

Or consider another instance of a fixed but apparently unrecognized pattern. Malinowski reports that Trobrianders cooperatively engaged in the technological task of building a canoe are engaged not only in that explicit technical task but also in establishing and reinforcing interpersonal relations among themselves in the process. Much of the recent data on those primary groups called "informal organizations" deals with these patterns of relations which are observed by the social scientist but are unrecognized, at least in their full implications, by the participants.⁶³

All this points to a *fifth* desideratum for the descriptive protocol: regularities of behavior *associated* with the nominally central activity (although not part of the explicit culture pattern) should be included in the protocols of the field worker, since these *unwitting regularities* often provide basic clues to distinctive functions of the total pattern. As we shall see, the inclusion of these "unwitting" regularities in the descriptive protocol directs the investigator almost at once to analysis of the pattern in terms of what we have called latent functions.

In summary, then, the descriptive protocol should, so far as possible, include:

- 1) location of participants in the pattern within the social structure—differential participation;
- 2) consideration of alternative modes of behavior excluded by emphasis on the observed pattern (*i.e.* attention not only to what occurs but also to what is neglected by virtue of the existing pattern);
- 3) the emotive and cognitive meanings attached by participants to the pattern;
- 4) a distinction between the motivations for participating in the pattern and the objective behavior involved in the pattern;
- 5) regularities of behavior not recognized by participants but which are nonetheless associated with the central pattern of behavior.

That these desiderata for the observer's protocol are far from complete is altogether likely. But they do provide a tentative step in the direction of *specifying* points of observation which facilitate subsequent functional analysis. They are intended to be somewhat more specific than the suggestions ordinarily found in general statements of procedure, such as those advising the observer to be sensitive to the "context of situation."

MANIFEST AND LATENT FUNCTIONS

As has been implied in earlier sections, the distinction between manifest and latent functions was devised to preclude the inadvertent confusion, often found in the sociological literature, between conscious *motivations* for social behavior and its *objective consequences*. Our

⁶³ The rediscovery of the primary group by those engaged in sociological studies of industry has been one of the chief fillips to the functional approach in recent sociological research. Reference is had here to the work of Elton Mayo, Roethlisberger and Dickson, William Whyte, and Burleigh Gardner, among many others. There remain, of course, the interesting differences in *interpretation* to which these data lend themselves

scrutiny of current vocabularies of functional analysis has shown how easily, and how unfortunately, the sociologist may identify *motives* with *functions*. It was further indicated that the motive and the function vary independently and that the failure to register this fact in an established terminology has contributed to the unwitting tendency among sociologists to confuse the subjective categories of motivation with the objective categories of function. This, then, is the central purpose of our succumbing to the not-always-commendable practice of introducing new terms into the rapidly growing technical vocabulary of sociology, a practice regarded by many laymen as an affront to their intelligence and an offense against common intelligibility.

As will be readily recognized, I have adapted the terms "manifest" and "latent" from their use in another context by Freud (although Francis Bacon had long ago spoken of "latent process" and "latent configuration" in connection with processes which are below the threshold of superficial observation).

The distinction itself has been repeatedly drawn by observers of human behavior at irregular intervals over a span of many centuries.⁶⁴ Indeed, it would be disconcerting to find that a distinction which we have come to regard as central to functional analysis had not been made by any of that numerous company who have in effect adopted a functional orientation. We need mention only a few of those who have, in recent decades, found it necessary to distinguish in their specific interpretations of behavior between the end-in-view and the functional consequences of action.

George H. Mead⁶⁵: ". . . that attitude of hostility toward the law-breaker has the unique advantage [read: latent function] of uniting all members of the community in the emotional solidarity of aggression. While the most admirable of humanitarian efforts are sure to run counter to the individual interests of very many in the community, or fail to touch the interest and imagination of the multitude and to leave the community divided or indifferent, the cry of thief or murderer is attuned to profound complexes, lying below the surface of competing individual efforts, and citizens who have [been] separated by divergent interests stand together against the common enemy."

Emile Durkheim's⁶⁶ similar analysis of the social functions of punishment is also focused on its latent functions (consequences for the community) rather than confined to manifest functions (consequences for the criminal).

64. References to some of the more significant among these earlier appearances of the distinction will be found in Merton, "Unanticipated consequences . . ." *op. cit.*

65. George H. Mead, "The psychology of punitive justice," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1918, 23, 577-602, esp. 591.

66. As suggested earlier in this chapter, Durkheim adopted a functional orientation throughout his work, and he operates, albeit often without explicit notice, with concepts equivalent to that of latent function in all of his researches. The reference in the text at this point is to his "Deux lois de l'évolution pénale," *L'année sociologique*, 1899-1900, 4, 55-95, as well as to his *Division of Labor in Society* (Glen-coe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1947).

W. G. Sumner⁶⁷: "... from the first acts by which men try to satisfy needs, each act stands by itself, and looks no further than the immediate satisfaction. From recurrent needs arise habits for the individual and customs for the group, but these results are consequences which were never conscious, and never foreseen or intended. They are not noticed until they have long existed, and it is still longer before they are appreciated." Although this fails to locate the latent functions of standardized social actions for a designated social structure, it plainly makes the basic distinction between ends-in-view and objective consequences.

R. M. MacIver⁶⁸: In addition to the direct effects of institutions, "there are further effects by way of control which lie outside the direct purposes of men . . . this type of reactive form of control . . . may, though unintended, be of profound service to society."

W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki⁶⁹: "Although all the new [Polish peasant cooperative] institutions are thus formed with the definite purpose of satisfying certain specific needs, their social function is by no means limited to their explicit and conscious purpose . . . every one of these institutions—commune or agricultural circle, loan and savings bank, or theater—is not merely a mechanism for the management of certain values but also an association of people, each member of which is supposed to participate in the common activities as a living, concrete individual. Whatever is the predominant, official common interest upon which the institution is founded, the association as a concrete group of human personalities unofficially involves many other interests; the social contacts between its members are not limited to their common pursuit, though the latter, of course, constitutes both the main reason for which the association is formed and the most permanent bond which holds it together. Owing to this combination of an abstract political, economic, or rather rational mechanism for the satisfaction of specific needs with the concrete unity of a social group, the new institution is also the best intermediary link between the peasant primary-group and the secondary national system."

These and numerous other sociological observers have, then, from time to time distinguished between categories of subjective disposition ("needs, interests, purposes") and categories of generally unrecognized but objective functional consequences ("unique advantages," "never conscious" consequences, "unintended . . . service to society," "function not limited to conscious and explicit purpose").

67. This one of his many such observations is of course from W. G. Sumner's *Folkways*, (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1906), 3. His collaborator, Albert G. Keller retained the distinction in his own writings; see, for example, his *Social Evolution*, (New York: Macmillan, 1927), at 93-95.

68. This is advisedly drawn from one of MacIver's earlier works, *Community*, (London: Macmillan, 1915). The distinction takes on greater importance in his later writings, becoming a major element in his *Social Causation*, (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1942), esp. at 314-321, and informs the greater part of his *The More Perfect Union*, (New York: Macmillan, 1948).

69. The single excerpt quoted in the text is one of scores which have led to *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* being deservedly described as a "sociological classic." See pages 1426-7 and 1523 ff. As will be noted later in this chapter, the insights and conceptual distinctions contained in this one passage, and there are many others like it in point of richness of content, were forgotten or never noticed by those industrial sociologists who recently came to develop the notion of "informal organization" in industry.

Since the occasion for making the distinction arises with great frequency, and since the purpose of a conceptual scheme is to direct observations toward salient elements of a situation and to prevent the inadvertent oversight of these elements, it would seem justifiable to designate this distinction by an appropriate set of terms. This is the rationale for the distinction between manifest functions and latent functions; the first referring to those objective consequences for a specified unit (person, subgroup, social or cultural system) which contribute to its adjustment or adaptation and were so intended; the second referring to unintended and unrecognized consequences of the same order.

There are some indications that the christening of this distinction may serve a heuristic purpose by becoming incorporated into an explicit conceptual apparatus, thus aiding both systematic observation and later analysis. In recent years, for example, the distinction between manifest and latent functions has been utilized in analyses of racial intermarriage,⁷⁰ social stratification,⁷¹ affective frustration,⁷² Veblen's sociological theories,⁷³ prevailing American orientations toward Russia,⁷⁴ propaganda as a means of social control,⁷⁵ Malinowski's anthropological theory,⁷⁶ Navajo witchcraft,⁷⁷ problems in the sociology of knowledge,⁷⁸ fashion,⁷⁹ the dynamics of personality,⁸⁰ national security measures,⁸¹ the internal social dynamics of bureaucracy,⁸² and a great variety of other sociological problems.

The very diversity of these subject-matters suggests that the theoretic

70. Merton, "Intermarriage and the social structure," *op. cit.*

71. Kingsley Davis, "A conceptual analysis of stratification," *American Sociological Review*, 1942, 7, 309-321.

72. Thorner, *op. cit.*, esp. at 165.

73. A. K. Davis, *Thorstein Veblen's Social Theory*, Harvard Ph.D. dissertation, 1941 and "Veblen on the decline of the Protestant Ethic," *Social Forces*, 1944, 22, 282-86; Louis Schneider, *The Freudian Psychology and Veblen's Social Theory*, New York: King's Crown Press, 1948), esp. Chapter 2.

74. A. K. Davis, "Some sources of American hostility to Russia," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1947, 53, 174-183.

75. Talcott Parsons, "Propaganda and social control," in his *Essays in Sociological Theory*.

76. Clyde Kluckhohn, "Bronislaw Malinowski, 1884-1942," *Journal of American Folklore*, 1943, 56, 208-219.

77. Clyde Kluckhohn, *Navaho Witchcraft*, *op. cit.*, esp. at 46-47 and ff.

78. Merton, Chapter XII of this volume.

79. Bernard Barber and L. S. Lobel, "'Fashion' in women's clothes and the American social system," *Social Forces*, 1952, 31, 124-131.

80. O. H. Mowrer and C. Kluckhohn, "Dynamic theory of personality," in J. M. Hunt, ed., *Personality and the Behavior Disorders*, (New York: Ronald Press, 1944), 1, 69-135, esp. at 72.

81. Marie Jahoda and S. W. Cook, "Security measures and freedom of thought: an exploratory study of the impact of loyalty and security programs," *Yale Law Journal*, 1952, 61, 296-333.

82. Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (University of California Press, 1949); A. W. Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954); P. M. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (University of Chicago Press, 1955); A. K. Davis, "Bureaucratic patterns in Navy officer corps," *Social Forces* 1948, 27, 142-153.

distinction between manifest and latent functions is not bound up with a limited and particular range of human behavior. But there still remains the large task of ferreting out the specific uses to which this distinction can be put, and it is to this large task that we devote the remaining pages of this chapter.

Heuristic Purposes of the Distinction

Clarifies the analysis of seemingly irrational social patterns. In the first place, the distinction aids the sociological interpretation of many social practices which persist even though their manifest purpose is clearly not achieved. The time-worn procedure in such instances has been for diverse, particularly lay, observers to refer to these practices as "superstitions," irrationalities," "mere inertia of tradition," *etc.* In other words, when group behavior does not—and, indeed, often cannot—attain its ostensible purpose there is an inclination to attribute its occurrence to lack of intelligence, sheer ignorance, survivals, or so-called inertia. Thus, the Hopi ceremonials designed to produce abundant rainfall may be labelled a superstitious practice of primitive folk and that is assumed to conclude the matter. It should be noted that this in no sense accounts for the group behavior. It is simply a case of name-calling; it substitutes the epithet "superstition" for an analysis of the actual role of this behavior in the life of the group. Given the concept of latent function, however, we are reminded that this behavior *may* perform a function for the group, although this function may be quite remote from the avowed purpose of the behavior.

The concept of latent function extends the observer's attention beyond the question of whether or not the behavior attains its avowed purpose. Temporarily ignoring these explicit purposes, it directs attention *toward* another range of consequences: those bearing, for example, upon the individual personalities of Hopi involved in the ceremony and upon the persistence and continuity of the larger group. Were one to confine himself to the problem of whether a manifest (purposed) function occurs, it becomes a problem, not for the sociologist, but for the meteorologist. And to be sure, our meteorologists agree that the rain ceremonial does not produce rain; but this is hardly to the point. It is merely to say that the ceremony does not have this technological use; that this purpose of the ceremony and its actual consequences do not coincide. But with the concept of latent function, we continue our inquiry, examining the consequences of the ceremony not for the rain gods or for meteorological phenomena, but for the groups which conduct the ceremony. And here it may be found, as many observers indicate, that the ceremonial does indeed have functions—but functions which are non-purposed or latent.

Ceremonials may fulfill the latent function of reinforcing the group identity by providing a periodic occasion on which the scattered mem-

bers of a group assemble to engage in a common activity. As Durkheim among others long since indicated, such ceremonials are a means by which collective expression is afforded the sentiments which, in a further analysis, are found to be a basic source of group unity. Through the systematic application of the concept of latent function, therefore, *apparently* irrational behavior may *at times* be found to be positively functional for the group. Operating with the concept of latent function, we are not too quick to conclude that if an activity of a group does not achieve its nominal purpose, then its persistence can be described only as an instance of "inertia," "survival," or "manipulation by powerful sub-groups in the society."

In point of fact, some conception like that of latent function has very often, almost invariably, been employed by social scientists observing *a standardized practice designed to achieve an objective which one knows from accredited physical science cannot be thus achieved*. This would plainly be the case, for example, with Pueblo rituals dealing with rain or fertility. *But with behavior which is not directed toward a clearly unattainable objective, sociological observers are less likely to examine the collateral or latent functions of the behavior.*

Directs attention to theoretically fruitful fields of inquiry. The distinction between manifest and latent functions serves further to direct the attention of the sociologist to precisely those realms of behavior, attitude and belief where he can most fruitfully apply his special skills. For what is his task if he confines himself to the study of manifest functions? He is then concerned very largely with determining whether a practice instituted for a particular purpose does, in fact, achieve this purpose. He will then inquire, for example, whether a new system of wage-payment achieves its avowed purpose of reducing labor turnover or of increasing output. He will ask whether a propaganda campaign has indeed gained its objective of increasing "willingness to fight" or "willingness to buy war bonds," or "tolerance toward other ethnic groups." Now, these are important, and complex, types of inquiry. But, so long as sociologists *confine* themselves to the study of manifest functions, their inquiry is set for them by practical men of affairs (whether a captain of industry, a trade union leader, or, conceivably, a Navaho chieftain, is for the moment immaterial), rather than by the theoretic problems which are at the core of the discipline. By dealing primarily with the realm of manifest functions, with the key problem of whether deliberately instituted practices or organizations succeed in achieving their objectives, the sociologist becomes converted into an industrious and skilled recorder of the altogether familiar pattern of behavior. *The terms of appraisal are fixed and limited by the question put to him by the non-theoretic men of affairs, e.g., has the new wage-payment program achieved such-and-such purposes?*

But armed with the concept of latent function, the sociologist extends his inquiry in those very directions which promise most for the theoretic development of the discipline. He examines the familiar (or planned) social practice to ascertain the latent, and hence generally unrecognized, functions (as well, of course, as the manifest functions). He considers, for example, the consequences of the new wage plan for, say, the trade union in which the workers are organized or the consequences of a propaganda program, not only for increasing its avowed purpose of stirring up patriotic fervor, but also for making large numbers of people reluctant to speak their minds when they differ with official policies, *etc.* In short, it is suggested that the *distinctive* intellectual contributions of the sociologist are found primarily in the study of unintended consequences (among which are latent functions) of social practices, as well as in the study of anticipated consequences (among which are manifest functions).⁸³

There is some evidence that it is precisely at the point where the research attention of sociologists has shifted from the plane of manifest to the plane of latent functions that they have made their *distinctive* and major contributions. This can be extensively documented but a few passing illustrations must suffice.

THE HAWTHORNE WESTERN ELECTRIC STUDIES:⁸⁴ As is well known, the early stages of this inquiry were concerned with the problem of the relations of "illumination to efficiency" of industrial workers. For some two and a half years, attention was focused on problems such as this: do variations in the intensity of lighting affect production? The initial results showed that within wide limits there was no uniform relation between illumination and output. Production output increased *both* in the experimental group where illumination was increased (or *decreased*) and in the control group where no changes in illumination were introduced. In short, the investigators confined themselves wholly to a search for the manifest functions. Lacking a concept of latent social function, no attention whatever was initially paid to the social consequences of the *experiment* for relations among members of the test and control groups or for relations between workers and the test room authorities. In other words, the investigators lacked a sociological frame of reference and

83. For a brief illustration of this general proposition, see Robert K. Merton, Marjorie Fiske and Alberta Curtis, *Mass Persuasion*, (New York: Harper, 1946), 185-189; Jahoda and Cook, *op. cit.*

84. This is cited as a case study of how an *elaborate research was wholly changed in theoretic orientation and in the character of its research findings by the introduction of a concept approximating the concept of latent function*. Selection of the case for this purpose does not, of course, imply full acceptance of the *interpretations* which the authors give their findings. Among the several volumes reporting the Western Electric research, see particularly F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker*, (Harvard University Press, 1939)

operated merely as "engineers" (just as a group of meteorologists might have explored the "effects" upon rainfall of the Hopi ceremonial).

Only after continued investigation, did it occur to the research group to explore the consequences of the new "experimental situation" for the self-images and self-conceptions of the workers taking part in the experiment, for the interpersonal relations among members of the group, for the coherence and unity of the group. As Elton Mayo reports it, "the illumination fiasco had made them alert to the need that very careful records should be kept of everything that happened in the room in addition to the obvious engineering and industrial devices. Their observations therefore included not only records of industrial and engineering changes but also records of physiological or medical changes, and, *in a sense*, of social and anthropological. This last took the form of a 'log' that gave as full an account as possible of the actual events of every day. . . ."85 In short, it was only after a long series of experiments which wholly neglected the latent social functions of the experiment (as a contrived social situation) that this distinctly sociological framework was introduced. "With this realization," the authors write, "the inquiry changed its character. No longer were the investigators interested in testing for the effects of single variables. In the place of a controlled experiment, they substituted the notion of a social situation which needed to be described and understood as a system of interdependent elements." Thereafter, as is now widely known, inquiry was directed very largely toward ferreting out the latent functions of standardized practices among the workers, of informal organization developing among workers, of workers' games instituted by "wise administrators," of large programs of worker counselling and interviewing, *etc.* The new conceptual scheme entirely altered the range and types of data gathered in the ensuing research.

One has only to return to the previously quoted excerpt from Thomas and Znaniecki in their classical work of some thirty years ago, to recognize the correctness of Shils' remark:

. . . indeed the history of the study of primary groups in American sociology is a supreme instance of the *discontinuities of the development of this discipline*: a problem is stressed by one who is an acknowledged founder of the discipline, the problem is left unstudied, then, some years later, it is taken up with enthusiasm as if no one had ever thought of it before.⁸⁶

For Thomas and Znaniecki had repeatedly emphasized the sociological view that, whatever its major purpose, "the association as a concrete group of human personalities unofficially involves many other interests;

85. Elton Mayo, *The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization*, (Harvard University Press, 1945), 70.

86. Edward Shils, *The Present State of American Sociology*, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1948), 42 [italics supplied].

the social contacts between its members are not limited to their common pursuit. . . ." In effect, then, it had taken years of experimentation to turn the attention of the Western Electric research team to the latent social functions of primary groups emerging in industrial organizations. It should be made clear that this case is not cited here as an instance of defective experimental design; that is not our immediate concern. It is considered only as an illustration of the pertinence for *sociological* inquiry of the concept of latent function, and the associated concepts of functional analysis. It illustrates how the inclusion of this concept (whether the term is used or not is inconsequential) can sensitize sociological investigators to a range of significant social variables which are otherwise easily overlooked. The explicit ticketing of the concept may perhaps lessen the frequency of such occasions of discontinuity in future sociological research.

The discovery of latent functions represents significant increments in sociological knowledge. There is another respect in which inquiry into latent functions represents a distinctive contribution of the social scientist. It is precisely the latent functions of a practice or belief which are *not* common knowledge, for these are unintended and generally unrecognized social and psychological consequences. As a result, findings concerning latent functions represent a greater increment in knowledge than findings concerning manifest functions. They represent, also, greater departures from "common-sense" knowledge about social life. Inasmuch as the latent functions depart, more or less, from the avowed manifest functions, the research which uncovers latent functions very often produces "paradoxical" results. The seeming paradox arises from the sharp modification of a familiar popular preconception which regards a standardized practice or belief *only* in terms of its manifest functions by indicating some of its subsidiary or collateral latent functions. The introduction of the concept of latent function in social research leads to conclusions which show that "social life is not as simple as it first seems." For as long as people confine themselves to *certain* consequences (*e.g.* manifest consequences), it is comparatively simple for them to pass moral judgments upon the practice or belief in question. Moral evaluations, generally based on these manifest consequences, tend to be polarized in terms of black or white. But the perception of further (latent) consequences often complicates the picture. Problems of moral evaluation (which are not our immediate concern) and problems of social engineering (which are our concern⁸⁷) both take on the additional complexities usually involved in responsible social decisions.

87. This is not to deny that social engineering has direct moral implications or that technique and morality are inescapably intertwined, but I do not intend to deal with this range of problems in the present chapter. For some discussion of these problems see chapters VI, XV and XVII; also Merton, Fiske and Curtis, *Mass Persuasion*, chapter 7.

An example of inquiry which implicitly uses the notion of latent function will illustrate the sense in which "paradox"—discrepancy between the apparent, merely manifest, function and the actual, which also includes latent functions—tends to occur as a result of including this concept. Thus, to revert to Veblen's well-known analysis of conspicuous consumption, it is no accident that he has been recognized as a social analyst gifted with an eye for the paradoxical, the ironic, the satiric. For these are frequent, if not inevitable, outcomes of applying the concept of latent function (or its equivalent).

THE PATTERN OF CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION. The manifest purpose of buying consumption goods is, of course, the satisfaction of the needs for which these goods are explicitly designed. Thus, automobiles are obviously intended to provide a certain kind of transportation; candles, to provide light; choice articles of food to provide sustenance; rare art products to provide aesthetic pleasure. Since these products *do* have these uses, it was largely assumed that these encompass the range of socially significant functions. Veblen indeed suggests that this was ordinarily the prevailing view (in the pre-Veblenian era, of course): "The end of acquisition and accumulation is conventionally held to be the consumption of the goods accumulated. . . . This is at least felt to be the economically legitimate end of acquisition, *which alone it is incumbent on the theory to take account of.*"⁸⁸

However, says Veblen in effect, as sociologists we must go on to consider the latent functions of acquisition, accumulation and consumption, and these latent functions are remote indeed from the manifest functions. "But, it is only when taken in a sense far removed from its naive meaning [*i.e.* manifest function] that the consumption of goods can be said to afford the incentive from which accumulation invariably proceeds." And among these latent functions, which help explain the persistence and the social location of the pattern of conspicuous consumption, is its symbolization of "pecuniary strength and so of gaining or retaining a good name." The exercise of "punctilious discrimination" in the excellence of "food, drink, shelter, service, ornaments, apparel, amusements" results not merely in direct gratifications derived from the consumption of "superior" to "inferior" articles, but also, and Veblen argues, more importantly, it results in a *heightening or reaffirmation of social status.*

The Veblenian paradox is that people buy expensive goods not so much because they are superior but because they are expensive. For it is the latent equation ("costliness = mark of higher social status") which he singles out in his functional analysis, rather than the manifest equation ("costliness = excellence of the goods"). Not that he denies manifest functions *any* place in buttressing the pattern of conspicuous

⁸⁸ Veblen, *Theory of Leisure Class*, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

consumption. These, too, are operative. "What has just been said must not be taken to mean that there are no other incentives to acquisition and accumulation than this desire to excel in pecuniary standing and so gain the esteem and envy of one's fellowmen. The desire for added comfort and security from want is present as a motive at every stage. . . ." Or again: "It would be hazardous to assert that a useful purpose is ever absent from the utility of any article or of any service, however obviously its prime purpose and chief element is conspicuous waste" and derived social esteem.⁸⁹ It is only that *these direct, manifest functions do not fully account for the prevailing patterns of consumption. Otherwise put, if the latent functions of status-enhancement or status-reaffirmation were removed from the patterns of conspicuous consumption, these patterns would undergo severe changes of a sort which the "conventional" economist could not foresee.*

In these respects, Veblen's analysis of latent functions departs from the common-sense notion that the end-product of consumption is "of course, the direct satisfaction which it provides": "People eat caviar because they're hungry; buy Cadillacs because they want the best car they can get; have dinner by candlelight because they like the peaceful atmosphere." The common-sense interpretation in terms of selected manifest motives gives way, in Veblen's analysis, to the collateral latent functions which are also, and perhaps more significantly, fulfilled by these practices. To be sure, the Veblenian analysis has, in the last decades, entered so fully into popular thought, that these latent functions are now widely recognized. [This raises the interesting problem of the changes occurring in a prevailing pattern of behavior when its *latent* functions become generally recognized (and are thus no longer latent). There will be no occasion for discussing this important problem in the present publication.]

The discovery of latent functions does not merely render conceptions of the functions served by certain social patterns more precise (as is the case also with studies of manifest functions), but introduces a *qualitatively different increment in the previous state of knowledge.*

Precludes the substitution of naive moral judgments for sociological

89. *Ibid.*, 32, 101. It will be noted throughout that Veblen is given to loose terminology. In the marked passages (and repeatedly elsewhere) he uses "incentive," "desire," "purpose," and "function" interchangeably. Since the context usually makes clear the denotation of these terms, no great harm is done. But it is clear that the expressed purposes of conformity to a culture pattern are by no means identical with the latent functions of the conformity. Veblen occasionally recognizes this. For example, "In strict accuracy nothing should be included under the head of conspicuous waste but such expenditure as is incurred on the ground of an invidious pecuniary comparison. But in order to bring any given item or element in under this head it is not necessary that it should be recognized as waste in this sense by the person incurring the expenditure." (*Ibid.* 99; italics supplied). Cf. A. K. Davis, "Veblen on the decline of the Protestant Ethic," *op. cit.*

analysis. Since moral evaluations in a society of the manifest consequences of a practice or compared to find that analysis in terms of latent counter to prevailing moral evaluations. For in latent functions will operate in the same fashion quences which are ordinarily the basis of these sectors of the American population, the political racket" are judged as unequivocally "bad" grounds for such moral judgment vary somewhat stantially in pointing out that political machine political patronage violates the code of selection of impersonal qualifications rather than on grounds contributions to the party war-chest; bossism which should be based on individual appraisal of the dates and of political issues, and not on ability leader; bribery, and "honest graft" obviously property; "protection" for crime clearly violates and so on.

In view of the manifold respects in which political ing degrees, run counter to the mores and at times pertinent to inquire how they manage to continue familiar "explanations" for the continuance of not here in point. To be sure, it may well be "senyry" would live up to their political obligations to be alert and enlightened; if the number of voters stantially reduced from the dozens, even hundreds voter is now expected to appraise in the course and national elections; if the electorate were a and educated classes without whose participation democratically oriented Bryce put it, "the best-speedily degenerate";—if these and a plethora of cal structure were introduced, perhaps the "evils" would indeed be exorcized.⁹⁰ But it should be are often not introduced, that political machines like quality of arising strong and unspoiled for short, this structure has exhibited a notable vitality American political life.

Proceeding from the functional view, the

90. These "explanations" are "causal" in design. social conditions under which political machines come are empirically confirmed, these explanations of course concerning the problem: how is it that political machines not in others? How do they manage to continue? But sufficient. The functional consequences of the machine, supplementing the causal interpretation.

analysis. Since moral evaluations in a society tend to be largely in terms of the manifest consequences of a practice or code, we should be prepared to find that analysis in terms of latent functions at times runs counter to prevailing moral evaluations. For it does not follow that the latent functions will operate in the same fashion as the manifest consequences which are ordinarily the basis of these judgments. Thus, in large sectors of the American population, the political machine or the "political racket" are judged as unequivocally "bad" and "undesirable." The grounds for such moral judgment vary somewhat, but they consist substantially in pointing out that political machines violate moral codes: political patronage violates the code of selecting personnel on the basis of impersonal qualifications rather than on grounds of party loyalty or contributions to the party war-chest; bossism violates the code that votes should be based on individual appraisal of the qualifications of candidates and of political issues, and not on abiding loyalty to a feudal leader; bribery, and "honest graft" obviously offend the proprieties of property; "protection" for crime clearly violates the law and the mores; and so on.

In view of the manifold respects in which political machines, in varying degrees, run counter to the mores and at times to the law, it becomes pertinent to inquire how they manage to continue in operation. The familiar "explanations" for the continuance of the political machine are not here in point. To be sure, it may well be that if "respectable citizenry" would live up to their political obligations, if the electorate were to be alert and enlightened; if the number of elective officers were substantially reduced from the dozens, even hundreds, which the average voter is now expected to appraise in the course of town, county, state and national elections; if the electorate were activated by the "wealthy and educated classes without whose participation," as the not-always democratically oriented Bryce put it, "the best-framed government must speedily degenerate";—if these and a plethora of similar changes in political structure were introduced, perhaps the "evils" of the political machine would indeed be exorcized.⁹⁰ But it should be noted that these changes are often not introduced, that political machines have had the phoenix-like quality of arising strong and unspoiled from their ashes, that, in short, this structure has exhibited a notable vitality in many areas of American political life.

Proceeding from the functional view, therefore, that we should

90. These "explanations" are "causal" in design. They profess to indicate the social conditions under which political machines come into being. In so far as they are empirically confirmed, these explanations of course add to our knowledge concerning the problem: how is it that political machines operate in certain areas and not in others? How do they manage to continue? *But these causal accounts are not sufficient.* The functional consequences of the machine, as we shall see, go far toward supplementing the causal interpretation.

ordinarily (not invariably) expect persistent social patterns and social structures to perform positive functions *which are at the time not adequately fulfilled by other existing patterns and structures*, the thought occurs that perhaps this publicly maligned organization is, *under present conditions*, satisfying basic latent functions.⁹¹ A brief examination of current analyses of this type of structure may also serve to illustrate additional problems of functional analysis.

SOME FUNCTIONS OF THE POLITICAL MACHINE. Without presuming to enter into the variations of detail marking different political machines—a Tweed, Vare, Crump, Flynn, Hague are by no means identical types of bosses—we can briefly examine the functions more or less common to the political machine, as a generic type of social organization. We neither attempt to itemize all the diverse functions of the political machine nor imply that all these functions are similarly fulfilled by each and every machine.

The key structural function of the Boss is to organize, centralize and maintain in good working condition “the scattered fragments of power” which are at present dispersed through our political organization. By this centralized organization of political power, the boss and his apparatus can satisfy the needs of diverse subgroups in the larger community which are not adequately satisfied by legally devised and culturally approved social structures.

To understand the role of bossism and the machine, therefore, we must look at two types of sociological variables: (1) the *structural context* which makes it difficult, if not impossible, for morally approved structures to fulfill essential social functions, thus leaving the door open for political machines (or their structural equivalents) to fulfill these functions and (2) the subgroups whose distinctive needs are left unsatisfied, except for the latent functions which the machine in fact fulfills.⁹²

Structural Context: The constitutional framework of American political organization specifically precludes the legal possibility of highly centralized power and, it has been noted, thus “discourages the growth

91. I trust it is superfluous to add that this hypothesis is not “in support of the political machine.” The question whether the dysfunctions of the machine outweigh its functions, the question whether alternative structures are not available which may fulfill its functions without necessarily entailing its social dysfunctions, still remain to be considered at an appropriate point. We are here concerned with documenting the statement that moral judgments based *entirely* on an appraisal of manifest functions of a social structure are “unrealistic” in the strict sense, *i.e.*, they do not take into account other actual consequences of that structure, consequences which may provide basic social support for the structure. As will be indicated later, “social reforms” or “social engineering” which ignore latent functions do so on pain of suffering acute disappointments and boomerang effects.

92. Again, as with preceding cases, we shall not consider the possible dysfunctions of the political machine.

of effective and responsible leadership. The framers, as Woodrow Wilson observed, set up the checks and balances to keep government at a sort of mechanical equilibrium, a kind of amicable contest among its several organic parts. The concentration of power as dangerous to liberty: and therefore the erection of barriers against its concentration.” This was found not only at the national level but in local government as well. Sait goes on to observe, “when the political machine among them demanded positive action, no one was free to act. The machine provided an antidote.”⁹³

The constitutional dispersion of power not only hinders effective decision and action but when action is attempted and hemmed in by legalistic considerations, it develops “a much more human system of partial democracy.” The chief object soon became the circumvention of the law. The lawlessness of the extra-official democracy is the chief poise of the legalism of the official democracy. The Boss is permitted to subordinate democracy to the law. The law is called in to extricate the victim, which he did not expect in consideration.”⁹⁴

Officially, political power is dispersed. Various checks and balances were devised for this manifest objective. Not only the separation of powers among the several branches of government, in some measure, tenure in each office was limited and approved. And the scope of power inherent in each office was circumscribed. Yet, observes Sait in rigorously functional terms, “the Boss is necessary; and since it does not develop within the constitutional framework, the Boss provides it in a form from the outside.”⁹⁵

Put in more generalized terms, *the functions of the official structure generate an alternative (unofficial) structure which exists somewhat more effectively. What are the origins, the political machine persists as an alternative to otherwise unfulfilled needs of diverse groups in the community. It is a response to a few of these subgroups and their characteristics. It is led at once to a range of latent functions of the political machine.*

Functions of the Political Machine for Decision Making: It is known that one source of strength of the political machine is

93. Edward M. Sait, “Machine, Political,” *Encyclopedia of Political Science*, IX, 658 b [italics supplied]; cf. A. F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (1908), Chap. 2.

94. Herbert Croly, *Progressive Democracy*, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1909), Sait, *op. cit.*, 658 b.

95. Sait, *op. cit.*, 659 a. [italics supplied].

of effective and responsible leadership. The framers of the Constitution, as Woodrow Wilson observed, set up the check and balance system 'to keep government at a sort of mechanical equipoise by means of a standing amicable contest among its several organic parts.' They distrusted power as dangerous to liberty: and therefore they spread it thin and erected barriers against its concentration." This dispersion of power is found not only at the national level but in local areas as well. "As a consequence," Sait goes on to observe, "when *the people or particular groups* among them demanded positive action, no one had adequate authority to act. The machine provided an antidote."⁹³

The constitutional dispersion of power not only makes for difficulty of effective decision and action but when action does occur it is defined and hemmed in by legalistic considerations. In consequence, there developed "a much *more human system* of partisan government, whose chief object soon became the circumvention of government by law. . . . The lawlessness of the extra-official democracy was merely the counterpoise of the legalism of the official democracy. The lawyer having been permitted to subordinate democracy to the Law, the Boss had to be called in to extricate the victim, which he did after a fashion and for a consideration."⁹⁴

Officially, political power is dispersed. Various well-known expedients were devised for this manifest objective. Not only was there the familiar separation of powers among the several branches of the government but, in some measure, tenure in each office was limited, rotation in office approved. And the scope of power inherent in each office was severely circumscribed. Yet, observes Sait in rigorously functional terms, "Leadership is necessary; and *since* it does not develop readily within the constitutional framework, the Boss provides it in a crude and irresponsible form from the outside."⁹⁵

Put in more generalized terms, *the functional deficiencies of the official structure generate an alternative (unofficial) structure to fulfill existing needs somewhat more effectively.* Whatever its specific historical origins, the political machine persists as an apparatus for satisfying otherwise unfulfilled needs of diverse groups in the population. By turning to a few of these subgroups and their characteristic needs, we shall be led at once to a range of latent functions of the political machine.

Functions of the Political Machine for Diverse Subgroups. It is well known that one source of strength of the political machine derives from

93. Edward M. Sait, "Machine, Political," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, IX, 658 b [italics supplied]; cf. A. F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago, 1908), Chap. 2.

94. Herbert Croly, *Progressive Democracy*, (New York, 1914), p. 254, cited by Sait, *op. cit.*, 658 b.

95. Sait, *op. cit.*, 659 a. [italics supplied].

its roots in the local community and the neighborhood. The political machine does not regard the electorate as an amorphous, undifferentiated mass of voters. With a keen sociological intuition, the machine recognizes that the voter is a person living in a specific neighborhood, with specific personal problems and personal wants. Public issues are abstract and remote; private problems are extremely concrete and immediate. It is not through the generalized appeal to large public concerns that the machine operates, but through the direct, quasi-feudal relationships between local representatives of the machine and voters in their neighborhood. Elections are won in the precinct.

The machine welds its link with ordinary men and women by elaborate networks of personal relations. Politics is transformed into personal ties. The precinct captain "must be a friend to every man, assuming if he does not feel sympathy with the unfortunate, and utilizing in his good works the resources which the boss puts at his disposal."⁹⁶ The precinct captain is forever a friend in need. In our prevailing impersonal society, the machine, through its local agents, fulfills the important social function of humanizing and personalizing all manner of assistance to those in need. Foodbaskets and jobs, legal and extra-legal advice, setting to rights minor scrapes with the law, helping the bright poor boy to a political scholarship in a local college, looking after the bereaved—the whole range of crises when a feller needs a friend, and, above all, a friend who knows the score and who can do something about it,—all these find the ever-helpful precinct captain available in the pinch.

To assess this function of the political machine adequately, it is important to note not only that aid is provided but *the manner in which it is provided*. After all, other agencies do exist for dispensing such assistance. Welfare agencies, settlement houses, legal aid clinics, medical aid in free hospitals, public relief departments, immigration authorities—these and a multitude of other organizations are available to provide the most varied types of assistance. But in contrast to the professional techniques of the welfare worker which may typically represent in the mind of the recipient the cold, bureaucratic dispensation of limited aid following upon detailed investigation of legal claims to aid of the "client" are the unprofessional techniques of the precinct captain who asks no questions, exacts no compliance with legal rules of eligibility and does not "snoop" into private affairs.⁹⁷

96. *Ibid.*, 659 a.

97. Much the same contrast with official welfare policy is found in Harry Hopkins' open-handed and non-political distribution of unemployment relief in New York State under the governorship of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. As Sherwood reports: "Hopkins was harshly criticized for these irregular activities by the established welfare agencies, which claimed it was 'unprofessional conduct' to hand out work tickets without thorough investigation of each applicant, his own or his family's financial resources and probably his religious affiliations. 'Harry told the agency to go to hell,' said [Hopkins' associate, Dr. Jacob A.] Goldberg." Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History*, (New York: Harper, 1948), 30.

For many, the loss of "self-respect" is too high assistance. In contrast to the gulf between the settler who so often come from a different social class, and ethnic group, the precinct worker is "just one of the boys" who stands what it's all about. The condescending lady who competes with the understanding friend in need. In the alternative structures for fulfilling the nominally provided aid and support to those who need it, it is the politician who is better integrated with the group than the impersonal, professionalized, socially distant welfare worker. And since the politician can manipulate the official organizations for the disbursement of aid whereas the welfare worker has practically no influence on the machine, this only adds to his greater effectiveness. And also, perhaps, more incisively, it was the Boss Lomasny, who described this essential function of the machine. Lincoln Steffens: "I think," said Lomasny, "that there's got to be somebody that any bloke can come to—no matter how bad he is—get help. *Help, you understand; none of your law and order*."

The "deprived classes," then, constitute one of the groups which the political machine satisfies wants not adequately in the fashion by the legitimate social structure.

For a second subgroup, that of business (perhaps also "small"), the political boss serves the function of protecting political privileges which entail immediate economic considerations, among which the public utilities (railroads, telephone and electric light companies, communication companies) are simply the most conspicuous in this regard, seeking large compensations which will enable them to stabilize their position. They often want to avoid a chaos of uncontrolled competition. They often want the greater security of an economic czar who controls the market, regulates competition, providing that this czar is not a dictator whose decisions subject to public scrutiny and public control. (The word "government control," and hence taboo.) They seek these requirements admirably.

Examined for a moment apart from any other functions of the political apparatus operated by the Boss is effective performance of these functions with a minimum of inefficiency. In the presence of diverse governmental divisions, bureaus and departments, and competent hands, the Boss rationalizes the relations

98. *The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens*, (Chautauque Press, 1931), 618. Deriving largely from Steffens, as he sets forth these functions of the political machine with great force in *Forney's American Institutions*, (New York: Harper, 1901), 100.

For many, the loss of "self-respect" is too high a price for legalized assistance. In contrast to the gulf between the settlement house workers who so often come from a different social class, educational background and ethnic group, the precinct worker is "just one of us," who understands what it's all about. The condescending lady bountiful can hardly compete with the understanding friend in need. In *this struggle between alternative structures for fulfilling the nominally same function* of providing aid and support to those who need it, it is clearly the machine politician who is better integrated with the groups which he serves than the impersonal, professionalized, socially distant and legally constrained welfare worker. And since the politician can at times influence and manipulate the official organizations for the dispensation of assistance, whereas the welfare worker has practically no influence on the political machine, this only adds to his greater effectiveness. More colloquially and also, perhaps, more incisively, it was the Boston ward-leader, Martin Lomasny, who described this essential function to the curious Lincoln Steffens: "I think," said Lomasny, "that there's got to be in every ward somebody that any bloke can come to—no matter what he's done—and get help. *Help, you understand; none of your law and justice, but help.*"⁹⁸

The "deprived classes," then, constitute one subgroup for whom the political machine satisfies wants not adequately satisfied in the same fashion by the legitimate social structure.

For a second subgroup, that of business (primarily "big" business but also "small"), the political boss serves the function of providing those political privileges which entail immediate economic gains. Business corporations, among which the public utilities (railroads, local transportation and electric light companies, communications corporations) are simply the most conspicuous in this regard, seek special political dispensations which will enable them to stabilize their situation and to near their objective of maximizing profits. Interestingly enough, corporations often want to avoid a chaos of uncontrolled competition. They want the greater security of an economic czar who controls, regulates and organizes competition, providing that this czar is not a public official with his decisions subject to public scrutiny and public control. (The latter would be "government control," and hence taboo.) The political boss fulfills these requirements admirably.

Examined for a moment apart from any moral considerations, the political apparatus operated by the Boss is effectively designed to perform these functions with a minimum of inefficiency. Holding the strings of diverse governmental divisions, bureaus and agencies in his competent hands, the Boss rationalizes the relations between public and

⁹⁸ *The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens*, (Chautauqua, New York: Chautauqua Press, 1931), 618. Deriving largely from Steffens, as he says, F. Stuart Chapin sets forth these functions of the political machine with great clarity. See his *Contemporary American Institutions*, (New York: Harper, 1934), 40-54.

private business. He serves as the business community's ambassador in the otherwise alien (and sometimes unfriendly) realm of government. And, in strict business-like terms, he is well-paid for his economic services to his respectable business clients. In an article entitled, "An Apology to Graft," Lincoln Steffens suggested that "Our economic system, which held up riches, power and acclaim as prizes to men bold enough and able enough to buy corruptly timber, mines, oil fields and franchises and 'get away with it,' was at fault."⁹⁹ And, in a conference with a hundred or so of Los Angeles business leaders, he described a fact well known to all of them: the Boss and his machine were an *integral part* of the organization of the economy. "You cannot build or operate a railroad, or a street railway, gas, water, or power company, develop and operate a mine, or get forests and cut timber on a large scale, or run any privileged business, without corrupting or joining in the corruption of the government. You tell me privately that you must, and here I am telling you semi-publicly that you must. And that is so all over the country. And that means that we have an organization of society in which, for *some reason*, you and your kind, the ablest, most intelligent, most imaginative, daring, and resourceful leaders of society, are and must be against society and its laws and its all-around growth."¹⁰⁰

Since the demand for the services of special privileges are built into the structure of the society, the Boss fulfills diverse functions for this second subgroup of business-seeking-privilege. These "needs" of business, as presently constituted, are not adequately provided for by conventional and culturally approved social structures; consequently, the extra-legal but more-or-less efficient organization of the political machine comes to provide these services. To adopt an *exclusively* moral attitude toward the "corrupt political machine" is to lose sight of the very structural conditions which generate the "evil" that is so bitterly attacked. To adopt a functional outlook is to provide not an apologia for the political machine but a more solid basis for modifying or eliminating the machine, *providing* specific structural arrangements are introduced either for eliminating these effective demands of the business community or, if that is the objective, of satisfying these demands through alternative means.

A third set of distinctive functions fulfilled by the political machine for a special subgroup is that of providing alternative channels of social mobility for those otherwise excluded from the more conventional avenues for personal "advancement." Both the sources of this special

99. *Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens*, 570.

100. *Ibid.*, 572-3 [italics supplied]. This helps explain, as Steffens noted after Police Commissioner Theodore Roosevelt, "the prominence and respectability of the men and women who intercede for crooks" when these have been apprehended in a periodic effort to "clean up the political machine." Cf. Steffens, 371, and *passim*.

"need" (for social mobility) and the respect in which the political machine comes to help satisfy this need can be understood in terms of the structure of the larger culture and society. As Merton notes, "American culture lays enormous emphasis on monetary success" as a goal legitimate for all members of the society. If, however, alone in our inventory of cultural goals, it still remains a goal heavily endowed with positive affect and value. However, certain groups and certain ecological areas are notable for their lack of opportunity for achieving these (monetary) goals. Their success. They constitute, in short, sub-populations. The emphasis upon pecuniary success has been absorbed by these groups. *little access to conventional and legitimate means* means that their success. The conventional occupational opportunities (in these areas) are almost completely limited to manual labor. The stigmatization of manual labor,¹⁰¹ and its correlate, the stigma of collar work, it is clear that the result is a tendency to pursue culturally approved objectives *through whatever means*. These people are on the one hand, "asked to orient themselves toward the prospect of accumulating wealth [and power] and on the other are largely denied effective opportunities to do so in conventional ways."

It is within this context of social structure that the political machine fulfills the basic function of providing avenues of social mobility for those otherwise disadvantaged. Within this context, even the political machine and the racket "represent the triumph of the underdog over morally prescribed 'failure' when the channels of social mobility are closed or narrowed in a society which places a high value on economic affluence, [power] and social ascent for all." As one sociologist has noted on the basis of several years of research in a slum area:

101. See the National Opinion Research Center survey of occupational aspirations which firmly documents the general impression that the rate of aspiration for manual occupations is very low indeed in the social scale of values, even among those who *themselves engaged in manual labor*. Consider this latter point in connection with the cultural and social structure which exacts the values of success even among those who find themselves confined to these occupations. Against this background, consider the powerful tendency toward this type of "success" by any means whatsoever. A garbage-collector is not other Americans in the view that the garbage-collector is "other." Other occupations can scarcely have a self-image which is pleasant. "pariah" occupation in the very society where he is assumed to have genuine merit can get ahead." Add to this, his occasional resentment that he have the same chance as others, no matter what they say, the enormous psychological pressure upon him for "evening up the score" by some means, whether strictly legal or not, for moving ahead. The structural and derivatively psychological background for the tendency in *some* groups to find some accessible avenue for social mobility.

102. Merton, "Social structure and anomie," chapter IV of *Social Structure and Social Theory*.

"need" (for social mobility) and the respect in which the political machine comes to help satisfy this need can be understood by examining the structure of the larger culture and society. As is well known, the American culture lays enormous emphasis on money and power as a "success" goal legitimate for all members of the society. By no means alone in our inventory of cultural goals, it still remains among the most heavily endowed with positive affect and value. However, certain sub-groups and certain ecological areas are notable for the relative absence of opportunity for achieving these (monetary and power) types of success. They constitute, in short, sub-populations where "the cultural emphasis upon pecuniary success has been absorbed, but where there is *little access to conventional and legitimate means for attaining such success*. The conventional occupational opportunities of persons in (such areas) are almost completely limited to manual labor. Given our cultural stigmatization of manual labor,¹⁰¹ and its correlate, the prestige of white-collar work, it is clear that the result is a tendency to achieve these culturally approved objectives *through whatever means are possible*. These people are on the one hand, "asked to orient their conduct toward the prospect of accumulating wealth [and power] and, on the other, they are largely denied effective opportunities to do so institutionally."

It is within this context of social structure that the political machine fulfills the basic function of providing avenues of social mobility for the otherwise disadvantaged. Within this context, even the corrupt political machine and the racket "represent the triumph of amoral intelligence over morally prescribed 'failure' when the channels of vertical mobility are closed or narrowed *in a society which places a high premium on economic affluence, [power] and social ascent for all its members*."¹⁰² As one sociologist has noted on the basis of several years of close observation in a slum area:

101. See the National Opinion Research Center survey of evaluation of occupations which firmly documents the general impression that the manual occupations rate very low indeed in the social scale of values, *even among those who are themselves engaged in manual labor*. Consider this latter point in its full implications. In effect, the cultural and social structure exacts the values of pecuniary and power success even among those who find themselves confined to the stigmatized manual occupations. Against this background, consider the powerful motivation for achieving this type of "success" by any means whatsoever. A garbage-collector who joins with other Americans in the view that the garbage-collector is "the lowest of the low" occupations can scarcely have a self-image which is pleasing to him; he is in a "pariah" occupation in the very society where he is assured that "all who have genuine merit can get ahead." Add to this, his occasional recognition that "he didn't have the same chance as others, no matter what they say," and one perceives the enormous psychological pressure upon him for "evening up the score" by finding some means, whether strictly legal or not, for moving ahead. All this provides the structural and derivatively psychological background for the "socially induced need" in some groups to find some accessible avenue for social mobility.

102. Merton, "Social structure and anomie," chapter IV of this volume.

The sociologist who dismisses racket and political organizations as deviations from desirable standards thereby neglects some of the major elements of slum life. . . . *He does not discover the functions they perform for the members* [of the groupings in the slum]. The Irish and later immigrant peoples have had the greatest difficulty in finding places for themselves in our urban social and economic structure. Does anyone believe that the immigrants and their children could have achieved their present degree of social mobility without gaining control of the political organization of some of our largest cities? The same is true of the racket organization. *Politics and the rackets have furnished an important means of social mobility for individuals, who, because of ethnic background and low class position, are blocked from advancement in the "respectable" channels.*¹⁰³

This, then, represents a third type of function performed for a distinctive subgroup. This function, it may be noted in passing, is fulfilled by the *sheer* existence and operation of the political machine, for it is in the machine itself that these individuals and subgroups find their culturally induced needs more or less satisfied. It refers to the services which the political apparatus provides for its own personnel. But seen in the wider social context we have set forth, it no longer appears as *merely* a means of self-aggrandizement for profit-hungry and power-hungry *individuals*, but as an organized provision for *subgroups* otherwise excluded from or handicapped in the race for "getting ahead."

Just as the political machine performs services for "legitimate" business, so it operates to perform not dissimilar services for "illegitimate" business: vice, crime and rackets. Once again, the basic sociological role of the machine in this respect can be more fully appreciated only if one temporarily abandons attitudes of moral indignation, to examine in all moral innocence the actual workings of the organization. In this light, it at once appears that the subgroup of the professional criminal, racketeer or gambler has basic similarities of organization, demands and operation to the subgroup of the industrialist, man of business or speculator. If there is a Lumber King or an Oil King, there is also a Vice King or a Racket King. If expansive legitimate business organizes administra-

103. William F. Whyte, "Social organization in the slums," *American Sociological Review*, Feb. 1943, 8, 34-39 (italics supplied). Thus, the political machine and the racket represent a special case of the type of organizational adjustment to the conditions described in chapter IV. It represents, note, an *organizational* adjustment: definite structures arise and operate to reduce somewhat the acute tensions and problems of individuals caught up in the described conflict between the "cultural accent on success-for-all" and the "socially structured fact of unequal opportunities for success." As chapter IV indicates, other types of *individual* "adjustment" are possible: lone-wolf crime, psychopathological states, rebellion, retreat by abandoning the culturally approved goals, etc. Likewise, other types of *organizational adjustment* sometimes occur; the racket or the political machine are not *alone* available as organized means for meeting this socially induced problem. Participation in revolutionary organizations, for example, can be seen within this context, as an alternative mode of organizational adjustment. All this bears theoretic notice here, since we might otherwise overlook the basic functional concepts of functional substitutes and functional equivalents, which are to be discussed at length in a subsequent publication.

tive and financial syndicates to "rationalize" areas of production and business enterprise, crime organize syndicates to bring order to the production of illicit goods and services. If the proliferation of small business enterprises is substituting, for example, the giant chain stores for groceries, so illegitimate business adopts the same and syndicates crime and vice.

Finally, and in many respects, most important, if not near-identity, of the economic role of "legitimate" and "illegitimate" business. *Both are in some degree a provision of goods and services for which there is a market.* Morals aside, they are both business, industrial enterprises, dispensing goods and services which someone there is a market in which goods and services are demanded. And, in a prevalently market society, private enterprises to arise whenever there is a market for goods or services.

As is well known, vice, crime and the racketeer consider only that there have been estimated to be 100,000 professional prostitutes in the United States of 1950, 100,000 the approximately 200,000 physicians and 350,000 nurses. It is difficult to estimate which have more professional men and women of medicine or than women of vice. It is, of course, difficult to estimate income, profits and dividends of illicit gambling compared it with the economic assets, income, and profits of, say, the shoe industry, but it is altogether possible that they are about on a par. No precise figures exist on the expenditures on illicit narcotics, and it is probable that the expenditures on candy, but it is also probable that the expenditure on books.

It takes but a moment's thought to recognize that, in *these terms*, there is no relevant difference between the production of illicit goods and services. The liquor traffic is a case in point. It would be peculiar to argue that prior to 1920 (when prohibition became effective), the provision of liquor was a service, that from 1920 to 1933, its production and distribution constituted an economic service dispensed in a market. To the present, it once again took on a service character. It would be *economically* (not morally) absurd to suggest that the demand for legged liquor in the dry state of Kansas is less than the demand than the sale of publicly manufactured liquor in the wet state of Missouri. Examples of this sort can

tive and financial syndicates to "rationalize" and to "integrate" diverse areas of production and business enterprise, so expansive rackets and crime organize syndicates to bring order to the otherwise chaotic areas of production of illicit goods and services. If legitimate business regards the proliferation of small business enterprises as wasteful and inefficient, substituting, for example, the giant chain stores for hundreds of corner groceries, so illegitimate business adopts the same businesslike attitude and syndicates crime and vice.

Finally, and in many respects, most important, is the basic similarity, if not near-identity, of the economic role of "legitimate" business and of "illegitimate" business. *Both are in some degree concerned with the provision of goods and services for which there is an economic demand.* Morals aside, they are both business, industrial and professional enterprises, dispensing goods and services which some people want, for which there is a market in which goods and services are transformed into commodities. And, in a prevalently market society, we should expect appropriate enterprises to arise whenever there is a market demand for certain goods or services.

As is well known, vice, crime and the rackets *are* "big business." Consider only that there have been estimated to be about 500,000 professional prostitutes in the United States of 1950, and compare this with the approximately 200,000 physicians and 350,000 professional registered nurses. It is difficult to estimate which have the larger clientele: the professional men and women of medicine or the professional men and women of vice. It is, of course, difficult to estimate the economic assets, income, profits and dividends of illicit gambling in this country and to compare it with the economic assets, income, profits and dividends of, say, the shoe industry, but it is altogether possible that the two industries are about on a par. No precise figures exist on the annual expenditures on illicit narcotics, and it is probable that these are less than the expenditures on candy, but it is also probable that they are larger than the expenditure on books.

It takes but a moment's thought to recognize that, *in strictly economic terms*, there is no relevant difference between the provision of licit and of illicit goods and services. The liquor traffic illustrates this perfectly. It would be peculiar to argue that prior to 1920 (when the 18th amendment became effective), the provision of liquor constituted an economic service, that from 1920 to 1933, its production and sale no longer constituted an economic service dispensed in a market, and that from 1934 to the present, it once again took on a serviceable aspect. Or, it would be *economically* (not morally) absurd to suggest that the sale of bootlegged liquor in the dry state of Kansas is less a response to a market demand than the sale of publicly manufactured liquor in the neighboring wet state of Missouri. Examples of this sort can of course be multiplied

many times over. Can it be held that in European countries, with registered and legalized prostitution, the prostitute contributes an economic service, whereas in this country, lacking legal sanction, the prostitute provides no such service? Or that the professional abortionist is in the economic market where he has approved legal status and that he is out of the economic market where he is legally taboo? Or that gambling satisfies a specific demand for entertainment in Nevada, where it constitutes the largest business enterprise of the larger cities in the state, but that it differs essentially in this respect from motion pictures in the neighboring state of California?¹⁰⁴

The failure to recognize that these businesses are only *morally* and not *economically* distinguishable from "legitimate" businesses has led to badly scrambled analysis. Once the economic identity of the two is recognized, we may anticipate that if the political machine performs functions for "legitimate big business" it will be all the more likely to perform not dissimilar functions for "illegitimate big business." And, of course, such is often the case.

The distinctive function of the political machine for their criminal, vice and racket clientele is to enable them to operate in satisfying the economic demands of a large market without due interference from the government. Just as big business may contribute funds to the political party war-chest to ensure a minimum of governmental interference, so with big rackets and big crime. In both instances, the political machine can, in varying degrees, provide "protection." In both instances, many features of the structural context are identical: (1) market demands for goods and services; (2) the operators' concern with maximizing gains from their enterprises; (3) the need for partial control of government which might otherwise interfere with these activities of businessmen; (4) the need for an efficient, powerful and centralized agency to provide an effective liaison of "business" with government.

Without assuming that the foregoing pages exhaust either the range of functions or the range of subgroups served by the political machine, we can at least see that *it presently fulfills some functions for these diverse subgroups which are not adequately fulfilled by culturally approved or more conventional structures.*

Several additional implications of the functional analysis of the political machine can be mentioned here only in passing, although they

104. Perhaps the most perceptive statement of this view has been made by Hawkins and Waller. "The prostitute, the pimp, the peddler of dope, the operator of the gambling hall, the vendor of obscene pictures, the bootlegger, the abortionist, all are productive, all produce services or goods which people desire and for which they are willing to pay. It happens that society has put these goods and services under the ban, but people go on producing them and people go on consuming them, and an act of the legislature does not make them any less a part of the economic system." "Critical notes on the cost of crime," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 1936, 26, 679-94, at 684.

obviously require to be developed at length. It has direct implications for *social engineering*. Periodic efforts at "political reform," "turning the political house" are typically (though not always) and ineffectual. It exemplifies a basic theorem: *an existing social structure without providing structures for fulfilling the functions previously fulfilled by that structure is doomed to failure.* (Needless to say, a wider bearing than the one instance of the "political reform" confines itself to the "mascals out," it is engaging in little more than a reform may for a time bring new figures into the picture, but the moral virtues remain intact and will actually effect a turnover in the personnel of the machine. It may even, for a time, so curb the activities of the machine that the many needs it has previously satisfied are unsatisfied unless the reform also involves a "re-forming" of the structure such that the existing needs are satisfied or unless it involves a change which eludes the political machine will return to its old scheme of things. *To seek social change, without manifest and latent functions performed by the existing change, is to indulge in social ritual rather than in social change.* The concepts of manifest and latent functions are indispensable elements in the theoretic repertoire. In this crucial sense, these concepts are not "abusive" (in the sense of the term), but are eminently sound. The enactment of social change, they can be regarded as considerably heightening the risk of failure.

A second implication of this analysis of the political machine has a bearing upon areas wider than the one we have just discussed. It has often been noted that the supporters of the political machine include both the "respectable" business class and the elements of the underworld. And, at first appearance, they seem to be very strange bedfellows. The latter is frequently called upon to sentence the very racketeer the night before at an informal dinner of the political machine. The strict attorney jostles the exonerated convict on the same platform where the Boss has called a meeting. The big business man almost as bitterly as the big racketeer about contributions to the party fund demanded by the Boss. The smoke-filled room of the successful politi-

obviously require to be developed at length. First, the foregoing analysis has direct implications for *social engineering*. It helps explain why the periodic efforts at "political reform," "turning the rascals out" and "cleaning political house" are typically (though not necessarily) short-lived and ineffectual. It exemplifies a basic theorem: *any attempt to eliminate an existing social structure without providing adequate alternative structures for fulfilling the functions previously fulfilled by the abolished organization is doomed to failure.* (Needless to say, this theorem has much wider bearing than the one instance of the political machine.) When "political reform" confines itself to the manifest task of "turning the rascals out," it is engaging in little more than sociological magic. The reform may for a time bring new figures into the political limelight; it may serve the casual social function of re-assuring the electorate that the moral virtues remain intact and will ultimately triumph; it may actually effect a turnover in the personnel of the political machine; it may even, for a time, so curb the activities of the machine as to leave unsatisfied the many needs it has previously fulfilled. But, inevitably, unless the reform also involves a "re-forming" of the social and political structure such that the existing needs are satisfied by alternative structures or unless it involves a change which eliminates these needs altogether, the political machine will return to its integral place in the social scheme of things. *To seek social change, without due recognition of the manifest and latent functions performed by the social organization undergoing change, is to indulge in social ritual rather than social engineering.* The concepts of manifest and latent functions (or their equivalents) are indispensable elements in the theoretic repertoire of the social engineer. In this crucial sense, these concepts are not "merely" theoretical (in the abusive sense of the term), but are eminently practical. In the deliberate enactment of social change, they can be ignored only at the price of considerably heightening the risk of failure.

A second implication of this analysis of the political machine also has a bearing upon areas wider than the one we have considered. The paradox has often been noted that the supporters of the political machine include both the "respectable" business class elements who are, of course, opposed to the criminal or racketeer and the distinctly "unrespectable" elements of the underworld. And, at first appearance, this is cited as an instance of very strange bedfellows. The learned judge is not infrequently called upon to sentence the very racketeer beside whom he sat the night before at an informal dinner of the political bigwigs. The district attorney jostles the exonerated convict on his way to the back room where the Boss has called a meeting. The big business man may complain almost as bitterly as the big racketeer about the "extortionate" contributions to the party fund demanded by the Boss. Social opposites meet—in the smoke-filled room of the successful politician.

In the light of a functional analysis all this of course no longer seems paradoxical. Since the machine serves both the businessman and the criminal man, the two seemingly antipodal groups intersect. This points to a more general theorem: *the social functions of an organization help determine the structure (including the recruitment of personnel involved in the structure), just as the structure helps determine the effectiveness with which the functions are fulfilled.* In terms of social status, the business group and the criminal group are indeed poles apart. But status does not fully determine behavior and the inter-relations between groups. Functions modify these relations. Given their distinctive needs, the several subgroups in the large society are "integrated," whatever their personal desires or intentions, by the centralizing structure which serves these several needs. In a phrase with many implications which require further study, *structure affects function and function affects structure.*

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This review of some salient considerations in structural and functional analysis has done little more than indicate some of the principal problems and potentialities of this mode of sociological interpretation. Each of the items codified in the paradigm require sustained theoretic clarification and cumulative empirical research. But it is clear that in functional theory, stripped of those traditional postulates which have fenced it in and often made it little more than a latter-day rationalization of existing practices, sociology has one beginning of a systematic and empirically relevant mode of analysis. It is hoped that the direction here indicated will suggest the feasibility and the desirability of further codification of functional analysis. In due course each section of the paradigm will be elaborated into a documented, analyzed and codified chapter in the history of functional analysis.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL POSTSCRIPT

When first written in 1948, the preceding paper constituted an effort to systematize the principal assumptions and conceptions of the then slowly evolving theory of functional analysis in sociology. The development of this sociological theory has since gained marked momentum. In preparing this edition, I have incorporated some of the intervening extensions and emendations of theory, but have postponed a detailed and extended formulation for a volume now in preparation. It might therefore be useful to list, at this juncture, some, though manifestly far from all, recent theoretical contributions to functional analysis in sociology.

The major contribution in recent years is, of course, that by Talcott Parsons in *The Social System* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951), supplemented by further works by Parsons and his associates: T. Parsons, R. F. Bales and E. A. Shils, *Working Papers in the Theory of Action*

(Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953); T. Parsons and E. A. Shils (editors), *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Chicago: University Press, 1951). The salient contributions are distinguished from its more provisional and conceptual developments; sociologists are only now beginning to work out the needed discriminations. But on the eve of the developments stemming from Parsons' formulations and of course it is plain that this represents a decisive step in the development of current sociological theory.

M. J. Levy, Jr., *The Structure of Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953) derives largely, as the author says, from the scheme, and presents a logical multiplication of concepts. It remains to be seen whether such a scheme will prove appropriate and useful in the analysis of social structure.

Less extensive but more incisive analyses of social structure in terms of functional analyses have been provided in the past, stemming from diverse 'cultural areas' of sociological interest. Seen from the following short bibliography. In the field of social structure and productive among these is the pair of papers by Dahrendorf, "Struktur und Funktion," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 1955, 7, 492-519 and by Parsons, "Remarks on 'The Social System,'" *The British Journal of Sociology*, 1955, 7, 134-146. Both papers are exemplary instances of functional analysis designed to indicate specific gaps in the present state of sociological theory. A considered and unpolemical statement of functional theory and of some of its key unsolved problems is given in Bernard Barber, "Structural-functional analysis: a misunderstanding," *American Sociological Review*, 1955, 20, 173-180. An effort to clarify the important problem of the relationship involved in that part of functional sociology which deals with the observed structural patterns in society has been made by Bredemeier, "The methodology of functionalism," *American Sociological Review*, 1955, 20, 173-180. Although this paper does not state certain assumptions to several functional analyses, it has the distinct merit of raising the important question of the logic of functional analysis.

For anthropologists' ordering of functional analysis in sociology (not in anthropology, merely), see the typology of Melford E. Spiro, "A typology of functional analysis," *Current Anthropology*, 1, 84-95 and the thorough-going critical examination of "Function," in *Current Anthropology*, (edited by M. J. Levy, Jr.) University of Chicago Press, 1956, 237-258.

The diffusion of functional theory as recently in the United States is manifested in a series of critical examinations

(Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953); T. Parsons and E. A. Shils (editors), *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951). The salient contributions of so comprehensive and logically complex a work as *The Social System* cannot be readily distinguished from its more provisional and at times debatable conceptual developments; sociologists are only now engaged in working out the needed discriminations. But on the evidence, both of research stemming from Parsons' formulations and of critical theoretical review, it is plain that this represents a decisive step toward a methodical statement of current sociological theory.

M. J. Levy, Jr., *The Structure of Society* (Princeton University Press, 1953) derives largely, as the author says, from Parsons' conceptual scheme, and presents a logical multiplication of numerous categories and concepts. It remains to be seen whether such taxonomies of concepts will prove appropriate and useful in the analysis of sociological problems.

Less extensive but more incisive analyses of selected theoretical problems of functional analyses have been provided in a number of papers stemming from diverse 'cultural areas' of sociological theory, as can be seen from the following short bibliography. Perhaps the most penetrating and productive among these is the pair of related papers by Ralf Dahrendorf, "Struktur und Funktion," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 1955, 7, 492-519 and by David Lockwood, "Some remarks on 'The Social System,'" *The British Journal of Sociology*, 1956, 7, 134-146. Both papers are exemplary instances of *systematic* theorizing, designed to indicate specific gaps in the present state of functional theory. A considered and unpolemical statement of the status of functional theory and of some of its key unsolved problems will be found in Bernard Barber, "Structural-functional analysis: some problems and misunderstandings," *American Sociological Review*, 1956, 21, 129-135. An effort to clarify the important problem of the logic of analysis involved in that part of functional sociology which is designed to interpret observed structural patterns in society has been made by Harry C. Bredemeier, "The methodology of functionalism," *American Sociological Review*, 1955, 20, 173-180. Although this paper questionably attributes certain assumptions to several functional analyses under review, it has the distinct merit of raising the important question of the appropriate logic of functional analysis.

For anthropologists' ordering of functional analysis in contemporary sociology (not in anthropology, merely), see the instructive paper by Melford E. Spiro, "A typology of functional analysis," *Explorations*, 1953, 1, 84-95 and the thorough-going critical examination by Raymond Firth, "Function," in *Current Anthropology*, (edited by William L. Thomas, Jr.) University of Chicago Press, 1956, 237-258.

The diffusion of functional theory as recently developed in the United States is manifested in a series of critical examinations of that theory in

Belgium, France, Italy and Brazil. Among the most significant of these are: Henri Janne, "Fonction et finalité en sociologie," *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, 1954, 16, 50-67 which attempts to link up current functional theory with the antecedent and contemporary theory of French and Belgian sociologists. A thorough-going critique of functional analysis in sociology is undertaken by Georges Gurvitch, "Le concept de structure sociale," *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, 1955, 19, 3-44. A comprehensive examination of functional theory in its bearings upon selected problems of sociological research will be found in Filippo Barbano, *Teoria e Ricerca nella Sociologia Contemporanea* (Milano: Dott. A. Giuffrè, 1955). Florestan Fernandes, *Ensaio sobre o Método de Interpretação Funcionalista na Sociologia* (São Paulo: Universidade de São Paulo, Boletim No. 170, 1953) is an informative and systematic monograph which rewards even a plodding and fallible reading such as mine.

The paradigm developed in the preceding pages has been formalized in terms of an abstract set of notations designed to make explicit how its various parts are related to elements of the functional approach in biology. See "A formalization of functionalism, with special reference to its application in the social sciences," in the forthcoming collection of papers by Ernest Nagel, *Logic Without Metaphysics* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957). For detailed application of the paradigm, see Warren Breed, "Social control in the newsroom: a functional analysis," *Social Forces*, 1955, 33, 326-335; A. H. Leighton and C. C. Hughes, "Notes on Eskimo patterns of suicide," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, 1955, 11, 327-338; Joan Chapman and Michael Eckstein, "A social-psychological study of the alleged visitation of the Virgin Mary in Puerto Rico," *Year Book of the American Philosophical Society*, 1954, 203-206; Dennis Chapman, *The Home and Social Status* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955); Christian Bay, *The Freedom of Expression: A Study in Political Ideals and Socio-Psychological Realities* (forthcoming); Michael Eckstein, "Diverse action and response to crime," (forthcoming); Y. B. Damle, *Communication of Modern Ideas and Knowledge in Indian Villages* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, 1955).

For an interesting discussion of manifest and latent consequences of action in relation to self-justifying and self-defeating images, see Chapter 8 of Kenneth Boulding, *The Image* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956).

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THE RECENT HISTORY of sociological theory has been written in terms of an alternation between two methods. On the one hand, we observe those sociologists who generalize, to find their way as rapidly as possible to sociological laws. Tending to assess the significance of their findings in terms of scope rather than the demonstrability of their results, they eschew the "triviality" of detailed, small-scale studies in favor of the grandeur of global summaries. At the other extreme, we find those who do not hunt too closely the implications of their findings, but remain confident and assured that what they report is true. Their reports of facts are verifiable and often verifiable, but at a loss to relate these facts to one another. In these, rather than other, observations have been the identifying motto would at times seem to be: "This is what we say is true, but it is at least not true." In radical empiricism the motto may read: "This is what we say is true, but it is at least not true." This cannot indicate its significance.

Whatever the bases of adherence to the two methods—different but not necessarily contradictory—provided by psychologists, sociologists of knowledge, and philosophers of science—it is abundantly clear that there is no real conflict ranged against each other. Generalizations can be made with care, at least with disciplined observation; and they need not be rendered trivial by avoidance of their implications.

With all this there will doubtless be widespread agreement. But this very unanimity suggests a certain platitudinousness. If, however, one function of the social sciences is the clarification of the implications of the seemingly self-evident, it may be that the most important implication of such programmatic statements is the distinction between sociological theory and empirical research.