lotion claim a beach chair, or a purse a seat in an airliner, or a drink on the bar the

¹⁹ Similarly ski lodges tend to allow more license with respect to the initiation of encounters among the unacquainted than is the case in business settings. Here I am indebted to an unpublished paper, "Ski Resort Behavior Patterns" (1965), by Beatrice Farrar.

²⁰ Gerald D. Suttles, *The Social Order of the Slum* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 67.

²¹ An early sociological use in print of this term is Robert Sommer, "Sociofugal Space," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXXII, no. 6 (1967), 654-660.

stool in front of it, or chips on a table the closest "slot" and the attendant exclusive right to make bets from it.

There are "boundary markers," objects that mark the line between two adjacent territories. The bar used in supermarket checkout counters to separate one customer's batch of articles from the next is an example; the common armrest between theater seats is another. Note, when boundary markers are employed either on both sides of an individual or in front and back, they function as "spacers," ensuring the user personal space in a row or column, if not a temporary stall.

There are (if I may use the phrase) "car markers," that is, signatures embedded in an object to claim it as part of the possessional territory of the signee, as when names are burned into sports equipment, livestock, and slaves, or when numbers are embossed on engine blocks, and so forth.

It is here that the "system of reference" problem becomes acute. Since territory implies a field of contiguous items—especially in the case of possessional preserves—it comes to pass that one means of marking possession of an object is to have clearly possessed things next to it. When, for example, a book is left on a newspaper, individuals will perceive that the newspaper is not to be taken, because the book and the newspaper will be understood to "belong together." Hence an object that is part of a territory can also function as a marker of territory; indeed, signatures of various kinds are of this order. Thus, personal effects, constituting a preserve in their own right, are frequently employed as markers; moving them or even touching them is something like touching their owner's body, and such acts are avoided in many circumstances or performed with suitable circumspection.

The issue of system of reference is especially delicate in connection with the territorial functioning of the body. The very notion of an egocentric territory suggests that the body is not only a preserve but also a central marker of various preserves—personal space, stall, turn, and personal effects. This becomes especially evident when the preserve in question is claimed not merely for the possessor of the body but for a multi-person party of which the

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possessor is only one member.²² Words can also be used as markers, as when moves toward a stall are warned away verbally by someone nearby who claims the area. And it is thus that the hand or foot in touch with a person can function as a "relationship marker," that is, a sign that stakes out a relationship claim. (Important among these are "with markers" which establish who is in a with with whom.) In the case of relationship markers, note, bodily contiguity or contact can function as an expression of a relationship from the point of view of those concerned to note this and as a possession marker from the point of view of those concerned to note that.²³

A final point. When a personal possession is used as a marker of personal space, the possessor will necessarily be on hand to face offenders: he can challenge any displacement of the marker and fight off—or at least bear witness to—its appropriation. He who would retain a stall, however, is less well protected because he may not always be present to guard the means of marking it. The marker itself is likely to be some personal effect that can be stolen and may well be worth stealing, reminding us that effects involve ownership in addition to possession. To hold a stall, then, one may have to expose a personal possession to theft. It follows that in

²² This is but one example of the limitations of the term "individual" as a technical unit. Clearly we use the term individual as an easy equivalent of good, claimant, marker, impediment, and counter-claimant—when the occasion is right. The term is also used to designate a vehicular unit in traffic organization, an interactant in conversational organization, and a member either of a single or a with. In all of these cases, distinctively different systems of reference are involved and hence, ultimately, different units. By allowing the word "individual" to cover all of these meanings, to shift from one to another in the same sentence, and to enter the argument at various levels, great flexibility in discourse is obtained. The price, of course, is rigor.

²³ There are some nice issues here. In doing a "pick up," the male must transform a two-person talk into a with, and if successful in this will come to employ standard with markers. There are ghetto males so oriented to active work of this kind that they have learned to maneuver a girl into not disallowing their employment of these markers even after she feels she has closed out matters conversationally. My sense is that this technique is often effective, the more so since no one can quite say what is happening.

communities in which petty theft is rampant, stall organization may be less found than usually. Recent trends in social organization bear this out. Beaches along the southern coast of France are heavily populated by individuals from a variety of nations, classes, and age-groups. Yet purses and trousers are used as markers by individuals who have disappeared momentarily into the waves. American beaches that draw users from large American cities are less conducive to stall organization. New York itself, as an environment of possible stalls, may be currently something of an extreme in this regard; its citizenry has appreciably foregone the use of this basic form of public social organization.

III *Modalities of Violation*

If territory-like preserves are the central claim in the study of comingling, then the central offense is an incursion, intrusion, encroachment, presumption, transgression, defilement, besmearing, contamination—in short, a violation. Now it seems the case that the chief agencies and authors of this kind of boundary offense are individuals themselves and what can be intimately identified with them.

Turn now to consider human agencies of violation and examine first the different modalities.

1. There is ecological placement of the body relative to a claimed territory. The model here is classical Indian caste relations, with its conception of measurable distances which mark a safe approach between persons of different castes, the ranking person serving as the center of a personal space and the other as a source of contamination, the potency of which depends on the social distance between the castes.²⁴

²⁴ A statement of the traditional conception may be found in J. H. Hutton, *Caste in India*, 2nd edition (Bombay, New York, Indian Branch: Oxford University Press, 1951), esp. p. 79. What indeed took place at various

2. The body, including the hands, as something that can touch and through this defile the sheath or possessions of another. The extreme here in our society is no doubt sexual molestation.

3. The glance, look, penetration of the eyes. Although in our society the offense that can be committed by intrusive looks tends to be slighter than other kinds of offensive incursions, the distance over which the intrusion can occur is considerable, the directions multiple, the occasions of possible intrusion very numerous, and the adjustments required in eye discipline constant and delicate. Note, the need for great eye discipline is reinforced by the fact that glances of the eye also play an important role in a different frame, that of applying to acts internal to an encounter, as in requests for and ratification of talk, the management of turn-taking among speakers, head aversion in support of modesty, shame and tact, the application of sincerity stress, middle-distance looks, and so forth. Within the encounter frame, direct gaze is often not an invasion because it has other jobs to do.²⁵

Although concern about various forms of incursion can be thought to increase positively with social class status, and although it certainly seems the case that the more affluent an individual, the larger the preserves he can command, nonetheless, as suggested, the relation is not simple. Eye behavior is an example. In lower-class Mexican-American youth gangs, for example, the notion of a "bad look" seems fairly well-established, involving an infraction of the rule that subordinates are supposed to avert their gaze after

times and places in India is, of course, another question. A current statement regarding the issue of contamination can be found in Louis Dumont, *Homo Hierarchicus*, Mark Sainsbury, trans. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 130-151.

²⁵ In addition, of course, there are great cross-cultural differences in the rules observed *within* the encounter frame. It has been suggested, for example, that one difficulty Puerto Rican schoolchildren have in American schools is that in casting their eyes down in what they take to be the proper response to being scolded by the teacher, they can give an American adult a sense that they are trying to refuse concern, which can lead to more scolding. (Thomas Kochman, "Cross-Cultural Communication: Contrasting Perspectives, Conflicting Sensibilities," unpublished paper, Department of Linguistics, Northeastern Illinois State College, 1970.)

having returned the superordinate's for a brief time. Turf and the dominance hierarchy can be at issue. Further, at dances, a youth may find it necessary to defend the integrity of his relationship to a girl whom another boy has looked at overlong from across the hall—a gallantry not perhaps as pronounced among those who can protect their relational possessions with the usual privacies that money can buy.²⁶

In middle-class society, care in use of the eyes can be readily found in connection with nakedness. In nudist camps, for example, apparently considerable effort is taken to avoid appearing to be looking at the private parts of others.²⁷ Topless waitresses sometimes obtain the same courtesy from their patrons, especially when engaging them in close serving. A rule in our society: when bodies are naked, glances are clothed.

4. Sound interference, being those noises made by an individual that are felt to intrude disruptively on bystanders, demanding, as it were, too much sound space for him. Also there is the practice of sustaining an encounter over a distance that is longer than proper according to the prevailing norms.

5. The addressing of words, as when subordinates in an encounter speak up, or remarks are addressed by way of cross-talk from an individual to those with whom he is not in a ratified state of talk,²⁸ or when street hustlers of various sorts initiate importuning encounters with passers-by, this latter, incidentally, being the source of the unpleasantness Western tourists face in begging cultures.

6. Bodily excreta, to be considered in terms of four distinct

²⁶ I draw here on an unpublished paper (1965) by Nick Vaca. See also Lewis Yablonsky, *The Violent Gang* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962; London: Collier-Macmillan, 1962), p. 157.

²⁷ Martin S. Weinberg, "Sexual Modesty and the Nudist Camp," *Social Problems*, XII, no. 3 (1965): 315.

²⁸ A nice illustration is provided by Tom Wolfe, "The Voices of Village Square," in his *The Kandy-Kolored Tangerine Flake Streamline Baby* (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1966; London: Mayflower Books, 1966), pp. 272-278.

agencies of defilement. First, corporeal excreta (or their stains) that contaminate by direct touch: spittle, snot, perspiration, food particles, blood, semen, vomit, urine, and fecal matter. (A germ-theory rationale supports our attitudes to this element, the classical extreme in contamination being the suppurative sores of lepers.)²⁹ Second, there is odor, including flatus, tainted breath, and body smells.³⁰ Like looking, odor operates over a distance and in all directions; unlike looking, it cannot be cut off once it violates and may linger in a confined place after the agency has gone. Third, a minor factor, body heat—to be found, for example, on sheets in “bird-cage” hotels, on toilet seats in powder rooms, in jackets and sweaters recently removed by their users and lent to, or mistakenly appropriated by, others.³¹ Finally, most ethereal of all, markings left by the body in which some bodily excreta can be imagined to remain; plate leavings are an example. Note that in this matter of markings, knives function in an interesting way (as do other serving implements), since they provide the means of taking without contaminating, as middle-class children learn the first time their mother finds a teeth-marked crater in a cake, a loaf of bread, or a piece of fruit. These craters are defiling, and it is very important to disinfect the object and its setting by cutting away with a clean knife until only a flat surface remains. Note, these understandings are neither recent nor local in Western society. Thus the Florentine, Giovanni Della Casa, in his book of manners published in 1558, suggests:

²⁹ Useful arguments that the germ theory merely rationalizes ritual concerns can be found in Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966).

³⁰ Commercials regarding measures to be taken so as not to “offend” provide rather risible material in this connection but are not nearly so risible as the facts. The care that some individuals do in fact take so as not to contaminate others by various bodily excreta would surely do credit to a saint. For example, males brushing close to females may say “excuse me” imploringly so as to prevent possible contamination by their breath.

³¹ The first treatment of the ritual implications of body heat is Edward Hall, “A System for the Notation of Proxemic Behavior,” *American Anthropologist*, LXX (October 1963), esp. 1014–1015.

It is also an unpleasant habit to lift another person's glass of wine or his food to your nose and smell it. I would even advise you not to smell your own food and drink, because drops may fall from your nose, and even the thought that this may happen is disgusting. I must also recommend you not to offer anyone else a glass of wine which you have tasted and touched with your lips, unless he is a very close intimate of yours. Still less should you offer him a pear or any other fruit from which you have already taken a bite.³²

Here reason is not an immediate basis for understanding. Couples who are sexually intimate may still feel repelled by the notion of using each other's toothbrush. Men will drink from the same bottle (and indeed might feel it unmanly to decline to do so) who would not touch each other's half-eaten food. An individual who feels it improper to use his own knife to take butter from the table's dish may be quite ready, nay eager, to eat in the Chinese style at a Chinese restaurant.³³ An individual who is quick to pick up and use a pair of sunglasses found in the street may decline to retrieve a comb or brush similarly seen, in many cases even when no one sees the seeing. And greasy and creamy foods that are not considered to contaminate the mouth can yet be felt to contaminate the hands should contact have to be made without insulation by utensils.

³² Giovanni Della Casa, *Galateo*, R. S. Pine-Coffin, trans. (London: Penguin Books, 1938), p. 26.

³³ In part, no doubt, because of a sliver of acculturation. In his *Autobiography*, Malcolm X provides an illustration. On his first being offered food in the Muslim style, he declines: "The trouble was, I have to admit it, at that point I didn't know if I could go for their manner of eating. Everything was in one pot on the dining room rug, and I saw them just all fall right in, using their hands." Some time later, after having been very well received, the following:

But the Muslim world's customs no longer seemed strange to me. My hands now readily plucked up food from a common dish shared with brother Muslims; I was drinking without hesitation from the same glass as others; I was washing from the same little pitcher of water; and sleeping with eight or ten others on a mat in the open.

The Autobiography of Malcolm X (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1965; London: Hutchinson, 1966), pp. 330, 343-344.

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The intrusive effect of bodily associated matters, whether proximity, touch, or excreta, varies greatly depending on what it is that intrudes. In Western society the elbows and upper back seem to have little capacity to contaminate, the sexual organs a great deal. Interestingly, something of a parallel is found in regard to preserves; as suggested, the elbow is part of the body that is little vulnerable to contamination, the "private parts" more so. It is thus that the elbows can be used in our society for spacers, ensuring the actor some measure of personal space, elbows being a part of the body which can hardly intrude or be intruded on.³⁴ In spite of this parallel, however, it should be clear that the character of the individual as a territory (or as the center of territories) is not simply an opposing counterpart to his being a source of violations. In the first role he holds others off, in the second, he penetrates; the shapes taken in the two roles are different.

IV Territorial Offenses

Discriminating types of territory and types of violation does not provide us with all the framework we need to bring order into the varieties of territorial offense.³⁵ The complication is that the claimant to a territory and the impediment to the claim are not neces-

³⁴ Since in every society individuals have to somehow get through the day, we can expect that in any society in which some parts of the body are defined as contaminating and contaminatable, other parts of the body will have to be given relatively neutral status. (Of course, as suggested, we are to expect that societies will differ widely in the way they segment the body for ritual purposes.) A comment on the pattern in India is provided by Henry Orenstein, "Toward a Grammar of Defilement in Hindu Sacred Law," in Milton Singer and Bernard S. Cohn, eds., *Structure and Change in Indian Society* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1968), p. 123.

³⁵ A useful classification of territorial offenses is available in Stanford M. Lyman and Marvin B. Scott, "Territoriality: A Neglected Sociological Dimension," *Social Problems*, XV (Fall 1967): 243-244.

sarily seated in different persons, nor are the agency of offense and the author of the offense necessarily located in the same individual.

1. The prototypical territorial offense occurs when one individual encroaches on the preserve claimed by and for another individual, the first thereby functioning as an impediment to the second's claim.

It should be noted that encroachment involves two different kinds of sin. One is suggested by the term "intrusion": this is the obvious case of an individual entering a territory to which he has no right of access, or otherwise contaminating a preserve. Authorship is variable: the act can be perceived to be unintentional, or a knowing by-product of some urgent design, or malicious, that is, performed merely to offend. The extremes are interesting. One is rape. Another, less well known, is defilement of fixed territories by means of defecation.³⁶ Still another is described by Valachi in his comment on his prep school, the New York Catholic Protectory:

The roughest one was Brother Abel. He was in charge of the tailor shop, and he would lay into us with his tape stick something awful. It didn't matter whether we did anything wrong or not. The best thing to do was stay out of his way unless you were looking for a beating. Then one day Brother Abel died. They put his body on display in the chapel. I'll never forget it. All the kids from the five yards of the protectory had to line up to view him and pay their last respects. All told, I'd say there were about 300 of us. I was near the end of the line and when it was my turn to view the body, I almost fainted. Brother Abel's chest was all covered with spit, so what could I do? I spit on him, too.³⁷

³⁶ See, for example, Albert B. Friedman, "The Scatological Rites of Burglars," *Western Folklore*, XXVII (July 1968): 171-179, and Albert K. Cohen, *Delinquent Boys* (New York: The Free Press, 1955; London: Collier-Macmillan, 1955), p. 28. This sort of defilement is to be distinguished from the routine use by various animals of their urine and feces as a means of territory claiming through marker distribution.

³⁷ Peter Maas, *The Valachi Papers* (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1969), p. 60. During the 1968 difficulties at Columbia University, the then Vice-President, David Truman, received a somewhat similar accolade from some students. See Jerry L. Avorn et al., *Up against the Ivy Wall* (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1969), p. 200.

To intrude, then, is one way to encroach; a second is to obtrude. I refer here to the capacity of a claimant to press territorial demands into a wider sphere than others feel is his due, causing them to feel that they themselves could be seen as functioning intrusively, even though they feel that this is not the case. The standard example occurs when an individual makes what are taken as overextensive claims to personal space, incidentally encroaching on the personal space of those adjacent to him or on areas felt to be public in the sense of being non-claimable. "Offensive" loudness which sustains an encounter over a long distance is another common case. Thus, the ski slopes of New England are beginning to enjoy patronage by young men of no background, who, having their own understanding of ritual sociability, maintain a running exchange of derisive greetings, banter, and other loud impieties from slope to lift, finding that this sort of separation between friends is a reason for establishing connection, not foregoing it, thereby giving considerable offense to those properly born to the silent sport. Kingsley Amis, explaining why he did not like Cambridge, provides a parallel illustration, but with the class difference reversed:

However understandable it might be that undergraduate Cambridge is still the resort of the upper classes, the results of this depressed me. To hear all of those young chaps—a small minority, no doubt, but how vocal—braying and baying to one another across the streets or in the interiors of pubs distracted me from thoughts of Donne. At times I became a one-man resistance movement, broadcasting baleful glares, trying to force them to thank me when I stood aside for them in shop doorways, stopping them from hijacking taxis. No good. They were too firmly seated. Early one lunch-time I was enjoying a quiet beer and minding my own business in Miller's Wine Parlour when a voice suddenly bawled:

"Well of course I know that type of acting's been pretty much left behind these days, but I must say that a fellow like Gielgud does seem to *me* to have a certain *presence* and *authority* and at least one does get the feeling that the man's read a *book* occasionally and can come on to the stage without *throwing himself about* like a . . ."

There was more. What arrested me was not the content of this discourse but its volume. I looked about me in amazement. Nobody else was taking the least notice, even Stanley behind the bar went on calmly polishing glasses. If I had been the father of the orator—he sat surrounded by parents and relatives—I should have laid my finger to my lips or, if that failed, my hand across his mouth. But then, I reflected, I am a child of the lower middle-classes, whose members keep their voices down in public lest others hear and condemn.³⁸

In everyday interaction, intrusions and obtrusions may occur simultaneously and, along with the corrective response they call forth, may guide behavior closely. A good example is presented when two individuals are led to have an animated conversation with each other while being required to sit more than comfortably close. A systematic link can then occur between those gestures of the current speaker that figure as the kinesic accompaniment of his talk and the defensive conduct of the current listener as he territorially adjusts to the shifting configuration of the talker. (These roles will switch, of course, as turns at talking are exchanged.) The result provides one basis for what has been called interaction synchrony.³⁹

2. There are, then, encroachments, these including intrusions and obtrusions. Consider now the territorial offense that results when an individual violates himself—a possibility implied in what has already been said about the separable ritual roles of the individual.

Self-violations vary in organization. First, there are self-befoulments: the individual as a source of contamination defiles himself as

³⁸ Kingsley Amis, "No More Parades: On Leaving Cambridge," *Encounter*, XXII (February 1964): 25 [stress in the original].

³⁹ A term introduced by W. S. Condon, of Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic, Pittsburgh, to refer to the close reciprocity of physical movement between speaker and listener. See W. S. Condon and W. D. Ogston, "Sound Film Analysis of Normal and Pathological Behavior Patterns," *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disorders*, CXLIII (1966): 338-347.

a preserve. The extreme here, at least in our society, is smearing oneself with and eating one's own fecal matter—a type of heroic perversity now becoming rare in our mental hospitals.⁴⁰ The cleanliness practices that protect the individual from self-befouling can everywhere be seen, very nicely, for example, at drug-store counters during lunch time when immaculate typists are to be observed eating messy triple-decker sandwiches while minimizing all contact with what might smear them, affecting this with a finger and mouth dexterity that is awesome, and all the while keeping their elbows and eyes out of the territories of those on either side of them.⁴¹

It should be noted that bodily excreta that become matters for befouling or self-contamination typically start out as a part of the body that is not self-defiling, not, as is said, ego-alien. It is shortly after leaving the body that these materials become somehow transformed in character, acquiring the power to befoul—as Allport has described nicely:

How very intimate (propriate) the bodily sense is can be seen by performing a little experiment in your imagination. Think first of swallowing the saliva in your mouth, or do so. Then imagine expectorating it into a tumbler and drinking it! What seemed natural and "mine" suddenly becomes disgusting and alien. Or picture yourself sucking blood from a prick in your finger, then imagine sucking blood from a bandage around your finger! What I perceive as sepa-

⁴⁰ The space program has sponsored research which has incidentally generated a quite contemporary version of these issues. In studies designed to closely measure the human metabolic process, experimental subjects were required to collect (for weighing and analysis) as much of their own bodily wastes as seemed possible, including perspiration. As might be expected, there was strong resistance on the part of the subjects. See Suellen Lanstein, "Human Experiments: Social Structure and Social Control" (Unpublished Master's Thesis, Space Science Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, n.d.).

⁴¹ In *Portnoy's Complaint* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969; New York: New American Library, 1970), Philip Roth has recently provided us with a literary treatment of the ritual work associated with bowel movements, which treatment will surely be definitive for a long time, perhaps forever.

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rate from my body becomes, in the twinkling of an eye, cold and foreign.⁴²

Among self-violations, then, there are self-befoulments. A second variety of self-violations could be described as debasements. An individual can willfully defile himself with contaminants from other persons which would otherwise be routinely avoided. The most eminent example can be cited:

Pope Paul VI washed and kissed the feet of twelve student priests—most of them nonwhites—at a Holy Thursday Mass yesterday in a gesture symbolizing the church in the service of the poor, the war-torn, and the oppressed.⁴³

From a novel, a less ritualized and less exalted instance:

"Most people have preconceived ideas of how to behave," Harry went on. "Like myself. Renaissance ideas. Not Max. He acts any way he feels like acting. Nothing is either good or bad, dignified or undignified. There is no experience he is not capable of having. He is completely mobile. For example. If when we sat down at this booth there were two half-full glasses of beer left by the previous occupants Max could finish them. He really could. It would not bother him a bit. It would not bother him a bit. . . . That is the real Modern Man."⁴⁴

⁴² Gordon Allport, *Becoming* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 43. We should not assume, incidentally, that different peoples will have the same conception as to where the shift is to occur between the self-identified and the self-polluting. For example, in the traditional Havik Brahmin ritual idiom, saliva was apparently an intense contaminant, and care was taken to minimize the contact of one's own lips with one's own person—even with one's own drink. (See Mary Douglas, *op. cit.*, p. 33.)

⁴³ *San Francisco Chronicle*, April 12, 1968.

⁴⁴ Chandler Brossard, *Who Walk in Darkness* (New York: New Directions Pub. Corp., 1952), p. 39. The difference here between Max and the Pope is interesting, but has little to do with the fact that one is a fictional character and the other real and that Brossard, to my knowledge, is not a familiar in Vatican circles. Max would be acting for himself in what is called a private capacity; and he would drink the beer not in order to commit an impropriety (in appearances, at least) but in spite of the impropriety. The Pope acted not as a private person but as an agent of the

Jules Henry, in one of the very few reports available on life in an old folks' home, provides some further examples. These, for Henry, were sufficiently telling of the conditions of the aged to render his explicating them unnecessary:

He [Mike, who works for his keep] went to the women's side room to get their trays. When he came out with them he stopped by Mr. Jacks' bed and offered him some bread that one of the patients had left and Mr. Jacks took it eagerly and put it in his bedside table. Then Mike stopped by Mr. Roberts' bed and offered him the coffee a patient had not drunk. Mr. Roberts thanked him, took it, and quickly drank it so that Mike could take the cup out with the rest of the dishes.

Mike stopped by Mr. Jacks' bedside and held out a partially eaten tray of food. He smiled and asked Mr. Jacks if he wanted the bread from the tray. Mr. Jacks said something, took the bread and placed it on the shelf on his bedside table.⁴⁵

A third class of self-violations, perhaps less important than the other two, involves exposure: an individual with a claim to a particular preserve can act (or be caused to act) so that other persons

Church, indeed as its symbol and ritual representative, and his act on the face of it had no utilitarian value, being part of a ceremony. Acts performed as part of a ceremony belong to a different frame than their literal counterpart, and what might be contaminating of self in the former need not be in the latter. (It is thus that the eminent when visiting the poor in a representative capacity are not defiled by the contact.) In spite of these analytical differences, however, Brossard and the Church here drew on the same ritual idiom in formulating acts that are meaningful to others.

⁴⁵ Jules Henry, *Culture against Man* (New York: Random House Inc., 1963; London: Tavistock Publications, 1966), p. 416. The notion that half-eaten food is contaminating to second eaters should not be carried too far. In restaurant kitchens, staff will often eat plate-leavings that they would never think of touching when they are themselves guests in a restaurant. (It might be added that in a study directed by Robert Sommer, a student-experimenter who ate leavings from a restaurant clean-up cart in the dining room managed to soon transform the alignment of other guests so that they entered into the spirit of things and jocularly passed him their own leavings.) And, of course, as will shortly be considered, if the leavings are those of a spouse, own-child, or parent, then considerable license may be exercised, almost as if what the food could spread already had been.

exercising only ordinary looks and touches yet find themselves encroaching. Improper attire and posture provide one example; inebriation, crying before strangers, self-revelations are others.⁴⁶

In discriminating between encroachments and self-violations, some notion of the authorship of the violation was relevant, whether the author was or was not the claimant, and whether he was or was not himself the impediment to the claim. Someone's intention and will were thus constitutive features of the resulting description. But it is not sufficient merely to introduce the issue of intention as an initial premise; intention must be further considered. Given these general understandings about intent and offense, we must see that exceptional circumstances are known to occur, calling for a further elaboration of understandings. The difficulty turns on the concept of authorship and, by implication, the concept of responsibility, neither of which can be adequately treated here. Only two complications will be pointed out. First, both of the individuals involved in a territorial offense—the claimant and the counter-claimant—may be seen to have acted innocently and inadvertently, so that in this particular instance no one is held to be the author of the offense. And yet the ritual work that ensues, the accounts and apologies that restore order, will be oriented to what the offense would have been had it been done with the usual, the "thinkable," authorship. That which is shown to be no one's fault is that which would otherwise be seen as someone's fault, and must be so seen if one is to know how to nullify it. Second, under what is seen as extreme constraint, an individual may violate his own preserves or those of others and yet still be seen as not having authored the act. It is thus that a female prisoner, obliged to disrobe in order to be searched, may be forced to expose herself, as may a high school girl who gets an "F" if she refuses to shower nude after gym with eight other girls "and the

⁴⁶ As here described, exposure has a form that is also found in offenses less interactional in character. Thus, in recent times there has been some effort to impose penalties (or at least disapproval) on those who manage their property so that others can easily be tempted into stealing it or abusing it.

gym teacher standing there watching." ⁴⁷ Here again those who attend the disrobing may be seen as the ultimate authors of the offense, but the offense that has occurred is one that takes its character from the sort of thing that an individual ordinarily willfully does himself to himself. ⁴⁸

3. We have thus far considered the ways in which an individual can intrude and obtrude upon an other or violate himself. A systematic complication must now be introduced. As suggested, it is the case that two or more individuals may together possess the same territory, jointly laying claim to it in the name of their collectivity. Thus when an individual claims a table by sitting at it, he can indeed be claiming the table for his party, a social unit in which he is merely one participant. Every social relationship, both anonymous and personal, implies some joint tenure, and some relationships (such as marital ones) imply a great deal.

It follows, as already suggested, that an act which may intrude or expose when performed by one individual to another can be perfectly appropriate when performed by the same individual to someone else, someone with whom he shares the relevant territory. ⁴⁹ Thus a policeman who feels it necessary to ask a prostitute in the station to empty her own purse so he can inspect its contents is likely to feel free to dig into his wife's purse for change or cigarettes. Indeed, the very forms of behavior employed to celeb-

⁴⁷ Reported in a letter of complaint to Abigail Van Buren, *San Francisco Chronicle*, October 30, 1964.

⁴⁸ Mary Owen Cameron, in *The Booster and the Snitch* (New York: The Free Press, 1964; London: Collier-Macmillan, 1964), p. 161, suggests that by requiring apprehended female shoplifters to strip to be searched, store security personnel hope to humiliate the offender into changing her ways.

⁴⁹ That is not to say that an individual who is obliged to give up a preserve because a relationship calls for it will be happy about doing so. A good example is what used to be called (in the last generation when this view was presumably more prevalent) "the repulsive side of marriage." Respectable women of the time elaborately avoided all contamination from men, only to find after the wedding that one of these persons had to be let in. No doubt there was some consolation for these ladies in the fact that although they were obliged to suffer this violation, they were not obliged to enjoy it.

brate and affirm relationships—rituals such as greetings, enquiries after health, and love-making—are very close in character to what would be a violation of preserves if performed between wrongly related individuals. The same can be said for acts performed as a means of signaling the initiation or extension of a personal relationship. And it is hard to see how it could be otherwise. For if an individual is to join someone in some kind of social bond, surely he must do so by giving up some of the boundaries and barriers that ordinarily separate them.⁵⁰ Indeed the fact of having given up these separatenesses is a central symbol and substance of relationship—just as the act of *first* giving them up is a central mark of relationship formation. In consequence, an offensive territorial act can usually be seen as a presumption regarding relationship—for there will be some relationship in which the relevant preserve is shared and violation in this connection impossible.

All this leads us to see that in addition to encroachments and self-violations there is a third variety of territorial offense: preclusiveness, namely, the effort of an individual to keep persons at a distance he has no right (in their eyes) to maintain. Refusal to be drawn into talk by kinsmen, or to divulge relevant private information to a legitimate authority, or to disrobe before a physician are cases in point.

V Conclusions

I would like to raise three general points in connection with territoriality and face-to-face interaction. First, although there is much here that can be described in traditional Durkheimian terms having

⁵⁰ Here the current vogue of "encounter-group therapy" is of interest. Given that the license to enter private preserves is an expression of an intimate relationship, it is possible to closely simulate relationship formation by arranging to encourage violations. During the last war the Chinese attempted something similar with their so-called brainwashing groups. The American version is apparently much more fun.

to do with ritual delicacy and the maintenance and infraction of normative rulings, it is also the case that similarities to animal activity are very marked; indeed, it is from ethology that the basic concepts come. Somehow we must develop a perspective which can closely incorporate these two traditionally alien points of view—at least when studying the small behaviors comprising face-to-face interaction.

Second, the traditional way of thinking about threats to rules focuses on a claimant and a potential offender, and although this certainly has its value, especially when we examine closely all the means available for introducing remedies and corrections, still the role of the situation is usually thereby neglected. A better paradigm in many ways would be to assume a few participants all attempting to avoid outright violation of the rules and all forced to deal with the contingencies introduced by various features of various settings. Here the various aims and desires of the participants are taken as given—as standard and routine—and the active, variable element is seen to be the peculiarities of the current situation. For example, urinals in public toilets in America bring men very close to each other under circumstances where, for a period of time, they must expose themselves. In such places considerable care is taken in regard to eyes lest privacy be violated more than necessary. When two men are urinating next to each other, their eyes will have a very narrow surface territory that will be safe.⁵¹ Similarly, when an individual enters a new region, he may find few places available that are sufficiently far removed from other persons present to allow their being stared at with impunity; and the places that are removed may not provide a cover of occasioned activity for him. Locations that qualify on both counts are thus likely to become resources in the setting, that is, niches that appear to induce staring; the Coke machine in packed bus depots, the coffee machine in busy offices, the checkout counter in supermarkets are examples. Similarly, it is upon entrance to a new region that

⁵¹ A fact which clears the way, of course, for a special use to be made of pointed staring, in which connection see Laud Humphreys, *Tearoom Trade* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970).

the individual will find that orientation scanning is most urgent, and it is there that he will seek a cover for this operation. The slot to which a bus conductor addresses his ticket-taking attentions is a case in point; from here the oncoming passenger will have his first opportunity to check out the people he must ride with, will be far enough away from most of them to allow inoffensive staring, and will have a transaction with the conductor (or change box) to serve as a rationale for pausing. Indeed, settings such as restaurants often give rise to what has been called an "entrance cycle."⁵² Just outside the entrance, the incomer may take a last opportunity to perform a grooming check on his personal front;⁵³ upon entrance, the moment that is given to taking off outside clothes, waiting for other members of the party, addressing himself to the hostess, and so on provides the cover and distance required in order to safely engage in a scanning operation.

The final general point about territoriality. In considering the minor situational and egocentric preserves of the self—the respect shown for them and the defenses employed of them—we are led to deal with what is somehow central to the subjective sense that the individual has concerning his selfhood, his ego, the part of himself with which he identifies his positive feelings. And here the issue is not whether a preserve is exclusively maintained, or shared, or given up entirely, but rather the role the individual is allowed in determining what happens to his claim. An apparently self-determined, active deciding as to how one's preserves will be used allows these preserves to provide the bases of a ritual idiom. Thus, on the issue of will and self-determination turns the whole possibility of using territories of the self in a dual way, with comings-into-touch avoided as a means of maintaining respect and en-

⁵² Nicely described under that title by Lynette Lofland, in *In the Presence of Strangers: A Study of Behavior in Public Settings* (The University of Michigan: Center for Research in Social Organization, May 1966), p. 100 ff.

⁵³ In restaurants, opportunity for grooming checks is institutionally provided women by "ladies rooms." At social parties, entering females are often given the same pre-presentational help.

gaged in as a means of establishing regard. And on this duality rests the possibility of according meaning to territorial events and the practicality of so doing.⁵⁴ It is no wonder that felt self-determination is crucial to one's sense of what it means to be a full-fledged person. Personal will or volition may be seen, then, not as something which territorial arrangements must come to terms with and make allowances for, but rather as a function which must be inserted into agents to make the dual role of preserves work.

⁵⁴ Multiple or "overdetermined" use of the same interaction arrangements seems a general feature of public life. In addition to those mentioned, other examples might be cited. Given that a rule exists against seeking out a stranger's eyes, seeking can then be done as a means of making a pickup or as a means of making oneself known to someone one expects to meet but is unacquainted with. Similarly, given that staring is an invasion of informational preserve, a stare can then be used as a warranted negative sanction against someone who has misbehaved—the misbehavior providing and ensuring a special significance to overlong examination. (Thus, if one wants to stare at others with impunity, one need only arrange to cause them to invade a territorial preserve, and then one can properly respond by examining them.) Here see Goffman, *Behavior in Public Places* (New York: The Free Press, 1963; London: Collier-Macmillan, 1963), p. 95.

In general, then, we can say that a rule tends to make possible a meaningful set of non-adherences, only one of which is an infraction, the others being functions made possible by our capacity to discriminate (and to trust others to discriminate) among types of non-adherence.